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THE CONTRIBUTORS

JACK H. NAGEL is Assistant Professor of Political Science and Public Policy Analysis at the University of Pennsylvania. His book, *The Descriptive Analysis of Power*, will be published in 1975. He plans to continue investigating the relativity of evaluation and its implications for political satisfaction and discontent.

MORRIS JANOWITZ, Distinguished Service Professor at the University of Chicago, is currently engaged in the preparation of a theoretical treatise on social control in industrial society. He is chairman of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, and a member of the Board of Editors of the newly formed publication, *Armed Forces and Society: An Interdisciplinary Journal.*

HARRY G. GELBER is Reader in Politics at Monash University, Melbourne, Australia. In 1973 he served as Visiting Professor of Political Science at Yale University and published "Nuclear Weapons and Chinese Policy." He is working on problems of arms control.

FRANCIS X. MURPHY is a Professor at the Lateran University, Rome, a Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C., and is currently serving as an Adjunct Professor in the Political Science Department of the Johns Hopkins University. He is the author of *Politics and the Early Christian, A Monument to St. Jerome*, and other books. At present he is completing a study on the Catholic Church in the post-Conciliar age.

CHALMERS JOHNSON is Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley. His most recent works are *Conspiracy at Matsukawa* (1972), *Autopsy on People's War* (1973), and, as editor, *Ideology and Politics in Contemporary China* (1973).

CLAUDE AKE, a Nigerian, teaches political theory at Carleton University, Ottawa, Ontario.

JAMES P. SEWELL currently is a Visiting Fellow at the Center for International Studies, Princeton University, and Professor of Politics at Brock University, St. Catharines, Ontario. At present he is working on a critical examination of a Great Power-governed world.

HANS DAALDER is Professor of Political Science at Leiden University, the Netherlands. He is the author of *Cabinet Reform in Britain, 1914-1963* (1963). Among the symposium volumes to which he has contributed are Robert A. Dahl, ed., *Political Oppositions in Western Democracies* (1966) and Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner, eds., *Political Parties and Political Development* (1966).

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ABSTRACTS

Inequality and Discontent: A Nonlinear Hypothesis

By J. H. NAGEL

Discontent arising from social comparison is the product of two factors: the tendency to compare and the magnitude of felt grievance once comparison occurs. The former varies inversely with inequality; the latter varies directly. Therefore, maximum discontent will occur at intermediate levels of inequality. Evidence from South Vietnam supports this hypothesis, suggesting a new resolution to a debate among Mitchell, Paige, Paranzino, Sansom, and Russo. Cross-national tests are inconclusive, however. The theory predicts that radical land reform will be most conducive to political peace and that the Green Revolution in agriculture will produce most instability where land distribution is moderately egalitarian. Other applications range from sex roles in marriage to the governance of religious communities.

Toward a Redefiniton of Military Strategy in International Relations

By M. JANOWITZ

A sociological orientation derived from institutional analysis as applied to the analysis of the changing role of force in international relations. The concept of stabilizing versus destabilizing military systems is offered as a substitute for traditional balance of power and contemporary systems analysis. The transformations in military organization which are required to reduce the threat of nuclear war, contain the arms race, and inhibit peripheral warfare are explored.

Technical Innovation and Arms Control

By H. G. GELBER

There are uncertainties about the meaning of innovation and ways of promoting it. To limit it is even more difficult. The two great powers seek technical advantages in research and development not only to produce more advanced weapons systems, but to improve intelligence, to exercise political pressure, and to remove uncertainties for many aspects of planning. Restraint might be approached through changes in strategy (including the requirement for assurance) and in funding, through regulating the flow of information, and through continuous negotiations. Each has drawbacks. Restraint therefore requires a continuing desire by both sides for political accommodation.

Vatican Politics: Structure and Function

By F. X. MURPHY

The Catholic Church functions in the political order, guided by the pope as spiritual leader of over half a billion faithful, head of the Holy See, and ruler of Vatican City. The Holy See has diplomatic relations with most independent and some Communist countries. It is working toward a diplomatic exchange with continental China. Pope John's Vatican Council II prescribed basic changes in the Church's internal structure and external commitment. Pope Paul VI has modified the Church's structure to internationalize the Curia and the College of Cardinals, and to decentralize Church policy. Changes in Church attitudes follow a pattern of "reverse English." When mutation is on the horizon, all of tradition says "no change." Such official reaction is an unwitting acknowledgment that change is in being. It is to be hoped that tomorrow's Church will avoid triumphalism.

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BY HAROLD AND MARGARET SPROUT

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Political Science and East Asian Area Studies

By C. JOHNSON

Area studies, in particular area studies of East Asia, have long been denigrated in the academic discipline of political science as insufficiently theoretical or as not contributing to the development of theory in the social sciences. This view is rejected. East Asian area studies are shown to be based on the comparative method or as constituting case studies, of which six types are identified and discussed: atheoretical case studies, interpretive case studies, hypothesis-generating case studies, theory-confirming case studies, theory-infirming case studies, and deviant case studies. Area studies are also examined as a form of "critical analysis," which is identified as one of three fundamental forms of analysis in political science. The other two are theory and style analysis. An analogy is drawn with scholarly analyses of music in order to illustrate the logical basis of critical analysis. Exemplary theoretical works in English on the politics of modern East Asia are surveyed.

Modernization and Political Instability: A Theoretical Exploration

By C. AKE

Is the process of modernization politically destabilizing? The arguments usually made in support of the view that modernization is politically destabilizing are weak. The problem of political instability in transitional societies is more apparent than real; it is created by our conceptual confusions and prejudices. To all appearances, the real and interesting problem is not how to maintain order, but how to revolutionize it.

Shapes of a World to Come

By J. P. SEWELL

An examination of three different studies demonstrates the diversity of observers' approaches to the future. Books by Jagdish Bhagwati, *et al.* (*Economics and World Order*), Alastair Buchan (*Power and Equilibrium in the 1970s*), and Raymond Vernon (*Sovereignty at Bay*) are explored with the guidance of elementary questions: Which *actors* should one follow? What *substantive range* of interplay among these actors should be observed? How should the *quality of relations* among them be characterized? Conclusions are offered regarding the field of international relations–as represented here–and its needs. The essay calls for inquiries which take the status quo as a point of departure without remaining fixed upon it, and for studies which sketch the contours of a future world and work back to where respective actors now stand.

The Consociational Democracy Theme

By H. DAALDER

A review of books on the politics of Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Switzerland by Lucien Huyse, Gerhard Lehmbruch, Arend Lijphart, C. Bingham Powell, Jr., and Jürg Steiner, as well as a general theoretical study by Eric A. Nordlinger, suggests that a new model of consociational democracy is being developed. This model is a conscious reaction to the prevailing Anglo-American assumptions about democracy and seeks to establish the conditions for democratic rule in deeply divided societies. Five main themes are emphasized in submitting this model to a theoretical critique: (1) its assumed relationship to the politics of small states; (2) the "self-denying hypothesis" argument according to which elites move deliberately to curb the perils of deep social splits by processes of elite accommodation; (3) the specific quantitative and qualitative nature of social cleavages; (4) factors which may make for the politicization or non-politicization of social divisions; and (5) the issue whether accommodating elite behavior preceded the rise of social cleavages or was a response to them. The new model is in some danger of reïfication. A number of critical questions are raised for further study. But this body of literature also shows the merit of the "theoretical country study" for the general field of comparative politics and democratic theory.

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INEQUALITY AND DISCONTENT: A Nonlinear Hypothesis

By JACK NAGEL*

AT least since Aristotle, theorists have believed that political discontent and its consequents—protest, instability, violence, revolution—depend not only on the absolute level of economic well-being, but also on the distribution of wealth. Contemporary political analysts have tried to test this ancient assumption using modern statistical methods. Their results are distressingly confusing. One cross-national investigation finds the commonsensical positive linear relation: the more the inequality, the greater the instability.[1] A second study purports to show the opposite relation in the important case of South Vietnam: the greater the inequality, the less the support for revolution.[2] And a third analysis, also of South Vietnam, detects no relation at all between inequality and rebellion.[3]

Must we be satisfied, as one author suggests, with "two [or three?] contrary theories of rebellion, each with some basis in fact," each valid under some circumstances and not under others?[4] The answer offered in this paper is no. As is often true, theoretical effort can integrate apparently discrepant facts. By drawing on the psychological theory of social comparison, I shall suggest that the relation of inequality and discontent is curvilinear. Specifically, I predict that, *ceteris paribus*, discontent will be lowest when important values are distributed most equally or most unequally; maximum discontent will occur at intermediate levels of inequality.

The plan of the paper is as follows: the hypothesis is derived in Section I; it is tested for South Vietnam in Section II and cross-nationally

* I am greatly indebted to Dennis Paranzino, who provided data cards, ran preliminary tests of the principal hypothesis as applied to Vietnam, and, in frequent conversations, offered many useful suggestions, both substantive and methodological. I am also grateful to Robert Inman and Ralph Ginsberg for helpful advice on statistical questions. This research was partially supported by a summer grant from the Fels Center of Government.

[1] Bruce M. Russett, "Inequality and Instability: The Relation of Land Tenure to Politics," *World Politics*, XVI (April 1964), 442-54.

[2] Edward J. Mitchell, "Inequality and Insurgency: A Statistical Study of South Vietnam," *World Politics*, XX (April 1968), 421-38.

[3] Anthony J. Russo, Jr., "Economic and Social Correlates of Government Control in South Vietnam," in I. K. Feierabend, R. L. Feierabend, and T. R. Gurr, eds., *Anger, Violence, and Politics* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1972), 314-24.

[4] Mitchell (fn. 2).

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in Section III. In the final section, I discuss implications for research, theory, policy, and ideology.

I. Theoretical Derivation

Objective inequality, I assume, affects behavior through subjective comparisons. One individual measures his lot against another's, finds himself relatively advantaged or disadvantaged, and accordingly feels gratified or dissatisfied. Both the perceptual act of comparison and the ensuing emotion are necessary for inequality to produce discontent. This naive analysis can be restated formally as a multiplicative relation:

(Discontent due to Inequality) = (Tendency to Compare) × (Grievance Resulting from Comparison); or, symbolically:

$$D = TG. \tag{1}$$

Inequality must then affect discontent through its impact on the two factors, T and G. The relation of inequality to the second factor, G, seems straightforward. The more unequal the assets of two individuals, the less happy the poorer will feel *if* he compares himself with the richer. Representing inequality by g and assuming a linear relation with slope a_2, we have:

$$G = a_2 g. \tag{2}$$

(The letter g is used because inequality is commonly measured by the Gini index, which varies from zero [absolute equality] to one [all wealth held by one individual].)[5]

The effect of inequality on the tendency to compare is less obvious. The psychologist Leon Festinger, however, proposes the following hypothesis as a fundamental premise in his theory of social comparison: "The tendency to compare oneself with some other specific person decreases as the difference between his opinion or ability and one's own increases."[6] Although Festinger's theory was originally restricted to comparisons of opinions and abilities, it has been fruitfully extended

[5] On the Gini index and other measures of inequality, see Hayward Alker, Jr., *Mathematics and Politics* (New York 1965), chap. 3; and Anthony B. Atkinson, "On the Measurement of Inequality," *Journal of Economic Theory*, II (September 1970), 244-63. Use of the aggregate Gini statistic in a theory based on propositions about interindividual comparisons can be questioned. The leap will be justified here only by intuition and by the obvious fact that it works in the two-person case. Mathematical justification for the n-person case will be left for a later, more theoretical paper. The need for a detailed derivation is accentuated by Atkinson's account of possible ordinal differences among inequality measures.

[6] Leon Festinger, "A Theory of Social Comparison Processes," *Human Relations*, VII (May 1954), 117-40.

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to other dimensions.[7] Evidence exists to support application of his proposition to comparisons of wealth. In a 1962 British sample survey, Runciman found that few respondents compared themselves with persons outside their own economic stratum.[8] More casual observation also supports the principle. For example, policemen and firemen jealously watch each other's salary contracts, but seldom seem to worry that corporation executives receive forty times as much as they do.

Applying the Festinger hypothesis to wealth, we posit that the tendency to compare wealth varies inversely with inequality:

$$T = 1 - a_1 g . \tag{3}$$

(The coefficient a_1 and its counterpart a_2 will be explained below.)

According to Equation (1), the expressions in (2) and (3) should be multiplied together to determine the overall effect of inequality on discontent:

$$D = (1 - a_1 g) a_2 g \tag{4}$$

or,

$$D = a_2 g - a_1 a_2 g^2 . \tag{5}$$

The relation summarized by Equation (5) is curvilinear. Figure 1 shows how the product of the two linear relations is a parabola of discontent which, *ceteris paribus*, begins at zero in a perfectly egalitarian system, increases with inequality up to a maximum at some intermediate level of inequality, and then decreases again as complete inequality is approached. Elementary calculus can easily show that maximum discontent occurs when $g = \frac{1}{2a_1}$.[9]

Since a_1 plays this crucial role as the sole determinant of the turning point in the sign of the inequality-discontent relation, some attention

[7] See Stanley S. Schachter, *The Psychology of Affiliation* (Stanford 1959) and various articles in Bibb Latane, ed., "Studies in Social Comparison," special supplement to the *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, II (September 1966).

[8] W. G. Runciman, *Relative Deprivation and Social Justice* (Berkeley 1966), esp. chap. x. Similar evidence from France is cited *ibid.*, 26-27.

[9] The maximum occurs when the first derivative of D, D', equals zero:

$$D' = a_2 - 2a_1 a_2 g = 0$$

$$g = \frac{a_2}{2a_1 a_2} = \frac{1}{2a_1} .$$

The second-order condition for a maximum is satisfied if $a_2 > 0$ and $a_1 > 0$; the latter must be given the Festinger postulate.

The level of discontent at the maximum point is computed by inserting $g = \frac{1}{2}a_1$ into Equation (5). This yields

$$D_{max} = \frac{a_2}{4a_1} .$$

In Figure 1, all variables are assumed normalized so that they vary between 0 and 1. a_2 has been set at .9 and a_1 at .8.

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

FIGURE 1. TENDENCY TO COMPARE, GRIEVANCE FROM COMPARISON, AND DISCONTENT AS FUNCTIONS OF INEQUALITY

should be given to its interpretation. The parameter indicates how rapidly the tendency to compare decreases as inequality increases. Although a_1 might conceivably be constant across societies, it probably varies with history, culture, ideology, and other factors. For example, Marxist ideology may reduce the propensity not to compare with persons outside one's own class. Ideally, it should drive a_1 to zero, so that comparisons are made universally and discontent reflects only the intrinsic injustice of the situation. The result would be maximal discontent when the system is relatively inegalitarian. On the other hand, a_1 may be large in highly stratified, traditional societies; if so, discontent would reach its maximum at a much more egalitarian distribution than is ever likely to obtain in such systems.

Although the second parameter, a_2, has no effect on the location of the point of maximum discontent, it does reflect the intensity of anger caused by unfavorable comparisons. As Figure 1 and footnote 9 show, the greater the value of a_2, the higher the level of discontent for any given g including the maximum-discontent g. It seems safe to assume that a_2 also varies across systems.

The hypothesis will now be tested using data from revolutionary Vietnam. In the process, I hope to resolve a scholarly debate of more than academic import.

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II. Inequality and Revolution in South Vietnam

Controversy over the relation of economic inequality to rebellion in Vietnam begins with a study by Edward J. Mitchell.[10] Using multiple-regression analysis, Mitchell studied the relation across twenty-six South Vietnamese provinces between the extent of control by the Saigon government and an assortment of variables, including four which he considered indicators of land-tenure inequality.[11] His results seem to show that each measure of inequality related positively to Saigon control. More precisely, the greater the inequality of landholdings in a province, the larger the percentage of its hamlets classified as Saigon-controlled in 1965.[12] Mitchell interpreted his findings as follows:

> There exists in the areas of unequal distribution a powerful landlord class exercising firm control over a conservative peasantry which has thoroughly rationalized the inevitability of the existing situation. It is not these peasants who revolt, but those who 'have gained enough to give them the appetite for more.'
>
> From the point of view of government control, the ideal province in South Vietnam would be one in which few peasants farm their own land, the distribution of landholdings is unequal, no land redistribution has taken place, [and] large French landholdings existed in the past. . . .[13]

Mitchell's study soon came under a barrage of criticism—first in largely qualitative attacks by Paige and Sansom, and then in quantitative reanalyses by Paranzino and Russo.[14] To describe the many arguments of these four critics would be tedious; some of their points which are germane to my own analysis will be discussed later. For the purpose at hand, it suffices to focus on the clearest and most powerful revision of Mitchell, that provided by Anthony J. Russo.

Of the changes introduced by Russo, four are of interest here:

1. He tested the effect of regional differences, distinguishing between the Central and Southern Regions. These two areas differ sharply in

[10] Mitchell (fn. 2).

[11] Mitchell's four indicators were: the percentage of owner-operated land, the coefficient of variation of the distribution of land holdings, the percentage of land in formerly Vietnamese-owned estates subject to transfer under the Diem land reform program, and the percentage of land formerly French-owned and subject to transfer under the same program. All four measures have been criticized by Dennis Paranzino, "Inequality and Insurgency in Vietnam: A Further Reanalysis," *World Politics*, XXIV (July 1972), 565-78.

[12] Mitchell's data of Saigon control came from a map published by the *Los Angeles Times*, December 26, 1965, and reportedly obtained from U.S. Government sources.

[13] Mitchell (fn. 2), 437-38.

[14] Jeffery M. Paige, "Inequality and Insurgency in Vietnam: A Reanalysis," *World Politics*, XXIII (October 1970), 24-37; Robert L. Sansom, *The Economics of Insurgency in the Mekong Delta in Vietnam* (Cambridge, Mass. 1970), 230-32; Paranzino (fn. 11); Russo (fn. 3).

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culture and history; in addition, as Sansom and Paige note, strategic considerations also vary regionally.

2. Russo included as an independent variable the percentage of provincial inhabitants adhering to the Hoa Hao religious sect. Mitchell had already observed that this anti-Communist group might account for some of the unexplained variance in his study.

3. In place of Mitchell's four confusing and debatable inequality indicators, Russo substituted the more conventional Gini Index.

4. Finally, he included two measures of "rural welfare" in each province—its per capita income and the ratio of the average size of landholdings to the area needed for subsistence. Russo thus made it possible to distinguish equality and inequality from wealth and poverty. Mitchell, in contrast, had consistently confounded the level of wealth with its distribution.

Russo's four innovations had dramatic consequences. First, the amount of variance explained by his best equation rose sharply over Mitchell's best result.[15] Second, the well-being, Hoa Hao, and regional variables all turned out to be significantly related to Saigon control. Third, with the rural well-being factors in the regression, inequality appeared to have no effect on Saigon control. Russo attributed this to the positive correlation of inequality and wealth across South Vietnamese provinces.[16] "Provinces where inequality . . . is highest are often the richest"; and the richer provinces tend more to support Saigon. Essentially, then, Russo asserted that Mitchell's inequality-insurgency inverse relation is spurious, due to failure to control for wealth.[17]

We know, however, that an actual curvilinear relation, such as that predicted by the theory sketched in Section I, can yield insignificant results in a linear regression model. To see if this might be true of the Russo study, I reanalyzed his data to test for a parabolic relation between land-tenure inequality and Saigon control. This can be done quite simply by inserting in the regression equation the square of the Gini index.[18] Of numerous models estimated, the best results were obtained

[15] Mitchell's $\bar{R}^2$ is .68, but Paranzino reports that the equation is incorrectly estimated and should yield an $\bar{R}^2$ of .55. Russo reports an $\bar{R}^2$ of .82, but my own replication of his regression yields an R^2 of .83 and an $\bar{R}^2$ of .79. $\bar{R}^2$ is the conventional symbol for the coefficient of determination adjusted for degrees of freedom. For the formula relating the two quantities, see Arthur S. Goldberger, *Econometric Theory* (New York 1964), 217.

[16] The correlations are weak, however. Average income and the Gini index correlate .19; the correlation between the Gini and the ratio of average landholdings to subsistence areas is only .05.

[17] Russo (fn. 3), 322.

[18] Goldberger (fn. 15), 213-18.

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with an equation identical to Russo's, except for the presence of the Gini index and its square:

$$\begin{aligned}\hat{C} = {} & 9.87\ I + 10.8\frac{\bar{L}}{L_s} - 10.9\frac{\bar{L}}{L_s}D_s \\ & \quad (5.11) \qquad (4.38) \qquad (4.17) \\ & + .80\,HH + 18.0\,D_s - 467.5\,g \\ & \quad (7.73) \qquad (1.67) \qquad (2.60) \\ & + 415.9\,g^2 + 89.4. \\ & \quad (2.52)\end{aligned} \tag{6}$$

$$\bar{R}^2 = .84 \qquad F = 19.2 \qquad N = 26$$

Figures in parentheses below the regression coefficients are values of the t statistic for each coefficient. All are significant at the .01 level or better (by one-tailed tests), except the coefficient of D_s, which is just short of significance at the .05 level. The notation is the same as Russo's:

C = percentage of hamlets under Saigon control in 1965, as reported by Mitchell;

I = estimated 1964 per capita income in thousands of piastres;

$\frac{\bar{L}}{L_s}$ = the ratio of the mean size of landholdings in 1960 to the amount of land required to provide an average Vietnamese family with a daily rice ration of 250 grams per person for one year (rice yields are adjusted to provincial conditions);

HH = estimated percentage of province population in the Hoa Hao religion;

D_s = 1 for the Southern Region, and
= 0 for the Central Region

g = Gini index of inequality in size of 1960 landholdings.

The data used are also those reported by Russo.[19]

The results strongly support the curvilinear theory of inequality and discontent. The coefficients of g and g^2 are highly significant statistically; and their inclusion in the equation increases the proportion of variance explained from .79 to .84.[20] The signs of the g and g^2 terms

[19] Russo (fn. 3), Table 1. Original sources are as follows: *I*: Robert H. Stroup, "Rural Income and Expenditure Sample Survey: Preliminary Report," U.S. Agency for International Development, 1965; g and $\bar{L}/L_s$: "Report on the Agricultural Census of Vietnam," Department of Rural Affairs, Republic of Vietnam, 1961; *HH*: "The Religions of Vietnam in Faith and Fact," Southeast Asia Religious Project, Fleet Marine Force Pacific/IMAC. Dennis Paranzino generously supplied the data cards.

[20] See fn. 15 above. Comparable results occurred when Mitchell's chief inequality measure, the coefficient of variation, replaced the Gini coefficient. This finding may ease doubts raised by fn. 5.

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are the opposite of those in Equation (5). This is to be expected, for I assume Saigon control to be inversely related to discontent. Therefore, the curvature of the inequality-control relation should be the reverse of that shown in Figure 1. This is demonstrated by Figure 2, which is plotted using a technique employed by Mitchell.[21] Each point represents the actual Gini index value for a province and the control value that would be predicted by Equation (6) if all variables except the Gini index and its square were held constant at their means for all provinces.[22] The province numbers are those used by Mitchell.[23] The solid curve is the path predicted by Equation (6) using the same method, except that residual variance is excluded.



FIGURE 2. SAIGON CONTROL AND THE GINI INDEX OF LAND TENURE INEQUALITY

[21] Mitchell (fn. 2), 433 and Figures 1, 2, 3, and 4.

[22] Specifically, the control value C' is calculated as follows:

$$C' = 9.87\,\bar{I} + 10.8\,(\overline{\bar{L}/L_s}) - 10.9\,(\overline{\bar{L}/L_s})D_s + .8\,\overline{HH} + 18.0\,\bar{D}_s - 467.5\,g + 415.9\,g^2 + 89.4 + e.$$

The residual term e was computed for each province by inserting the actual values of all variables in the right side of Equation (6) and subtracting the result from the actual C value for the province.

[23] Provinces are: 1, An Giang; 2, An Xuyen; 3, Ba Xuyen; 4, Bien Hoa; 5, Binh Dinh; 6, Binh Duong; 7, Binh Thuan; 8, Dinh Tuong; 9, Khanh Hoa; 10, Kian Giang; 11, Kien Hoa; 12, Kien Phong; 13, Kien Tuong; 14, Long An; 15, Long Khanh; 16, Ninh Thuan; 17, Phong Dinh; 18, Phuoc Tuy; 19, Phu Yen; 20, Quang Nam; 21, Quang Ngai; 22, Quang Tri; 23, Tay Ninh; 24, Thua Thien; 25, Vinh Binh; 26, Vinh Long.

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Assuming (as I have, implicitly) that Saigon control is a linear function of discontent, the estimates in Equation (6) permit computation of the theoretical parameter a_1, which here equals .89. This high value suggests that, in Vietnam, Communist ideology had little effect on the tendency to compare less as differences in wealth increase. The level of inequality at which discontent is a maximum, computed from either Equation (6) or from the relation derived earlier, is $g = .56$.[24] Cultural and historical differences between regions, stressed by Paige and Russo, have no effect on these values. Tests revealed no interaction between region and the coefficients of g and g^2.

Region does interact with $\overline{L}/L_S$, and it also has independent impact. Equation (6) can be more easily interpreted when written as two separate equations, one for each region. For the Central Region,

$$\hat{C} = 9.87I + 10.8\frac{\overline{L}}{L_S} - 467.5g + 415.9g^2 + 89.4. \qquad (10)$$

For the Southern Region,

$$\hat{C} = 9.87I + .8\,HH - 467.5g + 415.9g^2 + 107.4. \qquad (11)$$

Thus, N.L.F. forces fared generally better in the Central Region. Reasons for this, as others have suggested, may be cultural, historical, strategic, or logistical. In the Southern Region, Hoa Hao religiosity hindered support for the Communist insurgency. (There are no Hoa Hao in the Central Region.)

All other variables seem more safely interpreted as affecting Saigon control through their effect on discontent. If so, discontent in Vietnamese provinces declines as the average level of economic well-being rises, as indicated in both regions by income and in the Central Region by the size of landholdings relative to the requirements of subsistence. In both regions, as my theory predicts, discontent bears a curvilinear

[24] The values for g and a_1 are derived as follows: I assume Saigon control is a linear function of discontent and other variables:

$$C = b_1 - b_2D + \ldots, \qquad (7)$$

where b_1 and b_2 are unknown parameters. From Equation (5):

$$C = b_1 - b_2a_2g + b_2a_1a_2g^2 + \ldots. \qquad (8)$$

(For the purpose at hand, it makes no difference whether the non-Gini terms in Equation 6 affect C through D or directly.) To find g^*, the level of g at which discontent is a maximum (and Saigon control is a minimum), we set the partial derivative of C with respect to g equal to zero:

$$\frac{\partial C}{\partial g} = -b_2a_2 + 2b_2a_1a_2g = 0. \qquad (9)$$

From Equation (6) we take $b_2a_2 = 467.5$ and $b_2a_1a_2 = 415.9$. Substituting in (9) and solving for g^*, we obtain $g^* = .56$. Inserting this value in (9), it is easy to compute $a_1 = .89$. Unfortunately, it is not possible to solve for a_2 without knowledge of the unknown b_2.

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relation to the distribution of wealth. Discontent is low where land is very equally or very unequally distributed; it reaches its maximum where land distribution is moderately unequal.

Before concluding this section, it may be worthwhile to consider whether several criticisms of Mitchell's analysis are valid if applied to the present results.

1. *Multicollinearity*: In arguing that two of Mitchell's inequality indices should be combined into one, Paranzino notes that multicollinearity (a high correlation) between two independent variables can artifactually produce opposite signs in their regression coefficients.[25] As Goldberger observes, "over narrow ranges of variation, the successive powers of x may be multicollinear; x^2, for example, is approximately a linear function of x over any narrow range."[26] Since g and g^2 correlate .997, we should decide whether the opposite signs of their coefficients are due to such an artifact rather than to the correctness of my theory. The principal effect of multicollinearity is to produce large standard errors in estimates of regression coefficients. But the t statistic used in testing coefficient significance is inversely proportional to the standard errors. If t's are highly significant despite large standard errors, as mine are, then the best strategy is to accept the regression estimates despite the presence of high intercorrelation between the regressands.[27] This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that the pattern of signs was predicted *a priori*. Moreover, the same pattern was observed in numerous other models which I tested but did not report here because their overall results were inferior to Equation (6).

2. *Confusion of cause and effect*: Sansom's refutation of Mitchell rests heavily on his speculation that the land-tenure data reflect prior Viet Minh and N.L.F. land reforms. If so, the causal ordering should be the reverse of that presumed by Mitchell: "The fact that land was more inequitably distributed in GVN areas than in Viet Cong areas did not mean that the Viet Cong gained control in areas of equitable land distribution but that, in the areas they controlled, the Viet Minh and Viet Cong through their land reform programs *caused* the land to be more equitably distributed."[28] In presenting this theory, Sansom ignores Mitchell's own anticipatory rebuttal, which includes the fact

[25] Paranzino (fn. 11), 574-77. [26] Goldberger (fn. 15), 215.

[27] See J. Johnston, *Econometric Methods*, 2nd ed. (New York 1972), 159-64; Martin S. Feldstein, "Multicollinearity and Mean Square Error of Alternative Estimators," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 142 (Cambridge, Mass. 1970); and William J. Raduchel, "Multicollinearity Once Again," unpub. paper (Harvard University 1971). I am indebted to Robert P. Inman for the latter two references and for advice on this question.

[28] Sansom (fn. 14), 232; emphasis in original.

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that the land-tenure data were gathered in September 1960, when the Communist resurgence was just beginning.[29] In any event, the argument cannot apply to the present results, which, unlike Mitchell's, show Saigon control to be not less but greater in provinces with relatively equal land distribution.

3. *External influences*: Paige and Sansom contend that by late 1965, when the estimates of Saigon government control were made, the pattern of Communist success or failure depended more on logistics and strategy than on socioeconomic factors. Both writers particularly emphasize proximity to North Vietnam and the Ho Chi Minh Trail. This argument perhaps explains the regional effect reported in Equation (6) —that Saigon control is weaker in the Central Region (the northern part of South Vietnam). To test the hypothesis more directly, distances were computed from the Mu Gia Pass between North Vietnam and Laos to the capitals of the 26 provinces.[30] This new variable was incorporated in the basic model with regional effects excluded. Its effect was nil, while the pattern of coefficients for all other variables remained the same.[31]

Until more convincing rebuttals or alternative explanations are forthcoming, the evidence from South Vietnam upholds the curvilinear theory of inequality and discontent.[32] Caution should be exercised in interpreting this cross-sectional result, however. Despite the explanation

[29] The N.L.F. General Uprising campaign began July 20, 1960. *Ibid.*, 236.

[30] The Mu Gia Pass, heavily bombed by the U.S. until the 1973 treaty, is usually depicted as the starting point of the Ho Chi Minh Trail network—for instance, on a map in the *New York Times* edition of *The Pentagon Papers* (New York 1971), viii. Distances to province capitals were measured on a straight-line basis using a steel tape measure and the National Geographic Society map of Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand (Washington, February 1967), the scale of which is 30 miles to the inch. Province capitals are from the House Committee on Armed Services edition of the Pentagon Papers: *US-Vietnam Relations, 1945-67* (Washington 1971), Book 2, IV.A.5, map on p. 3.

[31] This finding indirectly helps refute the 1965 White Paper of the U.S. State Department, *Aggression from the North*, which purported to show the revolt in the South "inspired, directed, supplied, and controlled by the Communist regime in Hanoi." On the White Paper, see George McT. Kahin and John W. Lewis, *The United States in Vietnam* (New York 1967).

[32] There does exist, however, an alternative substantive explanation for the curvilinear relation of land-tenure inequality and control by the Saigon government. It can be argued that discontent varies directly with economic inequality, while the power of the discontented varies inversely with the same factor. If one further assumes that revolutionary success varies as the product of the oppressed class's discontent and its power, then this theory also implies a relation like that depicted in Figure 1. (The argument is an extension of that presented by William A. Gamson, *Power and Discontent* [Homewood, Ill. 1968] chap. 7.)

The data used in this paper do not permit a test of the two interpretations, but circumstances can be imagined in which they would make different predictions—for example, when the arrival of a revolutionary army reduces the normal power disparity between landlords and peasants.

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of an unusually high proportion of variance, Equation (6) is hardly a complete theory of revolution in Vietnam or anywhere else. Other areas could easily experience the same level of poverty and a similar, moderately unequal distribution of wealth and yet never give birth to a revolutionary movement of such remarkable strength and valor. A full historical explanation of the continuing Vietnamese struggle might be based on culture, ideology, leadership, organization, and more dynamic elements of the emerging social-psychological theory of revolution.[33]

III. Some Inconclusive Cross-National Evidence

The results to be described in this section generally do not support the nonlinear hypothesis. They are reported here in the belief that negative as well as positive findings ought to be disclosed, and in order to save others the trouble of undertaking one of the more obvious tests of the theory.

To see whether the curvilinear relation of inequality and discontent obtains cross-nationally, regressions were computed using as cases fifty-four countries for which Gini indices of land distribution are available.[34] Seven indicators of political instability served as dependent variables. Three are Gurr's composite indices of Conspiracy, Internal War, and Turmoil for the period 1961–65.[35] Four are direct counts of the frequency of violent events, adjusted for population: Deaths from domestic violence per million population during the periods 1948–67 and 1961–65, and Riots per million for the same period.[36]

[33] In particular, Sansom's historical account of the Mekong Delta describes Davies' *J*-curve pattern in classic purity. A major *J*-curve developed between 1868 and 1945, culminating in the Vietminh revolution. After a long era of rapid expansion, the rice-land frontier closed in 1930. As population continued to rise, the rice area cultivated per capita fell. As it did, "a rather startling decline in real incomes" occurred. A secondary *J*-pattern can be traced from 1945 to 1960. The peasants' lot improved in 1945–54, as the Vietminh reduced rents and interest, and redistributed land. But "during the interregnum of 1954–59, the social-institutional accomplishments of the Viet Minh were held in abeyance or (often) reversed." In 1960 the National Liberation Front instituted the second phase of heroic and tragic struggle. Sansom (fn. 14), chaps. 2 and 3. On the *J*-curve theory, see James C. Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution," *American Sociological Review*, XXVII (February 1962), 5-18.

[34] Charles L. Taylor and Michael C. Hudson, *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators*, 2nd ed. (New Haven 1972). With two exceptions, the *World Handbook* data used in this study were taken from tapes supplied by the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research through the Social Science Data Center of the University of Pennsylvania. The exceptions are the totals of Deaths and Riots for 1948–67, which were punched directly from the *Handbook*. I am grateful to Barry Cohen of the Data Center for his assistance and to Dennis Paranzino, who supplied cards for several of the variables used.

[35] Feierabend, Feierabend, and Gurr (fn. 3), 213-15. The Gurr indices are available for only 51 of the countries for which the *World Handbook* provides Gini scores.

[36] The latter four variables were computed from the *World Handbook* or its tapes (see fn. 34). 1960 population totals were employed.

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These seven variables were regressed against a cross-national counterpart of Equation (6) with the specifically Vietnamese factors excluded. Along with the Gini index and its square, the regressands included Gross National Product per capita in 1965 and the growth rate of per capita GNP from 1961 to 1965.[37]

For all of the dependent variables except Conspiracy, my theory predicts a curve like that in Figure 1—less violence when inequality is low and high, greater violence when inequality is moderate. The prediction for Conspiracy is the opposite, if we accept a plausible hypothesis of Gurr's: "The likelihood of conspiracy varies directly with the intensity and scope of elite relative deprivation and *inversely* with the intensity and scope of mass relative deprivation."[38] If, says Gurr, potential revolutionary leaders cannot find a mass base, they must resort to conspiratorial activities such as assassinations, terrorism, coups, and plots. Turmoil and Internal War, on the other hand, require mass participation and, presumably, mass discontent. Riots and Deaths should also be closely associated with these two dimensions of strife. The nonlinear inequality theory, when used with societal inequality measures, is a theory of *mass* discontent. Therefore, if Gurr is right, the theory should predict negatively to Conspiracy and positively to the other six indicators.

The results were disappointing. In none of the regressions computed were the coefficients of both the Gini index and its square significant. Indeed, for the four measures of Deaths and Riots, no equation attained statistical significance. The best predicting equations for Internal War and Turmoil, though significant, were hardly impressive.[39] Only for Conspiracy were our theoretical predictions even approached. For this variable the highest $\bar{R}^2$ was obtained with the following equation:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Conspiracy} &= -.0011\text{GNP} - 12.56g + 15.45g^2 + 4.52 . \qquad (12) \\ &\quad (3.17) \qquad (.81) \qquad (1.30) \\ \bar{R}^2 &= .38 \qquad F = 11.2 \qquad N = 51 \end{aligned}$$

Although the pattern of signs for the Gini terms is as predicted, their coefficients are not statistically significant. How can we explain these

[37] These time periods were selected to avoid missing cases. The data were from the *World Handbook* tapes.

[38] Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton 1970), 335; emphasis added.

[39] For both Internal War and Turmoil, the best prediction is afforded by GNP growth rate alone; the respective correlations are −.37 and −.27. In words, economic growth is associated with reduced Internal War and reduced Turmoil. This accords with common sense, but not with the speculations of Mancur Olson, Jr., "Economic Growth as a Destabilizing Force," *Journal of Economic History*, XXIII (December 1963), 529-52.

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non-confirmatory cross-national findings? One resort, of course, is to reject the theory; but this would conflict with the strong Vietnam evidence in its favor. Moreover, there are at least four explanations that might save the hypothesis. I shall discuss each briefly, calling upon additional data when possible.

1. *A truncated distribution?* Examination of the distribution of Gini scores reveals relatively few egalitarian societies in the sample. The mean score is .67; the range extends from .35 (Finland) all the way up to .93 (Peru). As many cases (eleven) are above .80 as below .50. Only two Communist nations are included (Poland and Yugoslavia). This skewness suggests that the left-hand portion of the curve in Figure 1 might be essentially cut off, with too few egalitarian countries included to reveal the predicted curvilinearity.

If this explanation is correct, deletion of either the g or the g^2 term from the regression equations might reveal a significant monotonic association between the Gini index and the various instability indicators—positively sloping for Conspiracy, negatively for all others. Computations confirmed the conjecture only for Conspiracy, however. Removal of g from Equation (12) did result in a highly significant positive coefficient for g^2:

$$\text{Conspiracy} = \underset{(3.30)}{-.0011\text{GNP}} + \underset{(4.38)}{5.87g^2} + .656 . \qquad (13)$$

$$\bar{R}^2 = .384 \qquad F = 16.6 \qquad N = 51$$

Both coefficients are significant at the $p < .005$ level (one-tailed), and $\bar{R}^2$ has improved marginally.[40] Equation (13) describes a parabolic relation between land-tenure inequality and Conspiracy; but for the range of inequality values examined, the parabola slopes positively everywhere: as inequality increases, Conspiracy increases at an accelerating rate.

2. *Other sources of wealth?* Many of the fifty-four nations for which we know land-distribution Gini indices are industrial. When agriculture is not the chief source of wealth, the distribution of land should not have a great effect on mass discontent and resulting political violence. To assay this possibility, two reanalyses of the data were conducted.

In the first test, the sample was divided into agricultural and non-

[40] Improvement in $\bar{R}^2$ is to be expected whenever one deletes a term whose coefficient has $t < 1$. See Yoel Haitovsky, "A Note on the Maximization of $\bar{R}^2$," *American Statistician*, XXIII (February 1969), 20-21.

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agricultural subsets,[41] and regressions were computed for the agricultural group only. This restriction greatly *weakened* the predictive power of my models. A significant equation was obtained only for Conspiracy:

$$\text{Conspiracy} = \underset{(1.74)}{-.0052\text{GNP}} + \underset{(3.05)}{6.24g^2} + 1.49 \qquad (14)$$

$$\bar{R}^2 = .23 \qquad F = 4.79 \qquad N = 27$$

Both coefficients are significant, $p < .05$. The slope and form of the relationship are again as predicted by the parabolic theory *cum* truncated-data hypothesis. Still, these results are hardly an improvement over those obtained with the unrestricted data set. Their weakness might be explained by the smaller number of cases and by the possibility that data from the generally less developed, primarily agricultural countries are of inferior quality.

In the second test incorporating the importance of agriculture, the two Gini terms were weighted by the percentage of each nation's male labor force engaged in agriculture in 1965.[42] Presumably, the greater the proportion of the population whose livelihood depends directly on agriculture, the stronger the effect of land distribution on discontent.[43] This modification produced, for the first time, significant regressions for the two Deaths variables, but coefficients for the Gini terms were not significant; only the GNP per capita growth rate proved to be an effective predictor. A similar result was obtained for Internal War, but no significant regression for Turmoil was computed.[44]

The results for Conspiracy, however, produced the first and only full confirmation of the curvilinear theory using cross-national data:

$$\text{Conspiracy} = \underset{(2.21)}{-.0014\text{GNP}} - \underset{(1.92)}{.15L_ag} + \underset{(2.52)}{.19L_ag^2} + 4.03 \qquad (15)$$

$$\bar{R}^2 = .32 \qquad F = 6.93 \qquad N = 38$$

[41] A country was classified as agricultural if the percentage of its male labor force in agriculture equalled or exceeded 50 in either 1960 or 1965, according to the *World Handbook* data. Two years were employed because many cases were missing on each, but only three were missing on both. For those three—Mali, Kenya, and South Vietnam—I made educated guesses and included all in the agricultural group.

[42] The single year was used in these tests because fewer cases were missing for 1965 than for 1960 and because substantial changes in this variable often occurred between the two dates. Missing cases reduced N to 40 for *World Handbook* dependent variables, and to 38 for Gurr's indices.

[43] Russett (fn. 1), reports that inclusion of the percentage of the labor force in agriculture raised the predictive power of his regressions; but he evidently incorporated the variable additively rather than multiplicatively. I see no theoretical rationale for the former course.

[44] Simple correlations of the growth rate with instability variables were as follows: Internal War, −.53; Deaths 1948–67, −.52; Deaths 1961–65, −.46.

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In Equation (12), L_a stands for the percentage of the male labor force in agriculture. All t's are significant at better than the .05 level. The signs of the Gini terms produce the predicted curvature: allowing for the importance of agriculture in the economy, Conspiracy is most probable where land is distributed very equally or very unequally.

3. *Too many mediating variables?* Strictly speaking, the theory outlined in Section I of this paper predicts only to discontent. In the tests undertaken it has been assumed that discontent will be reflected in its presumed consequences, such as successful insurgency or various forms of political violence. Whether or not this will be the case depends on other factors, none of which have been incorporated in the cross-national regressions above. In Gurr's theory, for example, the intensity and scope of relative deprivation (discontent) determines the potential for political violence, but the actualization of that potential depends upon the prevalence of utilitarian and normative justifications for violence, and the balance between regime and dissidents of coercive control and institutional support.[45] (This list includes Gurr's major organizing categories only.)

Incorporation of mediating variables or use of a direct measure of discontent as a dependent variable might more frequently reveal the predicted curvilinear relation in cross-national tests. Such efforts, however, are beyond the scope of this exploratory report.[46]

4. *Unstable parameters?* In Equation (5), the relationship between discontent and inequality depends upon two parameters, a_1 and a_2, which represent, respectively, the strength of the tendency not to compare as inequality increases, and the intensity of anger resulting from unfavorable comparisons. I assumed that the two parameters vary across cultures. This assumption, if correct, might alone explain the failure of cross-national tests to yield many significant results. For each society, the inequality-discontent relation may be of the type depicted in Figure 1; but the level, curvature, and maximum point of each society's curve may differ as a_1 and a_2 vary. Over a large number of cases, points located on similar but distinct curves might be expected to form a large curve of the same form. If so, the N's here may have been too small to reveal the tendency, especially since the data are no doubt inconsistent in derivation and quality.

[45] Gurr (fn. 38), *passim*, esp. chap. 10.

[46] One set of national RD scores is available—the data gathered between 1957 and 1962 by Hadley Cantril using his Self-Anchoring Scale. Unfortunately, he studied only 14 nations, and we have Gini scores for just 11 of these. I regressed this small sample against the Gini, its square, and GNP per capita, but obtained significant results only for GNP per capita, which correlates −.57 with average deprivation. (The Cantril data were taken from *ibid.*, 65.)

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In view of the above four arguments, I conclude that my cross-national results are inconclusive—neither supportive of the hypothesis (with one exception), nor persuasive grounds for rejecting it. Further tests are needed, but cross-national data may not be suitable for the task. Instead, researchers should seek units (a) of reasonable cultural homogeneity, (b) exhibiting a full range of variation in inequality (c) along a dimension of major importance to most members of the units. In addition, they should (d) employ as a dependent variable a direct measure of discontent, or else try to incorporate other variables believed to mediate between discontent and the dependent variables used.

In concluding this section, I shall report one interesting by-product of the cross-national research. In his well-known study, Russett found that political instability correlates positively with inequality of land tenure.[47] Although the data do not confirm my own quite different hypothesis, they also fail to replicate Russett's results. He found that, for forty-seven countries, the Gini index of landholdings correlated .46 with violent political Deaths per million from 1950 to 1962, and .29 with Eckstein's Internal War measure for 1946–61. For my larger sample and different time periods, I found no statistically significant correlations between the Gini index and instability indicators comparable to Russett's. Specifically, the Gini index correlates −.06 with Deaths per million in 1948–67, −.01 with Deaths per million in 1961–65, and .13 with Gurr's Internal War index for 1961–65.

IV. Discussion

The hypothesis introduced in this paper has important implications for research, theory, policy, and ideology.

I have already noted the need for further substantiation of the theory, particularly through intra-national analyses. The curvilinear relation suggests dynamic predictions which might also be tested. For example, it is generally agreed that, in the absence of preventative governmental policies, the so-called Green Revolution in less developed agricultural economies tends to increase rural inequality. This is so because landlords and prosperous peasants can more easily afford capital inputs of seed, fertilizer, and irrigation equipment required by the new techniques.[48] As land tenure becomes more unequal, countries initially located on the left side of the inequality-discontent curve should move

[47] Russett (fn. 1).

[48] See, e.g., Lester R. Brown, "The Agricultural Revolution in Asia," *Foreign Affairs*, XLVI (July 1968), 688-98, or Clifton R. Wharton, Jr., "The Green Revolution: Cornucopia or Pandora's Box?" *Foreign Affairs*, XLVII (April 1969), 464-76.

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into the region of maximum discontent and are therefore likely to become less stable. Countries initially at the maximum region or on the right side of the curve will experience decreasing discontent as inequality becomes even greater.

This result of the distributional change effected by the Green Revolution might be offset by the increase in average income which it also produces (in the short run, at least). Nevertheless, of seven Third-World nations which have most widely adopted the new farm techniques, two of the three with the lowest Gini indices—India and the Philippines—have experienced increasing rebelliousness in recent years. Of the four with higher Gini scores, only Pakistan has suffered notably greater instability.[49] While its upheaval was a mighty one, the causes seem more ethnic than economic. Moreover, Bangladesh, with its intensive rice cultivation, may well have a less unequal land distribution than the former Pakistan as a whole.

The inequality-discontent hypothesis does not, of course, apply only to national units, so research testing it might be conducted in a variety of settings. In a fascinating first-hand report not designed to test the present theory, Joseph Serano describes how a Roman Catholic religious community progressed over twelve years through the three stages predicted in Figure 1.[50] At first, the community was rigidly stratified, with its hierarchy ranging downward from priests to novices. "Paradoxically, in this 'deprived situation' I would have described myself and my peers [then at the bottom of the hierarchy] as generally satisfied." Between 1965 and 1970, under the influence of Vatican II, privileges and social barriers were reduced but not completely eliminated, and a system of democracy with hierarchically weighted voting was introduced. Discontent, however, rose noticeably and precipitated a crisis in 1971, when younger residents tried and failed to equalize the voting system. Finally, in 1972, the remaining social barriers and voting weights were eliminated. The result was an end to most conflicts and a definite improvement in the level of satisfaction.

[49] The seven countries are from a table in Lester Brown, *Seeds of Change: The Green Revolution and Development in the 1970's* (New York 1970), 40. Ranked in order of increasing Gini indices (in parentheses), the countries are Taiwan (.46), India (.52), the Philippines (.53), Turkey (.59), Iran (.62), Pakistan (.65), and Mexico (.69). Brown also lists four nations for which I have no Gini indices: Ceylon, Afghanistan, Indonesia, and Morocco. Except for two pioneers, Taiwan and Mexico, all experienced (or were expected to experience) their "yield takeoffs" between 1965 and 1970.

Increasing rebelliousness in India has been reported in the press and in Hari P. Sharma, "The Green Revolution in India: Prelude to a Red One?" in Kathleen Gough and Hari P. Sharma, eds., *Imperialism and Revolution in South Asia* (New York 1973), 77-102. The Moslem and Communist insurgencies in the Philippines have been described in frequent *New York Times* dispatches during 1972–73.

[50] Joseph A. Serano, S.J., untitled paper (University of Pennsylvania, December 1972).

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An example closer to home for most academics is the Women's Liberation Movement. To this not entirely casual observer, its ideas seem to cause most discontent and tension in homes which are neither traditional patriarchies nor fully equal partnerships, but where, despite considerable sharing of roles, the male retains some privileges and advantages.

On the theoretical level, it appears likely that the inequality-discontent relation can be incorporated into a general theory which will also include as special cases Davis's probabilistic theory of relative deprivation and the theory of status inconsistency.[51] Efforts to demonstrate this mathematically will soon be underway.

When applied to land-distribution policies, the curvilinear hypothesis offers some support to both radical and reactionary strategies. Least likely to promote the goal of stability are the half-hearted land reforms which the United States sometimes tries to foist on its client states. Those who do not value equality should not, however, leap too quickly to inequality as a bulwark against rebellion. Social comparisons are not the only factor affecting discontent. The evidence from both Vietnam and cross-national analyses suggests that wealth or changes in wealth are more consistently related to instability than is inequality. Inequality of landholdings correlates −.35 with growth in per capita GNP.[52] If we can interpret this correlation causally, reactionary land policies may lose more from poverty than they gain from inequality.

Allowing for the effects of both wealth and inequality, stability in the long run is most likely to be ensured by the policy least likely to preserve order in the short run—radical, egalitarian land redistribution. That is a goal not likely to be pursued by most existing Third-World governments. As China and Vietnam have shown, it can be accomplished by revolution.

Finally, now that I have moved into the ideological realm, there remains the question of the impact of my theory on sympathy for rebels. As Sansom notes, many American officials refused to admit the role of land tenure in arousing support for the Vietnamese liberation forces because of "an ideological desire to condemn the Viet Cong."[53] Such a tendency is evident in the tone of Mitchell's paper. Conversely, Russo uses his demonstration of the effect of poverty on N.L.F. support to

[51] James A. Davis, "A Formal Interpretation of the Theory of Relative Deprivation," *Sociometry*, XXII (December 1959), 280-96. The seminal reference on status inconsistency is Gerhard Lenski, "Status Crystallization: A Non-Vertical Dimension of Social Status," *American Sociological Review*, XIX (August 1954), 405-13. The literature on both concepts is mammoth.

[52] The correlation of inequality and per capita GNP, however, is only −.08.

[53] Sansom (fn. 14), 234-35.

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sustain his belief that the Communists are better attuned to the aspirations of oppressed peasants. My analysis, of course, upholds Russo's on the impact of poverty; but, unfortunately, the curvilinear effect of inequality might be seized upon to discredit the claims of revolutionaries. In my view, the goal of equality will not be tarnished if people seek it most vigorously when injustice is only "moderate"; but one might well regret this human tendency if it serves to protect the most inhuman inequities.

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TOWARD A REDEFINITION OF MILITARY STRATEGY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By MORRIS JANOWITZ

IN a period of search for politico-military détente between the major nuclear powers, one cannot avoid the question of whether the theories and categories for the analysis of international relations, especially those involving the role of military force, are appropriate and clarifying. Although they strive to make use of timeless categories, social scientists, especially when analyzing international relations, must take into consideration the changing historical context.[1] In this paper I will attempt to reassess the well-known issue of the limits of military intervention in international relations by advanced industrial societies. I will seek to extend and formulate the ideas which, in *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait*, were vaguely expressed in the notion of a constabulary.[2]

The intellectual approach rests on some standard notions of sociological analysis derived from the writings of Max Weber and Karl Mannheim on social structure and the growth of bureaucracy and large-scale organization under industrialism.[3] This type of "institutional" analysis focuses on the impact of goals and changes in goals on bureaucratic organization and the problem of implementing national policies. In particular, Mannheim's concept of "fundamental democratization," originally formulated to analyze the internal social structure of an advanced industrialized nation, can also be applied to characterize the transformation in the international arena which has produced the paradox of vastly increased concentrations of military power simultaneously with trends toward the diffusion of political power.[4] Most sociological writings about international relations have focused on attitudes and perceptions, when actually the categories of institutional analysis—currently relabeled "organization analysis"—are more ap-

[1] Quincy Wright, *A Study of War* (Chicago 1942), Vols. I and II.

[2] Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier* (New York 1971), 418-30.

[3] Max Weber, *General Economic History* (Glencoe, Ill. 1950). Karl Mannheim, *Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction* (New York 1940), 44-49. See also Herbert Goldhamer and Edward A. Shils, "Types of Power and Status," *American Journal of Sociology*, XLV (September 1939), 171-82.

[4] Mannheim (fn. 3), *passim*.

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propriate.[5] Although the focus of this paper is on the military organizations of the advanced industrial nations, the issues are applicable to the political-diplomatic agencies of international relations as well.

The central argument of this essay is that the classical categories for analyzing military organization and strategy must be reconceptualized in the era of nuclear weapons and the decline of colonial rule.[6] The idea of "stabilizing" and "destabilizing" military systems is offered as an alternative to the classical language—balance of power, offensive-defensive, and strategic-tactical military structures.

It is no simple matter to define and give concrete content to the terms "stabilizing" and "destabilizing" military structures, but their essential elements can be identified. These concepts supply a basis for reassessing international relations during the years since 1945, and for examining alternative approaches to the search for military détente. They also help to give meaning to the oft-repeated observation that, from the point of view of Western nations with multiparty political systems, the role of violence in international relations has undergone fundamental changes.[7]

First, the concepts are based on the recognition that total war, as prepared for and practiced by the nations of Europe and the United States and Japan during World Wars I and II, is no longer viewed as an instrument for achieving national goals.[8] To the extent that rationality operates, the outbreak of "major" war between industrialized nations is no longer defined as inevitable. A military force based on conventional mobilization for total war gives way to a force in being, which is designed to achieve deterrence.

Second, the overseas colonial empires of advanced industrial nations have in the main come to an end through voluntary withdrawal or political agitation, or, in a limited number of cases, as the result of military engagements.[9] Colonial rule has given way to varieties of assistance for the building of military institutions in the so-called de-

[5] See for example, Louis Kriesberg, ed., *Social Process in International Relations: A Reader* (New York 1968); Herbert Kelman, *International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis* (New York 1965).

[6] Bernard Brodie, *Strategy in the Missile Age* (Princeton 1959); D. Tarr, *American Strategy in the Nuclear Age* (New York 1966).

[7] Raymond Aron, *A Century of Total War* (New York 1954); Albert Wohlstetter, "The Delicate Balance of Terror," *Foreign Affairs*, XXXVII (January 1959), 211-34; Joseph Frankel, *International Politics: Conflict and Harmony* (London 1969).

[8] Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven 1966). Despite the author's language and particular style, this volume contains valuable materials on the actual pattern of communication and interaction between the U.S. and the Soviet military force.

[9] Rupert Emerson, *From Empire to Nation* (Cambridge, Mass. 1960); Clifford Geertz, ed., *Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa* (Glencoe, Ill. 1963).

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veloping nations, and to support for armed conflict either between or within these nations.[10]

As a result, the legitimacy and utility of every specific military preparation and operation must be judged in terms of new criteria which, in a kind of shorthand, have come to be called deterrence. Deterrence in turn is equated with a reduction of the chances and avoidance of the outbreak of major war between the advanced industrial powers, and with the inhibition of peripheral and limited war. But the term has limitations—and not only because it has been overused and misused. It deals mainly with military affairs and military goals and does not adequately encompass the range of processes and objectives required for an international order that seeks to avoid war.[11] To speak of stabilized military systems and the search for stabilization is, first, to indicate the multiple goals of military institutions of avoiding general war and reducing or inhibiting limited war.

But, second, an emphasis on stabilized military systems encompasses the goals of a declining level of military expenditures and expanding arms control, as well as a reduction in mass personal insecurity generated by the nuclear arms race. Given the dangers of accidental nuclear war, miscalculations leading to escalation of international tensions, and the sheer organizational complexity of managing nuclear military systems, new forms of communication and negotiation are required between "adversaries" if one is to speak of stabilized military systems.[12] In these terms, the management of military institutions involves the creation of an international arena which would improve economic intercourse and enhance the opportunity for political solutions to international tensions and imbalances. In short, deterrence as a concept has been mainly negative—and therefore of limited import for analyzing the organizational goals of military institutions.

Since, for industrialized nations, military intervention operates under marked limitations—and limitations which tend to increase—the notion of stabilizing versus destabilizing military systems is designed to explore these limitations and to assess the full range of impact that the military function has in the international arena. It is designed to avoid utopian thinking during a period of redefinition of national interests,

[10] Janowitz, *The Role of the Military in the Political Development of New Nations* (Chicago 1964); S. F. Finer, *The Man on Horseback* (London 1962); Philippe C. Schmitter, *Military Rule in Latin America* (Beverly Hills 1973).

[11] For an analysis of the changed political meaning of nationalism in international relations, see John Herz, *International Politics in the Atomic Age* (New York 1959); F. H. Hinsley, *Power and the Pursuit of Peace* (Cambridge 1963).

[12] The concept of "stabilizing" versus "destabilizing" military systems does not necessarily assume the idea of equilibrium in international relations, but is compatible with the analysis of historical change.

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since it assumes that stabilized military systems can have positive effects on the political, economic, and moral aspects of the international arena.

Obviously, in exploring the impact of the military function, we must distinguish between the nation-states with multiparty political systems and those with a single mass party, such as the Soviet Union and its associated nations, and Communist China. The political decision-making process of the single-party states enables them to allocate a larger share of the gross national product to military affairs, to mobilize—under conscription—a more extensive proportion of the available manpower, and to operate with less concern for currents of public opinion. In particular, any analysis of the consequences of military institutions on the international arena must assume this profound disparity in manpower resources when seeking to probe beyond the concept of deterrence.

But the disparity runs much deeper. In a parliamentary democracy, competing political elites strive to separate the police from the military and to remove the military from internal police functions except during gravest emergency. Competition between organized political parties depends on enforcing the nonpartisan role of the military. In a one-party state, the military is both an instrument of national defense and an active element in the internal police system. The military is also assigned a positive role in ideological indoctrination. It is an element in the "school of the nation," while remaining subject to extensive control by the party and the secret police.[13] In the Soviet Union, the military has to confront the realities of Sino-Soviet tension and the possibility of having to intervene to maintain allied governments in Eastern Europe.

Therefore, during a period when the military function is being transformed, the broader role of the military in one-party states implies that traditional assumptions about the military are less frequently and extensively called into question. Thus, the disparity in resources and manpower, plus the broader domestic role of the military, produces powerful elements of asymmetric response to issues of changed military functions. However, these crucial differences should not divert us from examining the extent to which complex technology and the social structure of advanced industrial society have produced important parallel consequences in military institutions in all advanced industrial nation-states.

[13] Raymond L. Garthoff, *Soviet Military Policy: A Historical Analysis* (New York 1966); see esp. chap. 2.

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SYSTEMIC ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The academic analysis of international relations is not based on a powerful or paradigmatic theory comparable to marginal utility analysis in economics or even to learning theory in behavioral psychology.[14] It would no doubt be asking too much to demand a "theory" of international relations, just as it is to search for a "theory" of the welfare state. Theories are formed by particular disciplines and not by areas of subject matter. The field of international relations invokes the application of a disciplinary orientation or a multidisciplinary orientation to a common set of problems of subject matter.

The classic formulations have been those related to the international balance of power; that is, they have been a form of political analysis. The balance-of-power model has had limited relevance, because it is so highly general that its plausibility hardly explains any particular set of circumstances or specifies the elements to be examined. The balance-of-power formula seems mainly to have served as a rationalization of power politics, if such rationalization were required. In the contemporary setting, the formula has even less explanatory relevance and is out of accord with the necessity of including "voluntaristic" factors, such as the initiative of political leaders and their "advisors" as independent dimensions in the analysis of international relations. Game theory, cybernetic models, and simulation modes of analysis which have come to the fore reflect effective rigor but have a tendency to mislead, since they cannot deal with change and transformation.[15] Their mechanistic assumptions bear limited relation to the realities of the world community. Because of their failure to deal with institutional and normative elements, they have not made a sufficient contribution to the clarification of the impact of particular means—especially military means—on political ends in the dynamics of international relations.

There is also a growing body of so-called revisionist literature about the origins of World War II and the immediate postwar period. The

[14] Richard C. Snyder, "Some Recent Trends in International Relations Theory and Research," in Austin Ranney, ed., *Essays on the Behavioral Study of Politics* (Urbana 1962), 103-71.

[15] Jessie Bernard, "The Theory of Games as a Modern Sociology of Conflict," *American Journal of Sociology*, LIX (March 1954), 411-530; Anatol Rapoport, "Lewis F. Richardson's Mathematical Theory of War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, I (September 1957); Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, Mass. 1963); Harold S. Guetzkow and others, *Simulation in International Relations: Developments for Research and Teaching* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1963); Bruce M. Russett, *Peace, War, and Numbers* (Beverly Hills 1972), in particular R. J. Rummel, "U.S. Foreign Relations: Conflict, Cooperation, and Attribute Distances," 71-115; J. W. Burton, *International Relations: A General Theory* (Cambridge 1965).

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bulk of this literature is countermoralizing.[16] Paradoxically, despite the vast flow of literature, systematic and realistic analysis of the management of international relations is still hard to obtain; it is as if the analytical task were swamped by the magnitude of available documentation. Thus, despite the enormous efforts in international propaganda during World War II and the cold war, by all the participants, there is no book that comes to the heart of the matter so well as Harold D. Lasswell's classic study of World War I, *Propaganda Technique in the World War*.[17] It remains astounding, therefore, that the role of mass persuasion is for all practical purposes an issue of peripheral concern to the contemporary theorist of international relations. Likewise, the consequences of guerrilla warfare are a study area in which the assertions of ideologists and advocates serve as substitutes for effective analysis of realities and limitations.[18]

The best scholarship has succeeded in demolishing the single-variable theories of international relations which dominated the field before World War II, whether such theories be based on economic determinism, the psychological basis of organized aggression, or vague and almost metaphysical notions of geopolitical potentials. The present status of scholarship in international relations in part reflects the basic and persistent problem of the intellectual analysis of violence. Intellectuals are fascinated by violence and, despite condemning it morally, they are often bemused by it or romanticize its character and consequences.[19] There is a real danger of generating moral indifference if "objectivity" is pressed ruthlessly and without social and political responsibility. In the name of objectivity and detachment, a personal fascination and/or obsession may be encountered—a characteristic that is common to writings as different as Herman Kahn's *On Thermonuclear War* and Frantz Fanon's *The Wretched of the Earth*.[20] But it is possible to delve into the study of violence with scholarly criteria in mind and with a sense of social and political responsibility.[21]

[16] Gabriel Kolko, *The Roots of American Foreign Policy* (Boston 1969); Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, *The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy: 1945–1954* (New York 1972); see also Charles S. Maier, "Revisionism and the Interpretation of Cold War Origins," *Perspectives in American History*, IV (1970), 313-47.

[17] (New York 1927, 1938).

[18] For an exception, see Douglas Pike, *Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam* (Cambridge, Mass. 1966).

[19] See Edward Shils' introduction to Georges Sorel, *Reflections on Violence* (Glencoe, Ill. 1950).

[20] (Princeton 1960); (New York 1965).

[21] On the other hand, the *United States Strategic Bombing Survey*, which sought to assess the economic and sociopolitical consequences of strategic air warfare during World War II, constitutes an important large-scale *tour de force*, based on empirical efforts. In this case, the fact that it was sponsored by U. S. military authorities is irrelevant; the investigators' conclusions were at variance with the operational logic of

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Because of the absence of a paradigmatic theory of international relations and the availability of a mass of information that must be confronted, the study of international relations is in actuality a process of forecasting—that is, extrapolating from existing trends, with an *ad hoc* focus on the search for limiting or even reversing conditions in concurrent trends.[22] Such extrapolation involves both internal national trends and trends in relations between nation-states. Since that is the present state of the field, the intellectual issue is to enrich this mode of analysis. The most effective approach is to identify the elements and dimensions that actually or potentially limit or reverse ongoing trends. Obviously, this involves an eclectic assembling of variables and dimensions from a number of different academic disciplines and some arbitrary ordering of their importance and consequences.

Morton Kaplan has pioneered in the systems analysis of international relations, but his aspiration appears to be too overreaching.[23] In a way, international relations can be considered as a system, but a system which is imperfect and unstable. In fact, it makes sense to speak of the systemic analysis of international relations if the model, rather than being a mechanistic and closed system, is a set of loose institutional arrangements based on the master trends of economic and military potentials, and reflects the voluntaristic and purposeful designs and accommodations of political leadership.

The term "systemic analysis" is designed to underline the assertion that there is no global, self-contained, and paradigmatic theory of international relations. Therefore, systemic analysis is not the same as systems analysis. Instead, the intellectual analysis of international relations can be pressed, not to predict the future, but to assist men in avoiding self-fulfilling prophecies. The purpose is to clarify present and emerging trends in order to assess the consequences of alternative policies and efforts at international institution building. Current exercises in "futurology" distort the real potentials of alternative models of international relations—highlighting the dilemmas which the leaders of advanced industrial societies face in adapting their institutions to economic and sociopolitical change.[24]

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the U. S. Air Force. Likewise, the fact that its findings had no impact on U. S. military policy is unfortunate, but its intellectual worth makes it a central contribution to the field of international relations. U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey, Morale Division, *The Effects of Strategic Bombing on German Morale, March–July, 1945*, I (Washington, D.C. 1947); U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey, Reports, *Pacific War, The Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japanese Morale* (Washington, D.C. 1945).

[22] Otis Dudley Duncan, *Toward Social Reporting: Next Steps* (New York 1969).

[23] Kaplan, *System and Process in International Politics* (New York 1957).

[24] Herman Kahn and Anthony J. Wiener, *The Year 2000: A Framework for Speculation on the Next Thirty-Three Years* (New York 1967).

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In building systemic models of international relations, one conventionally starts with economic and military elements and uses political elements as coordinating mechanisms. In recent years, there have also been efforts to incorporate psychological elements.[25] With the declining legitimacy of military force—because of the utter destructiveness of military technology and because of the internal sociopolitical tensions of an advanced industrial society—the social dimensions of international relations come into prominence. The notion of legitimacy and the crisis of legitimacy in military force is one formulation of the sociological dimension of international relations. It is dangerous to develop a sociological model of international relations, since it can quickly reduce itself to issues of manpower and morale or questions of ethics divorced from political reality. But basically, the changing function of the military is in part a reflection of these issues of norms and legitimacy.[26] Systemic analysis of international relations can therefore be enriched by the appropriate infusion of the sociological analysis of institutions, social structures, and institution building.

Two interrelated assumptions about the nature of advanced industrial societies and the impact of the industrial order offer a point of departure. They are relevant for linking the transformation of the internal social structure of an advanced industrial nation with trends in the international arena.

First, under conditions of advanced industrialism, there is a profound diffusion or dispersion of power and of authority within the nation-state and in the linkages between advanced industrialized states and the rest of the world community. There is, of course, a striking paradox: elements of diffusion and dispersion are compatible with elements of persistent and increased concentration of power and authority. We cannot assume that we are dealing with a closed system; however, the contemporary process of transformation of authority is difficult to comprehend.

Sociologists have spoken of functional interdependence to describe the process by which the division of labor in institutions becomes more complex and specialized. Mannheim has offered the notion of "fundamental democratization" to point to the normative and political implications of this development in the social order.[27] There is some merit in this formulation, although there is also a possibility of confusion,

[25] The pioneer effort was Harold D. Lasswell, *World Politics and Personal Insecurity* (New York 1965); see also Alex Strachey, *The Unconscious Motives of War* (New York 1957); Maurice L. Farber, "Psychoanalytic Hypotheses in the Study of War," *Journal of Social Issues*, XI, No. 1 (1955), 29-35.

[26] See, for example, Richard H. Tawney, *The Acquisitive Society* (New York 1920).

[27] Mannheim (fn. 3), 109-29.

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since he does not use "democracy" in the parliamentary sense. He is oriented to the residual power that emerges as formerly excluded groups increasingly enter the mainstream of society. In the United States, the trend toward fundamental democratization first became noticeable during the mobilization efforts of World War I, but its full implication developed and became more manifest during the Second Indochina War.

Since 1945, the most striking development in the internal social structure of Western parliamentary democracies has been the residual power that accrues to formerly excluded or low-status groups—minorities, unskilled workers, youth, old people, or women. The complexity of the division of labor and of functional interdependency plus new normative trends are key elements. Often the power of these groups is more negative than positive, but that is the implication of residual power. The new trends do not negate the persistence of extensive disparity and inequality in resources and privileges. This observation merely seeks to place the residual power in the context of the social structure of an advanced industrial society; its result is an increase in political tension and an undermining of political legitimacy. The difficulties of making effective political decisions become central. There is persistent tension between elite groups and pervasive veto groups. Political systems can operate on the basis of a gap between aspiration and actual practice, but the strains from the pressure of fundamental democratization are profound on the domestic scene. They result in chronic social conflict or national political stagnation, rather than in new revolutionary circumstances.[28]

At the international level, the same diffusion of power and authority can be noted. It reflects internal domestic changes and changes in the structure of international relations.[29] The phrase, "the shift from a bipolar to a multipolar world community," fails to capture adequately the complexity and content of this transformation. The diffusion of power involves the linkages between major nation-states; and simultaneously, within each region, a related process occurs among the smaller nation-states. The dispersion of residual power is striking, despite the enormous concentration of resources among the advanced industrial nations. As in the case of patterns of internal domestic authority, the increase in functional interdependence is operative; normative and ideological values have enlarged impact. Some writers

[28] Ralf Dahrendorf, *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society* (Stanford 1959); Barrington Moore, *Reflections on the Causes of Human Misery and Upon Certain Proposals to Eliminate Them* (Boston 1972).

[29] F. H. Hinsley, *Sovereignty* (New York 1966).

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believed that this fundamental democratization between nations, especially in the context of nuclear weapons systems, should result in invigorated competition between nations with attendant international stability, in an analog to the competitive process of the marketplace. However, the actual process of dispersion of power and authority produces no inherent increase in stability. As in the case of the impact of fundamental democratization on domestic social structure, the effect on international relations is persistent tension and great difficulty in achieving accommodation and effective political decisions.

Second, under advanced industrialism, both internally and internationally, the interplay of force and persuasion undergoes a transformation. An admixture of persuasion and force has traditionally been the central element in diplomacy. The calculus of force and persuasion has been modified so that there is good reason to speak of an increase and intensification in the fusion or articulation of persuasion and force, including the threat of force. In the period of mass armies and traditional warfare among industrialized nations up through World War I, there seems to have been a phasing or periodicity in the use of persuasion and coercion.[30] There was more of a separation between normal international relations and the application of force. The breakdown of the balance of power led to the use of force, and "victory" was pursued by the means at hand. Although there were intermittent periods of high tension, war followed peace and peace followed hostilities.

Under the technology and politics of deterrence and involvement in peripheral warfare, the threat of force and force itself are more continually invoked with concurrent efforts at persuasion. The process is one of gradually escalating and de-escalating force, of "fighting" and simultaneously "negotiating," of pursuing divergent means in different specific sectors of the international arena. In part, this process reflects the effort to avoid the use of great amounts of force; in part, it reflects the consequences of greater functional interdependence, in which the opposing powers must take into consideration the enlarged arenas of common interest. There is, at each step, a potent inhibition against using more powerful weapons. The symbolic aspects of force become more and more central. The fusion of force and persuasion partially reflects changes in the normative structure of international relations.

In Western political democracies, the same transformation in the balance of force and persuasion manifests itself internally—for example, in the efforts to control race relations, student protests, and labor rela-

[30] Hans Speier, *Social Order and the Risks of War* (Cambridge, Mass. 1969).

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tions, and even in the handling of bank robbers. The police are prepared to use personnel who specialize in negotiations with bank robbers holding hostages rather than to apply the force at their disposal. The application of force is not a periodic, all-or-nothing event: it is a continuous aspect of the social process, which must be moderated in terms of self-interest and recognition of the unanticipated consequences of the use of force.

The consequence of both (a) increased functional interdependence and "fundamental democratization" of residual power and (b) the fusion and moderation in the use of force and persuasion is a new level of complexity and fragility in international relations. It is not enough to assert that, because of nuclear weapons, there has been no major or total war between advanced industrial nations for more than a quarter of a century although levels of tension and the scope of armed conflict have been persistent and unacceptably high. It is necessary to offer hypotheses about the increased limits of military intervention since the end of World War II.

FORCE AND THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER

Inequality is an outstanding aspect of the international order and the same can be said of the internal social structure of any society, including the advanced industrial societies. Over the last quarter century, inequality between nations has probably declined less than inequality within nations, especially within advanced industrialized states. There is reason to believe that inequality between the industrialized and the less developed nations has in fact increased. Within advanced industrialized states, those persons who are not members of the middle majority—the sick, the aged, elements of the unskilled, and welfare recipients—may well find themselves with enduring disabilities that exclude them from the material benefits of affluence.

In some fundamental sense, the role of military force is designed to support the inequalities between nations or at least does so in fact (as domestic police power contributes to internal social stratification). This assertion does not deny that military force contributes to the maintenance of a world "order"—no matter how unstable—in which economic, educational, and administrative processes can and do operate to reduce existing degrees of inequality.

However, the hypothesis appears relevant that, at the international level, the capacity of advanced industrialized nations to maintain their economic advantages by reliance on military force has markedly declined. The cost of a military establishment is so huge that there is much greater advantage to be gained by reducing or even limiting military

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expenditures than by using the threat of force to achieve economic advantage.[31] Critics of a variety of political persuasions now generally concede that military expenditures are not needed to maintain the economic vitality of a "capitalist" society in the West, and that military expenditures are a tremendous burden to the Soviet Union during its continuing press for industrial growth.[32] Nuclear weapons rule out the possibility of drastically restructuring the "zones of influence," as was done after World War II. Moreover, on the contemporary international scene, the less developed nations will not as readily succumb to a show of the flag or a military presence. Of course, this does not rule out specific intervention to deny important resources to an opponent. To use the language of economics, the marginal utility of the military function has declined.

In addition, the psychological returns of a military force with nuclear weapons have grave limitations. "National security" and "defense of the motherland" are in part a matter of psychic security and of honor, prestige, and the positive attraction of membership in a collectivity. The phrase "world politics and personal insecurity," offered by Harold D. Lasswell, is a focal but neglected aspect of the transformation of international relations. The sheer accumulation of weapons—especially nuclear weapons—does not necessarily reduce anxiety.

The mass of the citizenry continues to support policies which are represented as essential for nuclear deterrence, although there may be extensive political debate about alternative strategies and levels of budgetary allocation. Popular support for national security is in part an expression of personal anxiety. However, the threat of mass destruction produces privatization as well as moral revulsion. There has been a long-term decline in enthusiasm for national war making. Popular support at the outbreak of World War I gave way to realistic participation during World War II, and the prospect of a third world war produces psychological numbness.[33] Since 1945, sharp outbursts of neutralism have demonstrated these pressures. During a period of military détente such feelings will become more prominent, and, although likely to be limited to a minority of the population, "psychological" neutralism can have extensive political consequences.

[31] Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *World Armaments and Disarmaments*, SIPRI Yearbook 1973 (Stockholm 1973); see also SIPRI Yearbooks for 1968–69, 1969–70, and 1972; United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures, 1971* (Washington, D.C. 1972).

[32] Stanley Lieberson, "An Empirical Study of Military-Industrial Linkages," in Sam C. Sarkesian, ed., *The Military-Industrial Complex: A Reassessment*, Sage Research Series on War, Revolution, and Peacekeeping, Vol. II (Beverly Hills 1972), 53-94.

[33] Ernst Kris and Nathan Leites, "Trends in Twentieth Century Propaganda," *Psychoanalysis and the Social Sciences*, 1 (1947), 393-409.

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The mass media, especially television in its day-to-day reporting of violence from Indochina to Northern Ireland, serve to increase the negative psychological consequences of military intervention. Military institutions have a diminished ability to contribute to psychological security: the reality and the imagery of violence produce higher levels of personal insecurity, leading to apathy and withdrawal.[84]

At the same time, there is a countertrend that is difficult to explain but understandable. For some persons, prolonged exposure to the international threat of mass destruction contributes to a weakening of their commitment to the internal order. The consequences are increased personal expression of diffuse violence. Personal insecurity and generalized dissatisfactions, especially among young groups, produce a noteworthy incidence of diffuse violence—at times with political overtones, but more often simply sheer outbursts of aggressive behavior. Therefore, it is necessary to face the hypothesis that not only has the ability of the military to contribute to a sense of personal security declined; but massive military preparations and expenditures (including those on nuclear weapons) contribute to diffuse and aggressive internal disorder.

Any examination of weapons control thus involves an inquiry into fundamental psychological insecurities. For example, the atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons heightened personal insecurity and became the focal point for mass agitation. In turn, the ending of atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons was more a psychological advance than a strategic one, but it was a significant step because it reduced personal insecurity. The prospect of joint Russian-American exploration in space, given its dramatic content, offers an interesting and promising potential step for containing and reducing the massive insecurity that nuclear weapons have been generating since 1945.

At the political level, the utility and legitimacy of military forces and military intervention—particularly for the Western political democracies—in maintaining and strengthening political alliances have tended to develop built-in limitations. The United States and the Soviet Union and, increasingly, Communist China, have built their foreign policy on a tangled web of politico-military alliances of varying degrees of involvement. While the structures of NATO and of the Warsaw Pact operate as keystones in the existing definitions of national security, the effective utility of military forces for building political alliances requires reassessment on the basis of a worldwide perspective.

The NATO experience until the middle of the 1960's represents, for

[84] For an evaluation of the impact of violence on television on social personality, see U. S. Public Health Service, The Surgeon-General's Scientific Advisory Committee on Television and Social Behavior, *Television and Growing Up: The Impact of Televised Violence* (Washington, D.C. 1972).

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the United States, a case where a military alliance successfully served to strengthen political arrangements. The NATO system was built on existing elements of political agreement, plus the expectation that American military forces were designed to deal with the threats posed by the Soviet Union while being in fact excluded from the internal political affairs of the Western European states which were in the alliance. The Warsaw Pact, by contrast, was built on the basis of a military occupation. The Soviet Union has used its forces for intervention in the internal politics of Warsaw Pact states and continues to reserve the option for direct military intervention in their domestic affairs.

In the industrialized context of Europe, the patterns and consequences of military alliances are very different from those of the developing countries. Throughout most of the developing states, military alliances and support involve some measure of direct or indirect involvement in the domestic internal security of the assisted state. With few notable exceptions, attempts to build an immediate political base by military assistance to the developing countries have been of limited and problematic consequence. The effectiveness of military alliances rests on the important element of political stability. It seems military alliances can operate only if there already exists a strong political base for the alliance. But military assistance often weakens the required political support, especially if it becomes an object of domestic political attack.

These observations do not deny the significance of particular military alliances that exist. They also do not deny that particular developing countries seek to develop programs of multiple assistance in order to maintain an element of independence and flexibility. The essential issue in the case of the economic, psychological, and political utility of military forces and military assistance in the context of deterrence is not to be assessed in terms of immediate power positions alone, but also in the broader perspective of the stabilizing and destabilizing effects of military forces on the international order.

STRATEGY VERSUS STABILIZATION IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

In the effort to reconceptualize the consequences—actual and desired—that the military systems of the advanced industrial states can have on international relations, it will be useful to assess the impact of some of the major intellectual formulations that have been developed since 1945.[35] The purpose is less to explore their actual influence—important

[35] The main outlines of "classical" military strategy in terms of which contemporary conceptions can be assessed are to be found in Gordon Craig, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy* (Princeton 1963).

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though that may be—and more to evaluate in retrospect their analytic adequacy.

In the years immediately after 1945, basic political decisions about military policy took place in the United States amid a vast outpouring of military and governmental studies and writings from academic circles.[36] It will remain for future intellectual historians to evaluate this effort fully. But the interim assessment can be made that most of these sources failed to clarify the effective limits within which military intervention, actual and symbolic, could operate. In retrospect, the bulk of these intellectual efforts seems not as productive of detached analytical explorations of alternatives as it is representative of an obsessive drive to insure that technological and organizational resources have their "maximum" military utility. One only has to reread Henry A. Kissinger's *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, published as late as 1957, to be reminded that the limitations of military intervention were not central to the mainstream of strategic analysis by academics.[37] The possibilities and conditions for a trend toward military détente were not even postulated in Kissinger's effort. Of course, there were writers who, after 1945, saw the fundamental transformation in the military function, but they were clearly in the minority.[38]

However, the issue is much more complex when one examines the link between the formulation of military strategy and the actualities of foreign relations. The central issue for the intellectual historian is not merely one of tracing the emergence of a transformation of strategic analysis. The essential historical problem is to explain why the traditional notions of the military function were immediately abandoned in the development of politico-military policy and practices in Western Europe, while in the Far East, and even more specifically in Southeast Asia, the process of adjustment to new realities came with agonizing slowness.[39] In fact, the outbreak of the Korean War and the first Indo-

[36] See Cecil H. Uyehara, "Scientific Advice and the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty" in Sanford A. Lakoff, ed., *Knowledge and Power* (New York 1966), 112-61; Robert Gilpin, *American Scientists and Nuclear Weapons Policy* (Princeton 1962); Gene M. Lyons and Louis Morton, *School for Strategy: Education and Research in National Security Affairs* (New York 1965).

[37] In assessing the marked difference in the success of U. S. foreign policy as between Western Europe and Southeast Asia, a reading of George Kennan, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," *Foreign Affairs*, XXV (July 1947), 566-82, is most helpful. First, there is no meaningful reference to nuclear weapons in his analysis. Second, he speaks of the need for "adroit and vigilant application of counter force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points." However, Kennan writes essentially about foreign policy in Europe, and does not draw the implication of his position for the Middle East or the Far East.

[38] P. M. S. Blackett, *Atomic Weapons and East-West Relations* (New York 1956).

[39] For an analysis of the "intelligence" dimension in U. S. decision making, see Roger Hilsman, *Strategic Intelligence and National Decisions* (Glencoe, Ill. 1956).

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china conflict acted as a stochastic process which inhibited adaptation to the requirements of a nuclear foreign policy.[40]

The dominant strategic "advice" offered from 1945 to 1960 was, on the whole, irrelevant to the central issues of the stabilization of nuclear weapons. During this period, the central strategic conception was the distinction between tactical and strategic nuclear weapons. No doubt this notion had a variety of origins, including internal military staff work, but the writings of civilian scholars contributed to its currency.[41] Even the most superficial examination of the literature reveals no conceptual or operational basis for the distinction, which was without rational purpose and lacked precision. At the time it was offered, it encountered determined and persistent critiques. It was one of those intellectual inventions which have little effective consequence, and it perished because of its political defects. It was essentially a notion generated by the intellectuals' fascination with violence, and designed to avoid the analysis of the limitations of military intervention in a nuclear context. Billions of dollars were spent on the development and deployment of tactical nuclear weapons. It is striking that the notion of tactical nuclear weapons was incorporated into the language of NATO defense exercises without significant destabilizing results. In effect, these weapons operated partially as elements in the strategic deployment of nuclear weapons—or were so considered by the Soviet Union.[42]

If, during the period after 1945, the main analytic contribution to military strategy was the distinction between strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, in the 1960's a new generation of nuclear weapons and a search for military détente were accompanied by an equally dubious strategic distinction, that between defensive and offensive nuclear weapons.

Technological developments and changes in the sociopolitical environment, both domestic and international, had signaled to the political leadership of both the Soviet Union and the United States that some form of strategic limitation on nuclear weapons would be re-

[40] Townsend Hoopes, *The Limits of Intervention: An Inside Account of How the Johnson Policy of Escalation in Vietnam Was Reversed* (New York 1969); Clifford Clark, "A Vietnam Reappraisal," *Foreign Affairs*, XLVII (July 1969), 601-22. For an early assessment of the requirements for negotiating the end of the Indochina War, see Lloyd A. Fallers, Clifford Geertz, and Morris Janowitz, "The Policy Proposals: A Negotiated Stalemate" in *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists: A Journal of Science and Public Affairs* (June 1965), 42-45.

[41] Bernard Brodie, "Nuclear Weapons: Strategic or Tactical," in *Foreign Affairs*, XXXII (January 1954), 217-29, and *Escalation and the Nuclear Option* (Princeton 1966); Henry A. Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* (New York 1957).

[42] Herbert S. Dinerstein, *War and the Soviet Union: Nuclear Weapons and the Revolution in Soviet Military and Political Thinking* (New York 1959); Thomas W. Wolfe, *Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads* (Cambridge, Mass. 1964).

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quired. To allow existing trends to continue would have created greater economic burdens and increasing international tension, because of the complexity and destructiveness of the new weapons. In more basic terms, some element of détente was needed to enhance the legitimacy of the political leadership and to allow them to govern with greater effectiveness. The pressure for détente did not mean that the new cycle of military preparation was abandoned, since existing internal political pressures and limitations on institutional arrangements for negotiations required its continuation. Nor did it imply that the Soviet Union, with its particular internal decision-making process, would not in specific arenas of international relations seek to press to the limits.

The core technological element in the transformation of the nuclear deterrent, which came into being in the 1960's, rested only in part on the increased destructive weight of the new weapons. It was rooted more in the imputed accuracy of delivery and, at the same time, in the greater capacity for directing nuclear weapons to alternative targets. In essence, these developments came to be defined as destabilizing; they caused a qualitative and quantitative intensification of the arms race. The response was to make launching sites more invulnerable, either by hardening them or by increasing their dispersion, and increasing reliance on submarines and the development of antiballistic missiles.

No doubt these technological developments were the precondition for a new threshold in the management of nuclear deterrence and, without political accommodation, they would have contributed markedly to an intensification of a "doomsday" sentiment. However, the emergence of the distinction between defensive and offensive weapons complicated and slowed the search for some form of strategic arms limitation, no matter how restricted. Although a variety of writers have contributed to the distinction, Fred C. Iklé's article, "Can Nuclear Deterrence Last Out the Century?" is a useful statement of the implication of this distinction, although he proceeds implicitly rather than explicitly.[48] According to Iklé, defensive weapons are those aimed at or threatening the enemy's offensive nuclear weapons, while offensive weapons are those aimed at or threatening civilian populations. When one superpower is faced with "numerical" parity in nuclear weapons, or even inferiority, as well as uncertainty about the vulnerability of its own nuclear deterrent, it will of necessity aim its weapons at the enemy's civilian population. It may, in this view, be forced to launch its weapons upon warning of attack rather than to respond in graduated measure. To hold civil populations hostage is considered

[48] *Foreign Affairs*, LI (January 1973), 267-85.

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immoral and unworthy of a nation such as the United States. Instead, the United States must emphasize the development of defensive nuclear weapons—that is, weapons invulnerable to enemy attack, which can be launched on a graduated basis and which, in particular, are aimed at the enemy's offensive weapons.

The fierce pressure, both in the United States and in the Soviet Union, to implement this strategic distinction can, at best, only slow the search for some form of strategic arms limitation. It is basically an imprecise distinction, which has the unanticipated consequence of continuing the image of an inevitable arms race. It will strengthen and perpetuate the prospect of the "doomsday machine," couched in the language of higher morality. First, the argument that it relies on defensive nuclear weapons has not produced and could not produce a positive ethical response. Advocates of the defensive nuclear strategy cannot in fact hold that such a strategy would make the use of nuclear weapons more acceptable, and their ethical argument is thus much too formalistic to have any transcendental value.

Second, there is no effective basis for making such a distinction. Of course an antiballistic missile is different from an intercontinental missile. However, the implementation of this concept would at best produce limited changes in the weapons systems being developed and deployed, would require greater expenditure of efforts, and, in reality, would increase the overall nuclear weapons apparatus. The advocates of the defensive-offensive distinction serve the useful purpose of alerting the political leadership and informed citizens to the complex and uncertain elements in the new nuclear deterrence. In particular, they emphasize the danger of accidents and of imprecise and ineffective control over nuclear weapons. These complexities and uncertainties would be applicable to defensive weapons in any enlarged system.

Third, politically the distinction between defensive and offensive strategy leads mainly to a continuation of nuclear weapons development, since the advocates are hardly concerned with assessing the mechanisms—technological and political—for containing the arms race. In essence, a massive system of nuclear weapons—if organized in terms of defensive-offensive weapons—presents the prospect of a never-ending and ever-accelerating arms race with profoundly destabilizing consequences. In contrast, recognition among political leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States that strategic arms agreements, no matter how limited, are a desirable goal appears powerful enough to overcome the argument of technical experts committed to the distinction between defensive and offensive nuclear systems, and to stimulate a search—political and technical—for alternatives.

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STABILIZING VERSUS DESTABILIZING MILITARY SYSTEMS

Instead of the classic concepts of strategic versus tactical, or offensive versus defensive, the alternative formulation, stabilizing versus destabilizing, is more useful for assessing the contemporary function of the military in international relations. The classic terms can be used to describe the technological dimensions of the military. But the notion of stabilizing and destabilizing is designed to reflect the politico-military processes at work in international relations. As shown above, the terms "stabilizing" and "destabilizing" compel one to consider the sociopolitical context of military systems in the search for a viable international system: the avoidance of nuclear war and the containment of peripheral military confrontations.

The central issue is to assess the stabilizing versus destabilizing consequences of alternative approaches to military détente, recognizing the asymmetrical constriction of conscripted manpower for the NATO forces in contrast to the Warsaw Pact states. A review of the years 1945 to 1968—from the first use of nuclear weapons to the active negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union about strategic arms limitations—is a precondition for assessing the trends that emerged after 1968, when the second phase in post-World War II international relations began.

To speak of stabilized systems of nuclear weapons implies the expectation that future weapons development will be economically manageable and also will not present the political specter of a perpetual, overpowering, and uncontrollable "doomsday" arms race, although some continuous change would be built in. In other words, nuclear weapons can be managed without consuming excessively large amounts of resources and producing such high levels of personal insecurity as to transform advanced industrial society into a type of garrison state in which the search for more and "better" nuclear systems becomes an omnipotent goal.

The hypothesis can be offered that between 1945 and 1968, although there was no explicit system of arms control, the development of nuclear weapons remained within tolerable limits of stabilization. The deployment of conventional forces, especially ground forces in Western Europe, supported this stabilized development. In contrast, the use of conventional forces in Southeast Asia had a destabilizing effect on that area and, in turn, on worldwide international relations.

It was a period when deterrence operated to avoid the outbreak of nuclear war without any fundamental politico-military realignments that could be viewed by any of the three central powers as basically

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threatening to the structure of the world community. However, the period 1945–1968 was only partly stabilizing at the level of nuclear weapons. Insufficient steps were taken to develop explicit systems of arms control and to anticipate a future in which more complex nuclear weapons would be deployed, and economic and political factors would require a more active search for a military détente. The destabilizing consequences of military intervention in the Second Indochina War reduced and delayed the United States ability to take the initiative in negotiating with the Soviet Union about strategic arms limitation and a restructuring of conventional forces in Western Europe, and contributed to increased destabilization throughout the world community, especially in the Middle East.

In 1945 it was clear that, while the United States had "numerical" superiority in nuclear weapons, the possibility of an outbreak of nuclear war was very remote, although effective steps had to be taken to prevent accidental warfare or miscalculation. The bulk of the strategic literature of that period, predicting or accounting for developments, can be readily dismissed. It would have been much too much to expect the United States political elite to begin realistic negotiations with the Soviet Union in 1950 on the basis of nuclear parity, which was to develop only at the end of the 1960's as a prerequisite of the SALT talks. However, there was no possibility of preventing the Soviet Union from achieving such parity if the United States was to remain a humane and democratic society.

In essence, the political leadership of the Soviet Union and the United States recognized the utter destructive capacity and unpredictability of nuclear weapons in any military confrontation between NATO and Warsaw Pact nations. The achievement of nuclear deterrence and relative stability between 1945 and 1968 is a reflection, not merely of weapons systems, but of political arrangements and normative patterns at the international level. The social structure and political posture of the United States initially ruled out a preventive attack on the Soviet Union. The NATO military system had at its disposal an adequate number of ground forces to achieve its deterrent role in the nuclear context. The ground-force structure of NATO, especially the very sizable American contingent, indicated a relatively stable political context, uninfluenced by the fears of a nuclear holocaust that could have produced excessive neutralism. Nor, on the other hand, was there a move toward an independent European deterrent under Franco-German hegemony, which would have been highly destabilizing from the point of view of Soviet-American relations. Moreover, the military presence of the United States insured the continued division of Germany, which was essential

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for the postwar reconstruction of both Western and Eastern Europe and for the long-term stability of the West.

During the Eisenhower Administration, while the Soviet Union was engaged in the first steps toward nuclear parity, there was in the United States an extensive effort to develop civilian defense. These measures collapsed, initially because of public indifference and later because of congressional reluctance to allocate the required funds. After a very brief period of limited hysteria, the penetration of a "doomsday" outlook into their day-to-day life proved not to be acceptable to the citizens of the United States, who thereby served to contain the level of international tension. A massive civilian defense program would have been destabilizing at that time because it would have weakened the credibility of the United States strategic intentions of avoiding nuclear war. It would also have weakened the social fabric of the United States by further distorting the values of everyday life.

The effectiveness of nuclear deterrence in the NATO-Warsaw Pact balance was enhanced by the limited but symbolically significant efforts at international arms control. These steps produced no more than marginal technical adjustments, but underlined the intention to keep military developments within credible and acceptable limits. (The accords started with the denuclearization of Antarctica, partial test bans, prohibition of nuclear weapons in outer space and in the sea bed, and the construction of the hot line.)

In contrast to the relatively stabilized military balance—conventional and nuclear—in Western Europe, which lasted until the middle of the 1960's, the progressive deployment and utilization of military force in the Far East had a very different impact, which was essentially destabilizing. In essence, the basic source of the destabilization was the failure to develop those political arrangements with Communist China which were blocked from 1947 on by domestic American political agitation. All available evidence indicates that, at the close of World War II and subsequently, Communist China would have been amenable to political initiatives comparable to those which were launched after 1968, and which would have taken into consideration the relations of China both with the Soviet Union and with other nation-states of the Far East and Southeast Asia. Instead, American foreign policy mechanically sought to apply the format of Western Europe without appropriate adaptation to the realities of the social structure of the Far East.

For a brief moment, the possibility of the use of "tactical" nuclear weapons to support the declining fortunes of the French in Indochina, particularly in the context of "white" military forces against Asiatic

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formations, proved highly destabilizing. This prospect created the specter of disaster for the world community. It was effectively avoided, but only after extensive destabilizing consequences.

Deployment of conventional forces, especially ground forces, failed to take into account the process of decolonization and emergent nationalism in the Far East and in Southeast Asia. After the defeat of Japan, the reimposition of colonial systems was not militarily feasible and was sure to be politically destabilizing. Initially, United States policy was oriented toward the goal of decolonization and the emergence of independent nation-states with their own indigenous military forces. The conventional United States military presence had to conform to these politico-military requirements. In the British and Dutch colonies, this objective was basically achieved, but lack of political decisiveness in Indochina presented the crucial and fatal exception. (The political error was rooted not only in tacit and then open support of French military intervention, but also in allocating a role to China in the initial occupation of Indochina.)

In retrospect—although there is no point in rewriting history—if the Nixon policies toward Nationalist China on Formosa which were implemented after 1968 had been initiated in 1946–47, alternative political and military arrangements for Korea and particularly Indochina might have been possible. However, the prolongation of the Second Indochina War was a major destabilizing process in the international arena after 1945. One of the causes was the limited effectiveness of U.S. military intervention, especially in its conventional strategic air attacks and the absence of adequate international political legitimacy of the effort. Later, limitations in the North Vietnamese military effort emerged. The failure of their tank offensive in spring 1972 (which was blunted by tactical airpower and the increased accuracy of United States bombing of the North in the fall of 1972) created the military conditions for the acceptance of a "cease-fire." It was clear, however, from the early 1960's on, that a contraction of American military involvement in the Second Indochina War depended on a direct initiative by the United States to satisfy the political objectives of Communist China.

The vast amount of documentation about the outbreak of the Second Indochina War has obscured the central issue: the demise of the determined United States military opposition to deploying ground forces on the mainland of Asia, which had become especially strong after Korea. The leaders of this opposition were called members of the "never-again club." Before 1960, key U.S. military leaders had been

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opposed to large-scale ground involvement in Southeast Asia. Likewise, the limits of military intervention had been recognized in the military plans that were developed, calling for one million to one million two hundred thousand men as the requirement for a ground force in Vietnam.[44]

It is arbitrary to take 1968 as the starting date of the second era in post-World War II politico-military development; no doubt it will be subject to reformulation in later retrospection. In that year, however, the internal political scene in the United States—changed because of the election of President Richard M. Nixon—shifted to permit de-escalation of the war in Vietnam, and to make possible new political initiatives with the Soviet Union and, later, with Communist China. President Nixon's election also permitted the political decision to start unilateral disarmament in the United States by ending the draft. In effect, 1968 was a political benchmark for response to developments which had been in progress since the early 1960's—for example, the growing "numerical nuclear parity" of the Soviet Union, the increased complexity of nuclear weapons, the limitations on American intervention in the Second Indochina War, the increased recognition of the limitations of military assistance programs to developing nations, the emerging tension between the Soviet Union and China, and the internal problems of advanced industrial countries, including the Soviet Union.

The initiatives toward détente sought a new stabilization, but contained actual and potential elements of destabilization. Starting in 1968, the legitimate utility of military force required new arrangements to stabilize the nuclear deterrent under conditions of nominal nuclear parity. It is of course assumed that political elites in the United States would not accept "marked" Russian nuclear superiority. A stabilized nuclear deterrent cannot be defined only in technological terms, namely, as an inhibited commitment of economic resources. Politically, it would be necessary to prevent both reactive neutralism and aggressive nationalism in Western Europe. Reactive neutralism would lead to significant pressure to opt out of nuclear defense arrangements be-

[44] It remains to be explained why the U. S. military did not follow its own professional judgment. The appropriate form of dissent would have been token resignation of the Chief of Staff, particularly the Chief of Staff of the ground forces, when he was assigned a task that he believed could obviously not be achieved with the resources placed at his disposal. The publication of the *Pentagon Papers* has probably postponed an analysis of this central issue, since the answer lies not in examination of specific documents but in the analysis of the workings of a military bureaucracy which in effect has become "overprofessionalized"—more prepared to follow orders than to exercise independent professional skill and judgment.

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cause of distrust of American intentions as being either too "forward" or too "unreliable," and could be assisted by high levels of privatization. On the other hand, aggressive nationalism might be attended by pressure for a more forward European defense posture. The political requirement of a stabilized nuclear deterrence would also involve the avoidance of an independent Western European deterrent, especially under Franco-German domination, which would be gravely destabilizing to United States-Soviet relations.

The complexities—technical, administrative, and political—encountered in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks underline the enormous difficulties of institution building for military stabilization after 1968. However, the main lines of strategic arms limitations began to emerge. The stabilizing elements include: institutionalization of arms control; negotiations as permanent mechanisms; improved unilateral and bilateral photoelectronic surveillance; further limitations on weapons testing; limitations on new launching complexes, including antiballistic missile systems and submarines; and improved hot-line procedures, including the stationing of joint military commissions in neutral territories. Moreover, the emerging patterns of strategic arms limitations face the incredibly complex task of political accommodation with Communist China.[45] This last is especially crucial since the United States would produce gravely destabilizing potentials if it were to seek to enhance its world position by a balance-of-power strategy of "playing off" the Soviet Union against Communist China.[46] These rivalries are likely to maintain themselves on their own accord, with destabilizing consequences. Negotiations with Communist China on strategic arms limitations might well begin earlier rather than later.

However, the core problem is not technical. It remains political, and is related in particular to the changed military function. The major political thrust of the period after 1968 has been to link strategic arms limitation negotiation to the issues of conventional forces in Western Europe. The stability of deterrence depends on the relevant contribution of conventional forces to the mechanics of deterrence, to internal political balance in the NATO structure, and to the political stability of each constituent nation. Paradoxically, despite the vast expenditure of the United States military, the central stabilizing element rests on the supply of an adequate number of conventional ground forces in Western Europe. The unilateral introduction of the all-volunteer force complicated this task; but with a viable professional reorientation, an

[45] Morton Halperin, *China and Nuclear Proliferation* (Chicago 1966).
[46] Raymond L. Garthoff, *Sino-Soviet Military Relations* (New York 1966).

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adequate force with legitimate military utility can be maintained even without conscription.[47]

In other words, under a stabilized foreign policy of "no more Vietnams," the United States would not station conventional ground forces outside Western Europe. (Correspondingly, the same would hold true for the Soviet Union and its external deployment in Eastern Europe.) The size of the remaining force has become subject to negotiation under a mutual balanced-reduction formula in the light of military and political requirements for nuclear deterrence and the worldwide search for military détente. Exceptions to the stationing of conventional forces by the United States and the Soviet Union exist outside of Europe, in American commitments in Korea and parallel Russian involvement in Egypt and Syria. Although they constitute potential points of negotiation, the political context indicates the possibility of protracted commitment and destabilization, especially in the Middle East.

Under a policy of "no more Vietnams," the United States would also retain a limited and uncommitted multiple-purpose contingency force on active duty, supported by a contracted and effective ready reserve. This force would have a reinforcement potential for NATO and, at the same time, serve as a deterrent to Russian ground-force deployment outside the Warsaw Pact region.

These conditions alter the role of naval forces. A stabilized military balance would involve the deployment of naval forces by both sides as an element of the NATO-Warsaw Pact mutual deterrence on both the North Atlantic and the East Mediterranean flanks. It can be expected that a naval presence ranging widely over the globe, for diffuse objectives of national prestige and presumed political advantage, will continue with only marginal politico-military consequences. Greater expansion of naval power as, for example, in the Indian Ocean, presents potentials for delimited elements of destabilization, but local nationalist sentiment serves as a partial counterweight. There is also the ever-present issue of avoiding naval accidents, which is already being pursued by direct negotiation and treaty between the Soviet Union and the United States.[48]

Elements of destabilization also exist in the competition which the United States and the Soviet Union have generated with respect to the developing countries. However, since 1968 a more realistic perspective

[47] Janowitz, "Volunteer Armed Forces and Military Purpose," *Foreign Affairs*, L (April 1972), 427-43; Erwin Hackel, "Military Manpower and Political Purpose," *Adelphi Papers* No. 72 (London 1970).

[48] Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, *Prevention of Incidents on the High Seas* (Agreement signed at Moscow 1972).

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has been emerging as military assistance programs have been shown to have very limited military utility. Unilateral and bilateral restraint is the key device that can lead to relevant reductions and refinements without denying genuine national needs or a concern for regional security. One crucial exception, the military assistance race in the Middle East since 1968, has created a trend toward greater destabilization. The search for worldwide military détente between the major powers requires powerful initiatives to deal with these instabilities. The concern of the United States to reduce the instabilities that operated in Vietnam appear to have limited its intent and/or capacity to make the tensions of the Middle East a central element in its détente posture. Alternatively, the Soviet Union has defined the search for détente as compatible with a "forward" military assistance policy in the Middle East. However, the outbreak of military hostilities in 1973 can be taken to reflect the elements of initiative and dispersion of power to client states rather than merely the overriding calculus of the great powers.

The ability of major powers to alter the political structure of developing nations by political manipulation, subversion, support of guerrilla groups, and other types of covert operations has no doubt been exaggerated, although there have been particularly striking cases. These attempts may well continue, even though massive efforts in Latin America, for example, have failed. Moreover, in the Western political democracies, there is growing recognition that measures of defense against internal subversion depend on viable political leadership as much as on military or paramilitary institutions. The appeals to nationalistic sentiment and reliance on indigenous political resources have demonstrated their effectiveness, so that a belief in the inevitable success of Communist-dominated coups and revolts has come to an end. This is not to overlook the destabilizing elements of direct colonial rule where it still persists. However, under conditions of nuclear deterrence, there is real danger that military officers will seek to maintain a traditional definition of the military function by such means as a strong emphasis on various forms of "counterinsurgency." The specter of Western officers and intelligence operatives "going native" and leading indigenous forces dies hard, especially under the circumstances of continued military assistance from the Soviet Union and China to developing nations. However, for a stabilized world balance, the less direct the intervention the better, since such a policy allows nationalism to operate as a counterpressure.

In partial summary, it can be said that narrower limits of the military function have emerged for advanced industrialized nations, especially those with parliamentary institutions. But to speak of narrower

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limits hardly alters the centrality of force—especially force that is legitimate in international relations and oriented toward stabilizing international relations.

INSTITUTION BUILDING FOR MILITARY STABILIZATION

The fusion of new concepts with the day-to-day realities of military organization has presented, and continues to present, deep problems in institution building. The behavior and perspectives of the military are influenced by the immediate realities of manning particular weapons systems as much as they are by the formulation of doctrine. These day-to-day realities maintain traditional combat philosophies. It is true that, in the parliamentary nations of the West, the terminology of deterrence has been incorporated into the language of the professional officer. There is much discussion of the phrase, "peacekeeping through a military presence." The phraseology of the deterrent force in the format of a constabulary or various alternatives is extensively debated in military circles. The formulation presented in *The Professional Soldier* continues to require clarification and explication. "The military establishment becomes a constabulary force when it is continuously prepared to act, committed to the minimum use of force and seeks viable international relations rather than victory, because it has incorporated a protective military posture."[49] However, verbal pronouncements are not reliable indicators of institutional change.

It is difficult to assess the actual and potential capacity of a military organization to transform itself and to meet its changed function. To move beyond the strategy of deterrence and consider issues of stabilization versus destabilization will be even more difficult. In the Soviet Union, the existence of a capacity to fight a conventional war in Europe, the possibility of intervention in socialist countries of Eastern Europe, and the confrontation on the Sino-Soviet border help to maintain traditional perspectives. However, the specter of nuclear weapons and their relation to conventional military operations has produced an equivalent but highly muted debate in Soviet professional circles about the nature of the military profession under nuclear arms.[50]

Comparison with the medical profession may be appropriate. In order to develop preventive medicine, a separate structure and, in effect, a separate profession—the specialist in public health, with different training, career, and perspective—had to be brought into being. Clearly, it is not feasible to think in such terms in the case of the military. The transformation in professional capacities must take place within ex-

[49] Janowitz (fn. 2), 418.
[50] John Erickson, "Soviet Military Power," *Strategic Review* (Spring 1973).

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isting operational units. For the military profession, the overriding consideration is whether a force effectively committed to a deterrent philosophy and to peacekeeping and the concept of military presence can maintain its essential combat readiness.

To the detached outside observer, this problem hardly appears insoluble, but to the professional officer it is a central and overriding preoccupation. Does deterrence carry with it the seeds of its own destruction? Will such a strategy, especially under a parliamentary system, undermine the credibility of the military? Can a military force maintain combat readiness without any combat experience or an equivalent? Does not an inherent advantage accrue to nations under single-party political systems which accord the military a different social position and a broader range of functions—functions that presumably make it more viable?

Institution building in the military, creating and maintaining a stabilized military force for deterrence, must be seen as an aspect of the long-term decline of the mass armed force based on conscription. The expansion of the military organization to fight a total war had the paradoxical consequence of "civilianizing" the military. The line between the military and the larger society weakened because of military dependence on civilian industry and science, and because of the impact of the mobilization of large numbers of civilians for wartime service. "Total war" made both soldier and civilian objects of attack and served further to attenuate the distinction between the military and civilian sectors of society. Notions such as Lasswell's "garrison state," Mills' "power elite," and Eisenhower's "industrial-military complex" served to highlight the political problems associated with the expansion of the military and the blurring of the distinction between the military and the civilian sectors.[51]

The emergence of an all-volunteer military slows the trend toward civilianization. While there is no return to a highly self-contained military establishment, the "new military" displays a strong preoccupation with maintaining its organizational boundaries and corporate identity. Top military leaders in particular struggle to maintain the distinctive features, qualities, and mystiques of military life as they see them. Although they are dependent on technical expertise, they press to select for the highest command posts those who have had combat experience; as the opportunities for combat decline, the emphasis is at least on operational experience. The military continues to recruit top leaders from those who have attended the prestigious military academies. It

[51] Harold D. Lasswell, "The Garrison State," *American Journal of Sociology*, XLVI (January 1941); C. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite* (New York 1956).

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seeks to build housing on military bases and to maintain the separate structure of the community and its own style of life. The issues of civilian control are changed under the volunteer force structure, and focus more and more on maintaining the social integration of the military into the larger society.

In Great Britain and in the United States, conscription has been terminated. In France and in NATO nations, the trend is toward reduction in the length of service and toward exploration of new forms of military service (the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark). Even in West Germany, questions of conscription and its form have come under continual administrative and political scrutiny. In the Western parliamentary democracies, the moral and political legitimacy of military service is thereby being transformed. The military profession and military occupations are seen as one set of "jobs" with special characteristics and qualifications, but the profession is weakened in its special mystique and special status.

Comparable trends are under way in the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact nations. The research of John Erickson has demonstrated that, although conscription remains intact and will continue to persist, forms of modern professionalism and an emphasis on "voluntarism" are increasing.[52] The military is becoming more and more concerned with recruiting and retaining volunteers who will man the highly complex weapons. In the navy and the air and rocket forces, manpower is volunteer—no doubt assisted by the volunteers' desire to avoid conscripted ground force service. In the ground force, a double system—a fused organization of long-term professionals and conscripts—has been emerging. Military service for the conscript is less and less a positive experience, as the Russian equivalent of affluence creates its own youth culture. The military must reluctantly accept its role as an ideological indoctrinator while its main concern is with military effectiveness.

In any military organization, there is a gap between the "big ideas" of military function and the immediate tasks which military personnel must continually perform. Military leaders hope that day-to-day routine will create, or at least contribute to, a sense of military readiness and essential social solidarity. In essence, the more a unit during its normal routine is a military force in being, the more able it is to maintain the sense of military distinctiveness. There are, of course, limits to this observation—for example, when the task becomes excessively tedious or irksome.

Thus, the air force is the service most able to recruit personnel and

[52] John Erickson, *Soviet Military Power* (London 1972).

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maintain morale under voluntary manpower systems, because the routines of flying aircraft create military units in being. Even missile crews and radar units, because of the deadly character of the weapons which they handle, feel a sense of urgency which helps them to overcome boredom. Naval units have traditionally represented a force in being and maintained a group solidarity derived from the vitality of seamanship. However, the tedium and pressure of the new naval life—for example, of the submarine at sea for months and months—has transformed some of these conditions and increased the problems of recruitment and self-conception.

The crisis of the military style of life is sharpest in the ground forces. Here the gap between preparation and training and presumed combat is the greatest. Training is only periodic and often lacks the sense of urgency, reality, or risk that routine operations in the air force and navy entail. Airborne and parachute units are closest to units in being, because of the risk and danger in training. As a result, parachute training, ranger training, and wilderness activities are emphasized, not only because of their functional importance but to maintain the professional ideology of combat readiness and military distinctiveness.

The actual disposition of forces conditions military perspectives. The military man maintains his traditional conception of combat readiness more easily if he is stationed abroad or close to a strategic border. The Canadian military thinks of its NATO commitment as an essential ingredient in the military profession. Loss of its overseas assignment would reduce its self-esteem; it would become simply a super-gendarmerie. With the end of a commitment east of Suez, the British military establishment fears a loss of morale in the ground forces, which only operations in North Ireland have staved off temporarily.[53]

Such manifestations of organizational traditionalism raise grave questions about the capacity of the military to operate as a deterrent force in the context of changing military utility. Theoretically, the deterrent force must be prepared for combat regardless of previous combat experience or strategic disposition. Moreover, the more effective concepts of deterrence are, the fewer are the opportunities for traditional ways of maintaining combat readiness. There can be no doubt that the military seeks out opportunities to maintain and to perfect its combat readiness in training. Training exercises and the analysis of previous campaigns often leave the professional unsatisfied, although they are pursued relentlessly. Military observers are sent to wherever military confrontation occurs; peripheral warfare is still seen as a device for the

[53] John Erickson and J. N. Wolfe, eds., *The Armed Services and Society* (Edinburgh 1970).

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experimental testing of new weapons and tactics. The military seeks to become involved in those operations which it defines as directly relevant for maintaining the combat mystique: intelligence operations, military assistance programs, and training foreign military personnel.

In parliamentary democracies, the preparation for and intervention in domestic disorders have become a highly divisive issue, one which has divided the military itself. Most officers see such involvements as weakening the legitimacy of the armed forces, and a task which must be assumed only under the gravest circumstances. A minority conceptualizes this domestic role of the military both as an essential aspect of the military operation and as a device for maintaining combat readiness. In the United States, the ground forces have, since their intervention in the race riots of 1968, pressed hard to have their role in domestic disorders curtailed. For example, in the events surrounding Wounded Knee, representatives of the ground forces counseled, and succeeded in implementing, a policy of restraint. Increased use of local and state police forces plus the expanded activities of federal marshals have been a resulting trend—but they have left many crucial legal and administrative issues unsolved.

The concern with combat readiness cannot be judged merely as irrational traditionalism, a desire to maintain special privilege, or a fetishistic involvement with the rituals of violence, although all these elements are involved. Combat readiness is a genuine problem, for there is insufficient experience to satisfy operational military officers.[54] The pressure of this uncertainty carries the danger that the military will develop an inflexible posture likely to stand in the way of pragmatic adjustment to emerging realities. One possible response is the acceptance of doctrines which distort the utility of military force in international relations and which are excessively ideological, absolutist, and assault-oriented.

The essential issue is to restructure the organizational milieu of the military so that combat readiness is not an expression of personal aggressiveness or rigid ideological perspectives, but rather a meaningful element of organizational effectiveness. To the outsider, a military

[54] The concern to maintain combat readiness also pervades the Russian forces. Their leaders are deeply concerned that they have had no combat experience for a quarter of a century; in their own terms, the occupation of allied socialist nations is not considered war. Their response has been to conduct frequent large-scale maneuvers, with which they are obsessed. The threat of a Sino-Soviet confrontation supplies a realistic stimulant. Russian military leaders cannot engage in candid discussion of these issues, and very little is known of the scope and quality of their thinking on these points. They must accept the insistence of political leaders that ideological training is a device for maintaining combat readiness—although, of course, they are fundamentally aware of its limitations.

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organization appears to be a highly routinized institution—an agency governed by rules and regulations and concerned with the precision of its daily life.

However, such an image belies the essential character of military organization, whether a mass armed force based on conscription or an all-volunteer system. The routines of military organization obscure the sense of emergency and crisis to be found in the military. In the mass armed force, emergency and crisis were expected in time of mobilization and combat; for the volunteer force, it is an ever-present immediate potentiality. Emergencies and crises derive from both anticipated and unanticipated technological, economic, and political events; from accidents, miscalculations, or unforeseen contingencies. The military commander is the man who, in his own image, is able to respond to emergencies and crises. The expectation of risk and uncertainty, although narrowed under deterrence, pervades the military from lowest rifleman to operational leader to ranking commander. The capacity to restore balance effectively or to create a new balance is the contemporary dimension of the heroic.

As an element of continuity with the past, the capacity to respond to the unexpected is indeed a core military value, but one only dimly perceived and appreciated. That is the relevance of the "combat spirit" in the context of deterrence. Military men need to be able to act decisively to insure that accidents are avoided, resources mobilized, appropriate responses implemented, and information not distorted under pressure. Physical prowess is involved, but motor responses have always required mental precision; under deterrence, an element of rational steadfastness is paramount.

The notion of deterrence in a military organization is not merely a routine capacity; it requires ability to pursue existing, detailed operating procedures and to apply them with intelligence in new situations. When military men speak of problematic issues involved in maintaining combat readiness, they are in effect seeking to maintain this ability. Thus, for example, it is understandable that in 1973 the Royal Air Force seized the opportunity to mount a quick emergency food airlift to remote regions of Nepal. It thereby demonstrated its emergency capacity, since its pilots had to fly over unfamiliar and dangerous terrain. It was an acceptable exercise in the heroic impulse and a legitimate exposure to danger.

A military force is a complex organization, and the motives and interests of its professional perspective can certainly not be expected to be uniform. In the past, social background was believed to be an essential criterion for selecting military personnel. At present, profes-

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sional socialization—that is, education and training—is considered essential to fashion and refashion the military man.

However, available data on education and socialization in the military supply no assurance that the process of transformation in the profession will be automatic or certain. In reality, the dominant impact of socialization is negative. Military socialization does not fundamentally alter the attitudes of recruits; it merely rejects those who do not conform to central norms and values. Moreover, the longer the time men spend in a military career, the more homogeneous their orientation becomes; and, all too often, the more pessimistic are their views about international relations.[55]

Tough training is necessary and may make for group loyalty, but it does not necessarily guarantee the professional perspectives required for a deterrent force. Moreover, as Marine Corps experience documents, there appears to be a modest supply of human beings, even in an advanced industrial society, who are prepared to expose themselves to the extreme rigors of Marine Corps training. But the responsibilities given to such men are limited to initial military assaults.

To adapt to the new realities of international relations, the military profession must first have a conceptual clarity about its strategic purpose. The new element is that such understanding is not reserved to the top leadership. In appropriate degrees, all professional levels must be aware of the redefined aspects of the military function. In fact, professionalism is not to be delimited in terms of skill, but includes the dimension of awareness of the goals and purposes of deterrence. An educational system which assumes that an officer is trained for a tactical mission and subsequently educated for strategic goals as he advances through the military hierarchy has become irrelevant and outmoded.

Second, since men are not guided by strategic concepts alone, group cohesion and collective motives are essential. In the United States, particularly in the aftermath of the war in Vietnam, core elements in the military are deeply concerned with keeping alive their concept of the "fighter spirit." In Western Europe, the military forces acknowledge this problem but are less concerned, since they accept the validity of their training and operational format. One cannot separate self-conceptions from public reputations. In comparison with the military in Western Europe, and especially in Great Britain, it does appear that

[55] Bengt Abrahamsson, *Military Professionalization and Political Power* (Beverly Hills 1972); John P. Lovell, "The Professional Socialization of the West Point Cadet" in Janowitz, ed., *The New Military: Changing Patterns of Organization* (New York 1964), 119-59; David E. Lebby, "Professional Socialization of the Naval Officer: The Effect of the Plebe Year at the U. S. Naval Academy," unpub. Ph.D. diss. (University of Pennsylvania 1970).

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the lower prestige and social standing of the United States military contributes to its concern with "tough" military virtues.

In reality, most men in the military profession perform routine organizational tasks which need not attract any particular types of personality. However, military men think of themselves as specialists in violence. The deterrent force cannot have its organizational climate fashioned by men acting out aggressive impulses; rather, it must be the expression of effectively internalized professional norms and values.

The vast apparatus which the military has erected for personnel selection hardly solves the underlying issues.[56] Of course, it does serve to eliminate a tiny minority of unstable and undesirable personalities. The social personality of the military profession is the result of a complex series of training and operational assignments and an elaborate process of self-selection. In the past as well as the present, the military profession has placed great emphasis on rotation of assignment as a means of developing and testing for the kind of social personality desired. Although such a system is costly and disrupts family life, these procedures are stubbornly justified and maintained by the military. The content of military education and diversity of recruitment are key mechanisms of refashioning the military perspective. Another central step is the careful selection of innovative personnel for the role of chief of staff, a task which legitimately falls to civilian political leadership. It should also be possible to develop the military career so that it can be the first step in a lifetime of public service.

Predictably, sons of military personnel enter active duty already socialized to a considerable extent into the profession. It is doubtful whether the military could operate without a strong element of occupational inheritance from father to son. In addition, the military life appeals to men seeking an active athletic existence (although the image of engineer-technologist has been strong in recent years).[57] These men are initially prepared to learn to pilot a fighter aircraft, make repeated military parachute jumps, or navigate a fast destroyer escort. Although such experiences serve as rites of passage and create organizational solidarities, there is no reason to believe that they improve a person's capacities for the detachment and administration required for higher command. But in any career there are multiple requirements and contradictory pressures, and the military is no exception.

Standards of personal behavior are a central issue. If it is to be seen as legitimate and reliable, a force which handles nuclear weapons cannot

[56] Paul D. Nelson, "Personnel Performance Prediction" in Roger W. Little, ed., *Handbook of Military Institutions* (Beverly Hills 1971), 91-122.

[57] Janowitz (fn. 2), 21-37.

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engage in the deviant practices found in civilian life. The constant screening of "human factors" becomes part of military medicine, and the personal and social controls required to deal with the difficult and tedious tasks of the "new military" will have to be different and more constrained than those in the civilian society.

In a parliamentary democracy, it has been assumed that an officer corps which is not excessively self-recruited and which is reasonably representative of the larger society would have a political orientation compatible with the larger society and would have internalized the advantages of civil control.[58] There can be no explicit political criteria of recruitment into the officer corps. The professional soldier—officer or enlisted man—has the right to personal privacy and to civic involvements, provided he does not engage in partisan behavior. Moreover, it is assumed that he will remain integrated into the larger society. (In the Soviet Union, political reliability is required and enforced by police controls, and the military is isolated from the larger society in order to insure continuing loyalty to the Party.)

However, in an all-volunteer force, especially in states with a long tradition of citizen-soldiers, all of these assumptions are being tested.[59] The strategic conceptions of deterrence and of stabilized military systems which do not produce tangible "victories" create high levels of professional tension and frustration, especially in a period of strong antimilitary sentiment. Recruitment becomes more difficult and the recruits tend to be less representative of the larger society. The potential danger is not simply that the military will become ingrown and socially isolated, although there is clearly a trend in this direction. The real danger is that the military will become both ideologically rigid and more specialized in its contacts with civilian society, and that these contacts may move it toward a more explicitly conservative and rightist orientation.

The result is hardly to produce a potential cadre for counterrevolution. Rather, the military emerges as one additional element of political controversy in a society already racked with extensive political conflict and dissensus. Unless this alternative can be avoided, the military is likely to operate as a pressure group against the realistic military policies required in the search for a new pattern of stabilization in international relations.[60]

[58] Samuel P. Huntington, *Soldier and State* (Cambridge, Mass. 1957).

[59] Janowitz, "The U. S. Forces and the Zero Draft," *Adelphi Papers* No. 94 (London 1973).

[60] For one of the earliest sociological explications of the norms required for an international order, see Charles Horton Cooley, *Social Process* (New York 1918), 256: "A ripe nationality is favorable to international order for the same reason that a ripe

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The formulations of social research are designed to clarify political and social alternatives; but they should be constructed so as to reduce the possibility of self-fulfilling prophecies. Thus it is necessary for this systemic analysis of international relations and military institutions to return to its point of departure. The assumptions of "fundamental democratization" and the interpenetration of coercion and persuasion reflect the continuity between the internal social structure of an advanced industrial society and the transformed processes of international relations. The emergence of nuclear weapons and the decline of colonial rule have combined to decrease the relevance of traditional conceptions of military intervention that are concerned with the "defeat" of national adversaries or the drastic restructuring of the balance of power. In a very crude way, the term "deterrence" represented a partial, incomplete, and ultimately unsatisfactory advance that sought to recognize realities and to reformulate international political analysis. The intellectual limitations of the notion of deterrence are varied; basically, the term denotes the military objectives without adequately encompassing the political, social, and moral ends.

In a period of search for military détente, the increased obsolescence of the notion of deterrence rests not merely on the changed character of the threat of national adversaries, although this is a relevant dimension. The concept of stabilizing versus destabilizing military systems is an attempt to move beyond the notion of deterrence. In particular, it is an attempt to explicate more specifically the political and moral objectives of military systems. It is an intellectual orientation concerned with the potentialities and limitations of military systems in creating new rules and new norms which are designed to reduce the threat of nuclear and limited war and at the same time to enhance the process of orderly change at the international level.

In each historical period, it is essential to avoid the extrapolation of trends that characterize much of international relations analysis. Therefore, my formulation of stabilizing versus destabilizing military systems should highlight the built-in limitations in the contemporary trend toward détente. It does not de-emphasize the centrality of force in international relations. I am hopeful, however, that it does offer a sharper set of categories for estimating changes in the utility and the legitimacy of the military function.

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individuality is favorable to order in a small group. It means that we have coherent, self-conscious, and more or less self-controlled elements out of which to build our system. To destroy nationality because it causes wars would be like killing people to get rid of their selfishness. . . ."

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TECHNICAL INNOVATION AND ARMS CONTROL

By HARRY G. GELBER*

THE Soviet-American strategic arms limitation discussions and agreements have been widely welcomed not only as important steps toward tighter arms control but as a symbol of the entire process of East-West détente. For the first time since 1945, the two superpowers have shown themselves willing to put agreed limitations on their central strategic armaments. The SALT I talks imposed rough numerical ceilings on deployment. One of the major difficulties in the attempt to extend these limitations in SALT II is the formulation of qualitative restraints. Each side is under pressure to create improved weapons systems. Each is concerned lest the other should achieve a breakthrough which would render its own systems ineffectual. Each needs to hedge against the possibility that the other might design around any particular set of arms control arrangements. In this paper I will examine the desire for innovation and the difficulties of control, and suggest a general framework within which the question of limitations might be further examined. In the first part, I will discuss the meaning of innovation and the ways in which it is organized and promoted. In the second, the reasons are examined why the two great powers seek advantages over each other in the area of R & D. Finally, I will look at some of the difficulties of achieving restraint by agreement and under verifiable conditions.

I. R & D and Technical Advance

The innovatory process covers a very wide spectrum of activities. I propose to try to discuss it in terms of the following classification: discovery, invention, innovation, development, technological drift, and testing. By discovery I mean the discovery of new ideas about the physical universe or its organizing principles. By invention I mean the creation of new things, which may or may not be based on new discoveries. By innovation, I mean the creation of new systems from previous inventions[1] or known components, or improvements in products

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[1] Edwin Mansfield, *The Economics of Technological Change* (London 1969), 131.

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or processes whose essential characteristics are known and remain unchanged. There is an obvious but probably insoluble ambiguity about the point at which improvements of detail begin to change the essential characteristics of the product. Development covers the process of engineering refinement from laboratory development to the final elaborations that precede and accompany testing. Technological drift is the useful term, coined by J. P. Ruina, to denote processes which do not, or need not, result from the decisions of higher authority or the formal R & D machinery at all. It involves minor improvements in systems and components, to cope with minor snags which have appeared during development, marketing, deployment, or servicing, but whose cumulative impact can amount to or make possible substantial system changes.

These or any other divisions are of course an arbitrary way of dividing what is in reality a continuum. And although discovery at one end of the spectrum and technological drift at the other are relatively clear-cut notions, invention, development, and especially innovation involve two quite separate kinds of change. One is a change or set of changes in policy, doctrine, or strategy for production or use. Changes here may or may not involve changes in the materials or equipment available. They may concern new processes, or new ways of organizing old processes, or new ways of using available items of hardware, or a combination of them. The other is a change in systems or products which might involve inventions which in turn may or may not be based on new discoveries, or innovations which may or may not incorporate new inventions.

These difficulties in defining types of change are naturally reflected in the categorization of activities designed to achieve them. A rough division between basic research, applied research, and development seems to be accepted both in the literature and in budgetary practice.[2] But this, too, has its difficulties. An attempt to achieve an invention may call for an effort to develop the results of some previous innovation;

[2] The definitions used in the literature differ in detail, but this kind of division seems widely accepted. The U.S. National Science Foundation distinguishes between basic research, or original investigations for the advancement of scientific knowledge without specific commercial objectives; applied research, or investigations to try to discover new scientific knowledge with specific commercial objectives in mind; and development, or the translation of research findings into products or processes. See also John Jewkes, David Sawers and Richard Stillerman, *The Sources of Invention*, 2nd ed. (London 1969), 26ff. Sir Frederick Dainton has suggested a further subdivision of the non-development segments of these activities into basic science, or pure research: strategic science, or a general effort to maintain the vigor of the scientific disciplines on which innovation and development are based; and tactical science, undertaken in support of immediate aims of product creation or improvement. See his report, "The Future of the Research Council System," in *A Framework for Government Research and Development*, Cmnd. 4814 (London, November 1971), 3-4.

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a development process may be held up pending the attempt to invent or innovate among subsystems or components.

PERCEPTION AND CAUSES OF DISCOVERY, INVENTION, AND INNOVATION

There are certain conceptual difficulties about trying to decide what "discovery," "invention," and "change" are, how they can be recognized, and how their implications can be perceived. Discoveries and inventions may be of two kinds. One is accretion to existing knowledge. The other comes through criticism, "by a method which destroys, changes, and alters, the whole thing including its most important instrument, the language in which our myths and theories are formulated."[3] Discoveries and particularly inventions can be "made to order" in the sense of being a response to some external demand. Or they can come without external and organizational stimuli. Either way, they often result from a highly imaginative and individualistic approach to a problem and the gift of seeing unusual associations and ideas. For this quality Derek Price has coined the term "mavericity."[4]

A judgment on a discovery or its quality must, like other judgments, depend upon the framework of assumptions within which perception and evaluation take place. Assessment will therefore depend upon the rapidity with which the unfamiliar idea is recognized as being not merely unfamiliar but fruitful, or the changed approach as more powerful than existing ones. Often this presents no problem. An accretion to existing knowledge can be comparatively easily recognized. An invention in response to a demand presents minimal problems of recognition and classification. Even for less expected changes there are established testing procedures. These are strongest within a well-defined scientific field. The validity of a new theory or proposition is likely to be apparent to the discoverer's fellow professionals. Views about its power and significance are usually formulated by the collective judgment of scientists in the field concerned. But these procedures are not free from difficulty. It usually takes time to formulate a collective judgment. The immediate reaction to claims of discovery or invention is typically dispute and debate rather than unanimous recognition. Even when formulated, collective judgments are fallible. Nor is a professional opinion on "power" and "significance" necessarily relevant to a political or administrative decision-maker.[5] The judgment of a man's professional peers is, however, usually the best available. Difficulties can

[3] Karl Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations*, 4th ed., rev. (London 1972), 129.
[4] Derek de Solla Price, *Big Science, Little Science* (New York 1963), 107.
[5] The scientist is concerned with explanatory power in the field concerned, the decision-maker with the question, "what difference does it make in the world of affairs?" The answer, even for a very powerful theory, may be, "none."

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therefore increase in a situation where there is nobody of precisely relevant scientific expertise. That can happen when a judgment has to be made outside a well-defined and established field, perhaps in relation to some new area of knowledge. In such a case established professional opinion may be unavailable or irrelevant. Here, even more than elsewhere, recognition—not just of the value of a discovery but of the fact that one has been made—may depend upon the subtlety of an observer's mind and the bias of his whole character.

How are such discoveries and inventions—as well as more easily recognized innovations—caused? There are, broadly speaking, three schools of thought. The first regards them as the result of personal inspiration which cannot be planned or predicted but merely discerned and accepted. The second argues that they are responses to social (often economic) needs. The third argues that they are the cumulative results of many previous or simpler innovative steps. Some evidence can be found to support each of these views, which relate to different parts of the innovative process in different ways. Roughly speaking, the first seems to have most validity at the discovery and invention end of the spectrum, while the second and third apply more clearly to development and parts of innovation. Certainly the underlying factor in all innovatory processes, whether in basic science or applied technology, is the motivation and creativity of individuals. The motivation can range from simple curiosity, or research done because it's fun, to the desire for career advancement, professional standing, or simply to serve mankind. Creativity, on the other hand, is a mysterious quality which can wax and wane over time within an individual and the direction of whose results can neither be predicted nor taken for granted.

The idea of discovery, invention, and innovation as a response to social or economic need also has something to be said for it. It seems likely that much the greater part of governmental and industrial expenditure on technical innovation is spent on "made-to-order" innovations and on product improvements where administrative and economic stimuli are primary motivating forces. A better can opener can be designed and produced in response to direct market pressures. A new anti-tank missile can be developed and deployed in response to the appearance of a new and faster tank in the opponent's order of battle. The research and development machineries of consumer goods and defense departments are geared to the need to respond to such challenges. It is also true in a broader sense that problems cannot be solved before they have arisen and been defined.

The third argument, that innovation results from a cumulative process, largely excludes those additions to knowledge which result

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from criticism and changes of theory. Within its sphere of reference, the argument can mean two things. If it means that new knowledge tends to emerge, not in isolation but in the form of addition to existing knowledge, and that new technology usually develops from old, it seems sensible.[6] It is an ancient idea that we all stand on the intellectual shoulders of our predecessors. If, however, it means that there is something automatic about the way in which old knowledge breeds new, it is more suspect. The simultaneity of discovery in many areas lends color to the idea. But the differences in phasing, pace, and direction of progress in different areas seem to deny its mechanistic or deterministic basis.

EXPLOITATION AND MANAGEMENT

It is clear, however, that there is no direct or linear relationship between discovery and innovation on the one hand and practical exploitation on the other. Scientific knowledge at or near the discovery end of the innovative spectrum circulates quickly and internationally, both through the professional literature and through person-to-person contacts. At the highest level, scientific expertise appears to be inseparable from membership of the transnational professional groups within and between which information flows much more quickly than the printed literature would suggest.[7] It seems a plausible hypothesis that scientific ideas in some respects behave like money: the quantity available may for many purposes be less important than the velocity of its circulation. If so, attempts to maintain secrecy at the level of basic science may not merely lead to, but define, a state of relative deprivation, since they must produce a less than optimal velocity of circulation of ideas.

Scientific knowledge is therefore something like a public good. But its relationship to exploitation is indirect. Conceptual breakthroughs and fundamental discoveries are comparatively rare, though they can be of the utmost importance when they occur. At lower levels of invention and innovation the supply of new ideas often greatly exceeds the demand. Moreover, practical system changes for commercial or strategic purposes usually rest on several innovations—often accomplished many years before—and only rarely on a single technical advance. In the weapons field, especially, programs are not usually begun until the feasibility of a practical system has begun to emerge.[8] Indeed,

[6] Price strongly urges this view (fn. 4), esp. 169, 172.

[7] Keith Pavitt has pointed out that copying hardware or blueprints is no effective substitute for the exchange of know-how and close person-to-person contacts. "Technology, International Competition, and Economic Growth," *World Politics*, XXV (January 1973), 186.

[8] Merton J. Peck and Frederic M. Scherer, *The Weapons Acquisition Process: An Economic Analysis* (Boston 1962), chap. 8.

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the larger and more complex the system, the safer it is to keep innovation to a minimum. As Sir Hermann Bondi has remarked: "It is an essential feature of any major project in advanced technology, be it concerned with space exploration, a particular missile system, or a special aeroplane, that it does not contain any very advanced parts. The problem with these systems is that they are extremely complex and accordingly very expensive. Therefore, these are not systems in which to try out devices or pieces of gadgetry that have not been tested before—one does not innovate, if one can possibly avoid it."[9]

It seems, therefore, that exploitation relies on three related processes: the selection or combination of already available ideas and innovations, the planned promotion of particular additions to the stock of ideas (usually in the more predictable areas of innovation and development), and the most rapid recognition and analysis of unexpected new ideas. There is an action-reaction relationship between existing ideas and technology and new knowledge, whether expected or not. At the same time, the availability of new ideas is not the only or even the principal motive force behind a move to exploit. Even if an invention or innovation is recognized to be exciting, it may not be economically or politically or strategically viable. Many inventions, especially those whose adoption would involve major departures from existing practice, must await changes in ancillary technology, or factor costs, or fashion, before they can be utilized. The claims of science and the pressures for a marketable technology may therefore contradict each other in some situations as much as they reinforce one another in others. The process of innovation may be, and in practice very often has been, separate in time from the changes of administrative attitude or economic circumstance which permit particular innovations to be applied for industrial or strategic purposes.

The rate of utilization of an innovation[10] is governed by the extent of uncertainty when the innovation first appears and the expected rate of reduction of that uncertainty. In each case, the uncertainties involve three categories: feasibility and performance of the end product, cost, and the extent and duration of the expected competitive or strategic advantage. Insofar as judgments involve the future, they involve economic and technical prediction. This concerns not just the performance

[9] Sir Hermann Bondi, "International Collaboration in Advanced Technology," *The World Today*, XXIX (January 1973), 16-23. Similarly, Jacob Schmookler argues that while many important inventions in oil refining, paper making, farming, and railroads have depended upon science, "few if any were directly stimulated by scientific discoveries." *Invention and Economic Growth* (Cambridge, Mass. 1966), 63.

[10] This categorization is partly derived from Mansfield (fn. 1), 119.

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of the product or the advantages which it confers, but predictions about what ordinary production and operating teams can be trained to do routinely. It follows that the greatest innovations tend to have the least predictable effects, and that useful technical change is often due to a number of minor and hence more manageable changes rather than to discoveries and inventions. Technological forecasting itself is better at predicting the diffusion of available knowledge than the appearance of something new. And the results of research are, *ex hypothesi*, unknown. Some of the objectives of an R & D program may be met by other research programs or invalidated by some other advance. Especially at the discovery and invention end of the spectrum the interaction between disciplines and research projects "is quite unpredictable both in its nature and in the nature and extent of its consequences which may be the emergence of an entirely new area of scientific activity or the application of a particular scientific technique to an entirely different field of science."[11] Many of the more valuable results of an R & D effort, in fact, turn out to be externalities or spin-off benefits. The probability that a particular aim will be achieved, or can even be defined at the start of a research project, is not always high.[12] Unexpected problems and opportunities often arise during development and testing. As a result, the product which finally emerges is apt to differ substantially from the original concept. One method for managing such uncertainties is to use prototype hardware items emerging from advanced development as building blocks in the development of a variety of possible systems: to develop a technological catalog from which end items can be procured comparatively cheaply and quickly.[13]

The question of resources for basic research is therefore, as Richard Nelson has pointed out, the classic problem of external economies.[14] Altogether, the financing of R & D presents serious analytical problems. It is true that, for both firms and industries, the rate of technological change seems to correlate directly with the rate of growth of cumulative R & D expenditures. Mansfield suggests that a 0.1 per cent increase in the first correlates with a 1 per cent change in the second.

[11] Dainton (fn. 2), II, para. 33.

[12] Some ways of dealing with these probabilities are discussed in Robert L. Winkler, "The Consensus of Subjective Probability Distributions," *Management Science*, XV, No. 3 (1968), B61-B75.

[13] See, for example, Thomas K. Glennan, "Research and Development," in Stephen Enke, *Defense Management* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1967); Burton M. Klein, "Policy Issues Involved in the Conduct of Military Development Programs," in Richard A. Tybout, ed., *The Economics of Research and Development* (Columbus, Ohio 1965).

[14] Richard R. Nelson, "The Simple Economics of Basic Scientific Research," *Journal of Political Economy*, LXVII (June 1959), 306.

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But, as he also points out, correlation does not necessarily prove causation.[15] In any case, there is no very precise measure of the rate of technical change. There is no measure for R & D in terms of inventions, or any measure for the relationship between invention and application. We know very little, in detail, about what we get in return for R & D expenditure.[16] The problem of externalities alone not merely makes it difficult to quantify the benefits of past research, but probably makes it impossible to use estimates of the future economic gains expected to accrue from any basic research program as a criterion for decisions on that program.[17] In practice, R & D funding is probably decided less on grounds relating to scientific proof than for a number of reasons, including public faith in the progress of science, general political and economic need, managerial instinct, a willingness to gamble on a man or a project and, not least, the wishes of a scientific community, carrying much public and political clout, for an appropriate slice of the public resource cake.

The forms of organization pose further problems. One would expect the independent inventor to be relatively prominent in low-cost areas calling for great personal initiative and ingenuity. It is such people who are likely to score highly on "mavericity." But even when researchers work in teams, there seems to be a preference for tightly knit groups with a high degree of autonomy and initiative. This may help to account for the suggestion that small firms or groups are better at making discoveries and inventions—especially important ones—than large organizations. Quantification in this field is extremely difficult, but studies which have attempted to distinguish between major and minor inventions do indicate that individuals and small groups play a disproportionately important role.[18] Hamberg has suggested a number of possible reasons: the desire of large organizations for quick, reliable, quantifiable, and predictable results; their desire to concentrate on extensions of work or processes which have already proved their worth; the type of individual attracted to work in large, organized laboratories; and

[15] Edwin Mansfield, *Industrial Research and Technological Innovation* (New York 1968), chap. 4.

[16] Richard M. Byrd, "Public Finances and the Technological Revolution—Comments," *Public Finance*, XXVI, No. 2 (1971), 160.

[17] Dainton (fn. 2), 9, para. 24.

[18] See, for example, Jewkes, Sawers, and Stillerman (fn. 2). Analysis of patents helps, but does not solve the problem. Many ideas are not patentable and others, especially in defense science, are not patented. Patent totals say nothing about the distinction between major inventions and trivia. In large organizations the taking out of patents may play a formal legitimizing role (as publication of articles does among academics), which bears no necessary correlation to the true value or originality of the work done.

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the fact that team research necessarily involves compromise.[19] Larger organizations, on the other hand, are often excellent in the larger and costlier areas, those of innovation and development on the basis of existing knowledge. They can therefore play an essential part even in the development of innovations originally made by small groups. It is the large organizations which provide the coordinating and development teams and the resources required to bring an invention to fruition as a commercially or strategically deployed system.

Irrespective of the size of the organization, the processes of invention, innovation, and development are in essential ways processes of trial and error, and of piecemeal adjustment. As suggested earlier, in developing a system it is usually not possible to predict the precise mix of performance characteristics which will emerge or the problems of component production which will crop up. Nor is it possible to be sure when a particular mix will be capable of production or deployment. Indeed, in important ways no system is ever finished and complete, if only because the requirements in response to which the system is produced are themselves constantly changing. It follows that the organizational patterns for invention, innovation, and development must themselves change constantly. The attempt to control any process involving technological change through a preconceived organizational pattern must lead to inefficiencies, for the changing technical requirements will be out of phase with the organization chart at any given time.[20] The best way to organize the development or the execution of a project in applied technology—such as the moon landings—may be through a massive and centralized organization. But, for R & D, too much stress on coordination, planning, and efficiency can be counterproductive. The best way to organize technical change may be an untidy and apparently contradictory one. Since one cannot predict the optimum result from paper planning, development may actually be less costly and more efficient if there is some duplication, internal competition,[21] and confusion, if at times several people seem to be doing the same job, and no one is sure (or cares) who is the boss—provided always that management remains adaptable and flexible. The emphasis, then, is less on form and structure than on the ability of managers to coordinate and en-

[19] D. Hamberg, "Invention in the Industrial Research Laboratory," *Journal of Political Economy*, LXXI (April 1963), 95-115.

[20] Albert O. Hirschman and Charles E. Lindblom, "Economic Development, Research and Development, Policy Making: Some Converging Views," in Amitai Etzioni, *A Sociological Reader on Complex Organizations*, 2nd ed. (New York 1969), 87-103.

[21] Charles J. Hitch and Roland N. McKean, *The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age* (Cambridge, Mass. 1960), 249-51.

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courage their scientific and technical people, to promote fruitful interaction, to recognize novel factors and potentially important insights and the need to amend goals in a constant process of reaction between ends and means. In sum, by traditional standards the innovative organization is not organized.

The spectacular technological successes which have occurred in fields ranging from moon exploration to agricultural technology and oceanography appear, therefore, to be based on several factors. There has been a conscious and partly successful attempt to reduce the impact of uncertainty, even within the research side of R & D. Governments and management have used the machinery of comparatively impersonal peer-group evaluation of scientists by scientists, both to choose research personnel and to encourage successful work. They have encouraged promising men as well as promising projects and, having chosen them, made maximum administrative, logistic, and instrumental support available. They have devised ways of monitoring details of projects as well as projects as a whole. There are sanctions in case of failure, or at least of repeated failure. And research administrations have reinforced any tendencies to concentrate on "manageable scientific questions," defined by Harvey Brooks as: "[ones] which are answerable either out of the existing body of scientific knowledge or through a search for new knowledge guided by existing understandings and involving only limited extensions of the current conceptual structure of science."[22]

Discovery and invention are, in any case, often less important than innovation and development in bringing technological success about. Development is not only the greatest source of improvements; it is also the most expensive and the most easily quantified segment of the R & D process, and the one which is easiest to steer in terms of expected end demand, whether by a commercial consumer or a Department of Defense. The development phase tends to be controllable in accordance with comparatively well-understood principles of industrial management. Questions about the cost-effectiveness of a particular process of production can be answered with some precision. Engineering developments may offer results which are relatively predictable in character and timing and whose impact on one's existing structure of doctrines, means, and ends seems both marginal and controllable. Even its nonlinear effects seem (sometimes mistakenly) easier to judge. And financial control of this element seems almost equivalent to financial control of the R & D process as a whole since, as a rule of thumb, development spending is to research spending as ten to one.

[22] Harvey Brooks, "Knowledge and Action: The Dilemma of Science Policy in the '70's," *Daedalus*, CII (Spring 1973), 128.

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Overall, then, the management of R & D calls for particular skills in coordination, the integration of various innovations or disciplines or levels of scientific activity, the identification and combination of existing or feasible concepts or components, the recognition and quick exploitation of innovation, and the direction of these processes toward existing or possible end demands. At the same time there must be no stifling of the autonomy of research or developmental groups or of that initiative on the part of working scientists and technologists which is essential to the success of the enterprise. In this sense, R & D is a man-management problem rather than simply a technical one. Management also influences or controls what may be the most important links of all: the communication links between technical groups as well as between scientists, administrators, outside groups, and the government. The possession of knowledge is meaningless unless it can be communicated to those who need it. Communication is therefore vital not merely to the internal workings of the R & D process, but to the development outside it of that end demand toward whose fulfillment the process is principally directed.

The role of governments in these matters is, of course, substantial and often decisive. Both the scale and the long-term nature of R & D investment, especially in very large projects such as space exploration or the production of airliners, make participation or underwriting by the state essential. No less important is the state's role as an underwriter of smaller risks, or its role in encouraging or imposing longer-term judgments in some areas than normal commercial criteria would suggest. The state, as the embodiment or carrier of the will of society, can define not merely the general direction of overall science and research policy, but the proportion of national resources which can be devoted to that end. In the weapons field, especially, where ordinary commercial tests do not operate, it sets the requirements and constitutes the sole customer. Within society at large, the state can and does encourage and influence research even in areas which it does not control directly. This can be done in a multitude of ways, ranging from research contracts awarded to industry, or grants to universities, to methods of partial support like tax concessions. The R & D process, like other areas of social policy, is therefore subject to the overriding political judgments that motivate state action.

LIMITATIONS

It is necessary to recognize the limits of the attempt to minimize uncertainty both in R & D and its practical exploitation. The incidence of innovation in large social aggregates may be predictable, as a matter of statistical probability, within quite narrow margins of uncertainty.

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But the magnitude of innovation and its precise direction are not, nor is the relationship between the scale and costs of innovative activity and the value of its results. Least of all can the particular be inferred from the statistical aggregate. All innovative work rests, in the end, not on aggregate but on individual creativity. And in planning research or development projects there are irremovable uncertainties about the assumption that some particular man or team will be creative; that, even if he or they have been creative in the past, they will go on being so in the future and under the conditions of some project which has not yet begun. Judgments here concern the largely subconscious processes that appear to underlie all genuinely creative activity.[23] Even if creativity were a static property of individuals rather than a quality which can wax and wane over time, and even if creativity were randomly distributed within populations (which seems unlikely), it would still not be true that the form of its expression could be calculated as a function of the distribution patterns of that property.

If, moreover, scientific and technological progress relies particularly upon unexpected conjunctions of ideas, it relies by definition upon the unpredictable. For prediction implies that, at least at the conceptual level, the predicted idea or circumstance already exists. R & D is much more a matter of organized serendipity. Technology does not follow science directly or by predictable paths; nor is it always clear beforehand from what disciplines or combinations usable answers will emerge. Most R & D does not result in useful products; many of the results achieved lead to quite unpredictable utilities, and in trying to solve one problem it not infrequently happens that the answer to quite a different one turns up.

Even when new ideas do emerge, the pattern of their adoption bears only a partial relationship to the pattern of their appearance. In part this is because, as suggested earlier, there is a disjunction between ideas and their economic utility. More broadly, there seems little evidence for saying that discoveries and inventions produced at a time when they were immediately needed would not have been produced but for that need; or that the most interesting and fruitful discoveries and inventions of any period relate to its salient social or economic needs; or that the emergence of a social need has customarily been followed by the discovery or invention required to fill it. Inventions often occur in the absence of social challenges. And social and economic challenges often remain unmet, whether by inventions or otherwise.

[23] Anthony Storr, *The Dynamics of Creation* (London 1972). I suppose that even Skinnerians would not argue that laws governing creative activity have yet been discovered.

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These uncertainties of the R & D process help to account for the large errors that are so often made in estimates prior to the development of commercial and especially of military systems. Other factors include unexpected problems which arise during development, and the alterations in system requirements caused by market changes or changes in an opposing order of battle. There is also the matter of technological drift. It has been argued, for example, that the increases in range and payload between the early model B-52's and the B-52H's, and the increases in SLBM ranges from the 1,200 miles of the Polaris A-1 to the 2,800 miles of the Polaris A-3 were achieved largely in this way. It is not only that some of the small changes involved may be relatively inexpensive and others not. It is that the costs and the development are unrelated to the recognized administrative and budgetary categories of R & D, may not become apparent until after they have happened, and even then, though apparent in the aggregate, seem difficult to identify in detail.

There are further difficulties about the relationship between R & D effort and public authorities or political decision-making. To begin with, many and perhaps most R & D decisions take place deep within organizations or technical teams and do not become apparent to top management or the government until after they have been taken. Most of them, indeed, do not crop up in a "yes-no" form at all. But even at higher levels there is no clear line of division between governmental and non-governmental effort, if only because of the sheer variety of institutional and financial ways in which R & D is promoted, in which governmental and non-governmental efforts are intertwined, and in which the complementary and conflicting interests of various groups are reconciled. It is true that research contracts can be audited and that the behavior of officials is influenced by the fact that they may have to explain themselves to some parliamentary or congressional committee. Rough controls, at aggregate levels, are imposed. Nevertheless, it is not always clear what the relationship is between any organization's innovative effort and the ends of public policy, or indeed whether those ends have been operationally defined. It would in some cases be equally difficult to demonstrate a clear correlation between any particular form or quantity of public support or direction and the results achieved. It is not even always possible to be sure that a particular piece of governmentally encouraged work would have remained undone but for that encouragement. Equally, work done in military establishments or under military contracts is usually (but not always) of greater military value than work done elsewhere. The line between military and non-military technology is proverbially difficult to draw. One of the classic cases is

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that of nuclear energy. Though the military applications of nuclear energy may be definable and controllable, the capacity to achieve such applications is in practice not clearly separable from work on nuclear-energy technology as a whole.

In view of these uncertainties, what is it that large nations try to achieve by their R & D efforts, especially in the military field?

II. The Requirement for Military R & D

The idea that technical innovation and development are important in defining strategic balances is of course not new. The whole history of war testifies to the role which improvements, whether of weapons or of tactics, have played in the relationships between states. If the nature of this role tended to change, and if its importance increased to some extent in the period after 1945, this was probably for two reasons. One was the growing complexity not only of weapons technology but of many other components of national power and influence. The other was the speed of technical change, which made assessment in general more difficult and even good assessments short-lived. These circumstances have altered the role of defense R & D in subtle but important ways. Innovative effort has always been an auxiliary in the production and perfection of the weapons systems which largely determine the military aspects of relations between powers. It has now become a major area of strategic competition in its own right. The possession of technical superiority in some field, and the perception by others of one's technical superiority, can produce political and strategic advantages even in the absence of deployed weapons.

The United States and the Soviet Union have over the years emphasized the technical and qualitative competition between them. Between 1969 and 1973, for example, the U.S. seems to have devoted approximately 10 per cent of its defense budget—or about 0.8 per cent of GNP—to defense RDT & E.[24] The Russians have spent more, both in absolute and relative terms, in order to narrow the American technical lead.[25] The precise balance has been difficult to determine because,

[24] Melvin R. Laird, *National Security Strategy of Realistic Deterrence*, Statement before the House Armed Services Committee on the FY 1973 Defense Budget and FY 1973–77 Program (Washington, D.C., February 17, 1972), 189, Table I; John S. Foster, Jr., *The Department of Defense Program of Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation, FY 1974*, Statement before the Defense Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, 93rd Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, D.C., March 28, 1973), 1-3.

[25] Between 1963 and 1971, U.S. total spending on R & D declined from 2.9% to 2.6% of GNP (1972: 2.4%), while Soviet R & D spending during the same period rose from 2.3% to 3.0% of a much smaller GNP. (A different computation suggests that total Soviet research expenditure rose from 1.6% of the national income in 1950 to 3.7% in 1968. See V. P. Dyatchenko and S. A. Sitaryan, "Problems of Public Finance in the Field of Research and Technical Development," *Public Finance*, XXVI, No. 2

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among other things, the distinction between military and non-military R & D is not exact. But as SALT II began, it seemed clear that though the Soviet Union had achieved a technical lead in some areas, the United States retained advantages in a number of crucial fields including multiple warhead technology, computer science, telecommunications, and some other areas of electronics. U.S. Administration spokesmen were, however, unanimous in arguing in 1972 and 1973 that the nation's security would be endangered if this technical lead was not maintained, and that increased funding was needed to maintain it.

In analyzing what the two superpowers hope to gain by such efforts, the following ten categories of real or potential advantages might be suggested.

1. The first aim is one of the two that have the greatest traditional importance: the urge to know. Each side has sought to refine its understanding of scientific principles and know-how in defense-related areas, whether as a prerequisite for management forecasts about the probable future course of scientific or strategic developments or as a means for deciding what systems, with what characteristics, to produce and deploy. In certain fields—for example, electronics and communications—increasing systems sophistication has made it more difficult to design around some remaining areas of ignorance.

2. The other traditionally important aim is the production of more effective and efficient weapons than those of the opponent. Security requires deployed weapons, not merely technology. The effort to achieve this aim, as well as the first, is of course subject to various limita-

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[1971], 117.) Between 1961 and 1969, the proportion of U.S. governmental R & D expenditure going to defense declined from 65% to 49% (1972: 54%). *Science Indicators 1972*, Report of the National Science Board, 1973 (National Science Foundation, Washington, D.C. 1973), 2-3, 20-25. In sum, American defense R & D spending rose somewhat during the 1960's in current dollars, declined in constant dollars, and declined somewhat more sharply as a proportion of total R & D spending and of government expenditure in the field.

On June 22, 1972, Dr. Foster told the Senate, "the Soviets now have a greater level of effort devoted to technology programs than does the U.S. . . . unless the Soviets reduce their program, it will eventually become necessary to further increase U.S. efforts to maintain a technological lead." *Military Implications of the Treaty on the Limitations of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms*, Hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 92nd Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington, D.C. 1972), 234. On March 28, 1973, Dr. Foster said that none of various projections made by the Pentagon showed that the U.S. was holding its own against the Soviet effort to achieve superiority; that the Russians were increasing their R & D spending by 10-15% per annum while the U.S. effort had recently declined; and that in some respects the Russians had closed the "technology gap" (fn. 24), 1-3, 2-3, 2-6, 3-16. Active officers were making similar points. For instance, General George S. Brown of the U.S. Air Force Systems Command argued that the U.S.S.R. was spending "far more" in every phase of R & D. *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, XCVIII (March 26, 1973), 7.

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tions. The principal ones are the character of one's strategic planning, the fiscal and budgetary constraints of the national economy, the skills and creativity of the national scientific and technical community, and the need to relate R & D not just to one's own preferences but to specific deployed or expected systems in the hands of an opponent. Within such constraints, each side has sought qualitative improvements in both existing and projected weapons and support systems. Improved aircraft, whether the Soviet Backfire or the American B-1, clearly fall under this heading. So do the improved missile submarine (FBMS) systems on both sides and various improvements in warhead or missile boost and guidance systems.

3. Each side can also hope to develop weapons likely to avoid particular sets of legal or political inhibitions. That could mean developing alternatives to napalm or new forms of bomb guidance which, by improving accuracy, limit collateral damage. It might mean using laser-based systems for guidance and, eventually, as part of a defensive system against bombers or (given the ambiguities of the SALT I arrangements), perhaps even against missiles. Indeed, the creation of any system of static limitations, especially one resting on rough numerical criteria like SALT I, seems sure to increase rather than to decrease the incentive to search for new techniques not subject to those prohibitions.

4. Not only can political leaders expect their R & D programs to refine the weapons and deployment possibilities among which they can choose; they can also expect their freedom of maneuver to be increased in other ways. By shortening the lead-times for alternative forms of deployment, R & D can increase a nation's political and strategic flexibility. And, in case unexpected technical possibilities were suddenly to appear on one side or the other, an administration able to adjust quickly to the new circumstances would have an obvious advantage.

5. The possession of technical initiative—which in practice means an advantage in lead-time—also offers increased possibilities for influencing, even manipulating, the decisions of an opponent. He can be faced with the possible deployment of weapons or equipment in such a way as to compel him to react even before the threat has materialized, with a consequent diversion of his resources and efforts. He would face additional difficulties if he could not estimate precisely at what stage of development a deployment decision of one's own was likely to be taken, and where additional time on development might result in the deployment of a system with significantly different operating characteristics, requiring different counter-measures. Insofar as an opponent, especially a technically inferior one, could not avoid trying to hedge against various forms of one's own possible deployment, he could be compelled

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to divert increased development efforts and resources. He could, for example, be compelled to replicate a suspected system before he could construct an effective counter. Or he might decide to increase his inventory in some category of weapons so as to compensate for certain kinds of qualitative inferiority. One side possessing tanks which had become increasingly vulnerable to the anti-tank equipment of the other might, at least pending the development of an effective anti-anti-tank system, build more of the old tanks as a hedge against force erosion. It is possible to view Soviet qualitative inferiority as one reason for the large increases in Soviet long-range missile launcher numbers during 1968–72.

6. Technical advantage is therefore also an increasingly important element of national intelligence efforts. It can permit estimates of the probable methods and timing of development by others which are essential to the effort to avoid technological surprise by an opponent. Dr. Foster has claimed that, "As long as we retain technological superiority, we can make meaningful measurements of relative strength without fear of surprise. We can estimate their progress because we've already been there. . . . Once we appear to have lost that superiority, we lose our ability to measure our relative strength and to compete efficiently, and in due course we should lose confidence in the realism of our deterrence." Moreover, "In those areas where we acknowledge technological parity or inferiority, we cannot have high confidence in our estimates of Soviet capability, nor can we predict with confidence what their next steps forward will be."[26]

Though Dr. Foster's formulations may have had as much to do with his budget requests as with a dispassionate analysis of his achievements, as a statement of aims this is plausible enough. R & D was thus regarded as permitting a closer estimate of the future capabilities of others. It provided hypotheses which could later be examined and validated by the normal means of collecting hard intelligence. It was, and is, much easier to find significant data and evidence if one knows what one is looking for—a fact which is bound to have repercussions not only on assessments of capabilities but on estimates of intentions. R & D programs can also, as Dr. Foster implied, suggest comparatively cost-effective methods of hedging against technological surprises. The R & D community might even in some cases be able to devise a counter to a system which the opponent had not yet deployed but was trying to develop to counteract one's own existing and deployed systems. This

[26] Dr. Foster's testimony on the fiscal year 1973 Defense RDT & E Program before the Armed Services Committee, House of Representatives, 92nd Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington, D.C., February 29, 1972), 1-13, 14, 15.

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would be possible in cases where technical ascendancy enabled one to judge, within acceptable tolerances, along which technical route the opponent would have to go at what pace in devising his counter.

7. It may also be possible to influence an opponent's strategic perceptions and his resource-allocation decisions at minimal cost. Under conditions of uncertainty, information becomes a commodity. The management and reduction of uncertainty are essential parts of any model of strategic behavior. They relate both to hardware and to information, and to the balance between them. Insofar as the R & D machinery on both sides produces more complex systems, the assessment of which requires more detailed and complicated information, progress in R & D is likely to increase the difficulty, for opposing strategic managers, in achieving a satisfactory trade-off between expenditure on hardware and expenditure directed to the acquisition and processing of information.

A side possessing a technical lead will have an advantage in its attempts to decrease the opponent's uncertainties in some respects. It may wish to do so for two reasons. One is to indicate the general nature of its own deployed systems and strategic purposes as a means of restraining the opponent. Deterrence requires that the opponent should know what one has and what one may do. A side having a technical advantage may also find it easier to convey information in ways which maximize the deterrent effect but minimize the opponent's opportunities of using the information to further his own programs. The second reason might be to try to decrease the opponent's uncertainties so that, in reducing his need to hedge against them, one also reduces one's own need to respond to these hedging measures. To this extent, it may be possible to influence the feedback from an opponent's program upon one's own scientific efforts or force structures.

8. R & D management can also pursue aims of strategic deception, and indicate and exploit political advantages emerging from technical possibilities. One can employ tactics such as deceptive budgetary allocations to different R & D categories, or the leakage of misleading information on R & D, possibly through the press, or deception in the management of testing. In each case it might be possible to mislead others (including, upon occasion, domestic critics) about the major thrust of one's own research or developmental work. It would not always be necessary that the deception be sustained for long, for an advantage in lead-time is an advantage in substance. This would be the case especially if the deceiver could rely on the inability of the other side's management to move swiftly from the acquisition of knowledge, whether of intelligence matters or scientific principles, to the develop-

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ment and deployment of suitable weapons systems. It might then be possible to indicate political and military ways of exploiting any deficiencies in the opponent's management. To this extent, it may be possible to blunt the effect of his R & D program.

9. There are also the diplomatic effects vis-à-vis allies. For a superpower, R & D cooperation with smaller allies can result in additional work done relatively cheaply but—an important aim—without any impairment of the greater power's independence of strategic decision. In 1972, for example, Dr. Foster called for increased integration of R & D within the Western alliance and, speaking before the Senate Armed Services Committee, claimed significant advantages in terms of cost-sharing and the production of mutual understanding. He added: "Any candidate considered for U.S. participation [i.e., in joint projects] also requires a prototype test and evaluation program, as well as the transfer of data and expertise for U.S. production. This will assure that the U.S. retains technological know-how, maintains a favorable balance of payments, sustains industry employment and remains independent of foreign sources for critically needed hardware."[27]

The implications for R & D, and for the exploitation of its results, are clear. Conversely, the very size and scope of a great power's R & D operation makes it desirable and sometimes imperative for smaller nations to seek information about, and access to, that technical effort. In part, no doubt, the smaller powers may seek to make the larger one dependent on them in some important technical area. These compulsions can and do form an important element of political influence, just as a command of the relevant areas of technology has tended to become a condition for adequate communication between a great power and other states. Seen from the White House or the Kremlin, the world is at this level divided into those who understand the complexities of strategic technology (and to whom one can talk), and those who do not.[28]

10. In terms of domestic politics, R & D effort has over a number of years proved to be much less open to challenge than the deployment of weapons systems. Even in the U.S.S.R., the fragmentary evidence indicates that the groups opposing larger strategic forces have hesitated to try to cut R & D. In the U.S., congressional criticism of R & D has over the years been notably less significant than criticism of produc-

[27] *Ibid.*, 2-14. In 1973 he expressed similar views. See his testimony of March 28, 1973 (fn. 24), 1-13, 3-18.

[28] As Dr. Kissinger rather pointedly put it during his news conference at the Intourist Hotel, Moscow, on May 27, 1972, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. "can talk to each other now in a way . . . in which few countries can talk to each other now, because many of them don't have the technical competence." *Military Implications* . . . (fn. 25), 112.

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tion, procurement, and deployment. Whether this can remain so is not entirely clear. It seems possible that the political debates surrounding SALT II, and the talks themselves once they delve more deeply into problems of technical innovation, could make R & D a subject of greater controversy. During 1972 and 1973 there were signs that this might happen in the case of the development process—especially engineering development—partly on the grounds that it can establish a dynamic which may spill over into procurement and deployment. But by the end of 1973 neither innovation nor exploratory development had come under serious and sustained criticism.

The desire for technical improvement is not related merely to administrative or governmental decisions about knowledge, or weapons, or political tactics. It is connected, both for individuals and groups, to the very meaning of concepts like "effort" and "success." The desire for national prestige is complemented by the fact that individual prestige can depend on the ability to design better components, systems, and techniques. The man who designs a better way to insulate wire or a quicker way to transmit information, or who can give a faster rate of climb to an interceptor aircraft, is successful in his profession in a way in which others are not, even if appreciation of his success is confined to his own team or firm. Not only do these pressures of individual and social psychology militate in favor of innovation, but there appear to be few directly competing, let alone contradictory, psychological pressures.

Institutional pressures frequently operate in a similar direction. They can range from inter-service competition or the desire to keep a particular contractor in business to the need to remedy some strategic or systems weakness for which one is responsible. This is a large subject, and one in which slogans like "bureaucratic imperialism" are unhelpful. It is not necessary to assume that service officers are other than patriotic, or officials other than carefully and properly concerned with their public duties, in order to explain why a service will seize the opportunity to perform some strategic task more quickly or cheaply or effectively than has been possible hitherto, or why the case for the elimination of identifiable weakness can be incontrovertible in committee, or why officials and businessmen alike adopt positions designed, among other things, to shield them from criticism or budgetary difficulty. Given the character of nation-states as the foci of political and institutional loyalties, the elimination of real or apparent national security risks ranks very high among the motivating forces of these institutions.

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III. Approaches to Restraint

WHY RESTRAINT?

The pressures to restrain military R & D are nevertheless considerable. The most important arise from the wish to make war less likely, to make it less destructive if it should occur, to strengthen political controls over technical and strategic processes, and to diminish the cost of military preparedness. It has been argued, for instance, that there exists a weapons-technology spiral which can make the strategic competition more vulnerable to mutual overreaction or technical accident.[29] Such a spiral is destabilizing in that it increases the technical uncertainties of each side's estimate of the other, and therefore the number and severity of the risks against which each side will feel compelled to hedge. Technical development can lead to further increases in the destructiveness of an already unbearably destructive form of warfare. It can also weaken political controls, whether by making technical matters harder to understand or, more importantly, by creating facts or defining risks to which statesmen have no choice but to react.

Research and development programs are increasingly expensive and produce ever more complicated and costly types of equipment. Worst of all, at both the scientific and economic levels, the R & D process has a built-in tendency to proliferate. The solution of one scientific problem, or the creation of a new technology, as a rule produces as many new difficulties as it resolves and as many new requirements as it satisfies. And since most technical advantages are relatively short-lived, the achievement of one merely creates fresh impulses to search for its successor. The solution of one R & D problem therefore often means pressures for further, and usually more, R & D. The creation of new information technologies, for instance, has made it possible to contemplate a large variety of new and much more complex technical tasks. Requirements may be increased in two ways. One stems from the fact that, as previously suggested, once the competing R & D processes on both sides increase technical complexity, each side requires larger, more complex, and more expensive means of obtaining adequate information. Increased R & D expenditure therefore tends to compel additional increased expenditure in adjacent fields. The other way in which requirements may expand lies in the fact that increasing technical complexity may encourage the adoption of strategies which are optimal under conditions of maximum technical uncertainty. The R & D proc-

[29] The idea of a spiral usually assumes that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. have been engaged in an "arms race." I ought, perhaps, to say that, for reasons going beyond the scope of this paper, I believe this idea is at best a dangerously oversimplified model of reality and at worst simply wrong.

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ess therefore influences the formulation of basic strategic doctrine in ways which also frequently imply greater costs.

The level of defense R & D activity, moreover, ultimately rests on comparatively arbitrary political judgments. Government-supported R & D is usually directed to areas where normal commercial notions of costs and profit will not induce spending by private or even state-owned corporations, or where corporate effort needs to be supplemented or coordinated in the interests of non-commercial aims. It follows that standard economic and market criteria alone cannot be decisive in judging R & D spending. Rather, the decision on what level of effort is appropriate rests on a combination of strategic doctrine and political attitude. But insofar as these attitudes and judgments are arbitrary, they are also vulnerable, either to alternative strategic doctrines, or to different political ideas, or to general social arguments for lower research- or arms-spending.

These propositions are not free from difficulty. The wish to make war less likely can, and often does, conflict with the wish to make it less destructive if it should come. And either aim can be promoted rather than obstructed by the results of R & D programs. One can produce *less* destructive weapons, for instance, rather than *more* destructive ones. R & D can also create arms-control possibilities which did not previously exist—for example in the field of surveillance mechanisms. It can help to prevent technical accidents—as was done during the early 1960's by work designed to strengthen the control devices on U.S. strategic weapons. And even the argument that assessments of the strategic balance and appropriate force structures are arbitrary must be treated with caution. For, if stated in too rigid a form, it may deny the validity not merely of one particular force level but of any alternative level including zero forces—which is logically absurd.

MAJOR CONSTRAINTS

It is more complicated and difficult to restrain technological development than to try to encourage it. There are several reasons. First, how can one restrain ideas? The penalties for even trying to restrain them can be severe, including as they do a decline in the number and morale of research staff and engineers, and increasing sterility in a wide range of teaching and research. Even the ability to monitor advances elsewhere can atrophy. Second, how can one know that a piece of knowledge which one has refrained from acquiring will remain undiscovered and dispensable? To quote Harvey Brooks once more: "The questions we begin by asking are not those which we end by answering and an insight that initially appears to have little relevance may rather sud-

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denly turn out to be the key to further progress towards a practical goal."[30] The importance of externalities means that any particular measure of restraint may prove in retrospect to have had quite unpredictable and undesirable side effects. At the same time, given the international character of science, knowledge which one has refrained from acquiring may turn out to have been acquired later by someone else and under conditions which confirm one's relative disadvantage. Third, restraints or limitations might take one of two forms: they could be very broad, embracing whole categories of research, or they could be selective and finely tuned. In the first case, they would create very large gaps, not just in capability but in knowledge. Such gaps are unlikely to be politically or scientifically acceptable, if only because of their effects on adjacent areas of knowledge and the difficulties of designing around large areas of deliberate ignorance. In the second case, how could one design limitations save on the basis of technical definitions which require prior knowledge of that which is to be limited? Fourth, in an important sense the thrust of developmental work is less toward the creation of "better systems" *per se* than toward the identification and definition of deficiencies in existing policies, structure, and weapons inventories.[31] From this perspective, a limitation of R & D implies acceptance of a permanent set of deficiencies in one's defense structure—deficiencies, moreover, whose character and consequences no one can clearly predict.

To design mutually understood and accepted restraints as between two opposing parties is harder still, for it introduces additional conditions, those of verification and assurance. It has so far been a principal requirement for abstention by either side that the opponent be known to be abstaining in related or affected areas. From this point of view there are, it seems, a number of things which cannot be done. One cannot give either side assurance that the other is not having interesting scientific or technological ideas, or that it is refraining from developing those ideas to whatever extent may be consistent with the avoidance of detection. In the absence of inspection of a sort which both sides have so far regarded as unacceptably intrusive, it is not possible to obtain satisfactory assurances about the processes by which scientific and technical possibilities emerge. In fact, it is very difficult to be sure whether any particular improvement is due to movements toward known production boundaries or to the expansion of those boundaries through

[30] Brooks (fn. 22), 129.

[31] The point has been clearly put by Dr. Foster. See his address of January 10, 1973, to the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics in Washington (Department of Defense Press Release, no date).

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an increase in knowledge. Nor is it possible to establish a clear line of separation between military and civilian technology at any stage prior to development, testing, and procurement. It is not possible to draft formal agreements to limit any technology whose essential characteristics have not become definable by the time the agreement is drafted. Indeed, since the danger of a scientific advance or technical breakthrough by the opponent cannot be removed by changes in any one parameter condition for innovative effort, any particular measure of "less R & D" will leave open the possibility of circumvention. Nor are evasion and circumvention the sole difficulties. Any agreement incorporating defined and static limitations will leave open to either side the possibility of research and development work that is consistent with its terms but will shorten the lead-time for any subsequent progress and therefore create a position of relative advantage if the agreement should be broken or abrogated. In other words, it is not easy to design a treaty which will not create disparities in the event of sudden abrogation by either party.

APPROACHES

Some things, on the other hand, seem possible. Most of them rest on notions of a common interest within the adversary relationship of the two sides,[32] and the impossibility or undesirability of limiting advances in knowledge and associated research and exploratory development programs.

In the first place, security considerations are always a function of the general political relationships between the powers concerned. Strategic planning rests upon threat perceptions and estimates of the balance of risks which are not immutable. Security problems sometimes come to seem less important, either because the political relations between the countries concerned improve, or because a possible conflict seems so cataclysmic that the prospect of its occurrence is less credible, or simply because attention comes to be focused on other problems, making security matters apparently less urgent. For any or all of these reasons, military effort, including R & D, can become less important and pressing. Sometimes the pressures can be indirect: energy, pollution, and environmental problems, for example, can divert attention and resources from defense matters or change the circumstances in which defense can be organized. Management of pressures and incentives in this area is clearly a matter of overall political intentions and leadership.

[32] Or more than two, as and when the development of nuclear forces by additional states makes it feasible and desirable to draw them into such discussions.

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There are also the statements of strategic doctrine and intentions from which requirements for weapons systems are often derived. The relationship between weapons and strategy is of course a two-way affair: the appearance of a new system can affect strategic planning as much as planning affects the search for new systems. Nevertheless it may be possible to change the strategic intentions of both sides in such a way as to facilitate arms control rather than to make it more difficult. This could happen in two ways. First, one side or both might choose to emphasize the deployment of systems capable of inspection and verification rather than systems which make it difficult; to improve national means of verification; to emphasize systems permitting more time for decision making rather than those requiring instant reaction; systems less sensitive to variations in strategy or tactics by either side; systems with greater accuracy and therefore less potential for direct and collateral destruction; and systems which potentially facilitate further arms-control measures. This last might be done by increasing the incentive for either side to eliminate older weapons systems and by designing systems so as to limit possible instabilities in the event that both sides agreed to move to lower numerical levels. Both sides might, for example, agree to abstain from the deployment of land-mobile ICBM's with very heavy-yield warheads. Or they might develop smaller-yield and more precise strategic systems, or ones with characteristics specific, and seen to be specific, against some third party.

Second, it may also be possible to redefine the areas in which both sides require assurance, as well as the degree of assurance needed. It may be true, for example, that an opponent could shorten his lead-time for potential deployment by clandestine or other non-observable forms of development. But it might be more fruitful to ask how close he could get, not to any new systems or technologies, but to drastically destabilizing ones, without giving adequate warning that he was doing so. It may be true that not all tests can be observed or their nature unambiguously established. But it might be enough to ask whether an opponent could reasonably plan for, say, a first strike against a land-based missile force unless he had tested his attack systems in an actual operational configuration and in ways which were bound to be observed.

Any such strategic changes would be quickly reflected in the procurement of weapons and therefore in the management of R & D efforts. Those efforts are highly sensitive to consumer expectations; it is the prospect of procurement which gives incentives and a sense of mission to R & D personnel. Changes in strategy and procurement can

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therefore change the very concept of what constitutes "success" in R & D. It is not always necessary to affect the views of all scientists and technologists. If the views and judgments of the professional leaders of the R & D community—of those who pass upon the efforts of others—can be influenced, the whole tenor of the R & D enterprise may be affected. To do so deliberately is, however, not free of risk. Attempts to influence can be counter-productive. Competing strategic and procurement views will continue to be held both within and outside most segments of the defense community, and will find reflection among R & D people. Management which is too tight and centralized, however laudable its aims, can render much R & D effort sterile. And, of course, any attempt to limit R & D may prove incompatible with other forms of arms control. If, for example, a limit on R & D means an increase in the risk of qualitative inferiority in some categories, it may be less tolerable at reduced deployment levels than at high ones.

If verified controls are to be added to changes of incentive, they are likely to be most effective if imposed in the area of advanced development and prototype testing. Such a procedure would avoid the apparently insoluble difficulties of trying to combine the necessary freedom of scientific work with tight administrative control and the varied and often obscure ways in which research is done with the needs of verification. It would allow, indeed encourage, senior scientists to help control the results of their own work. It has been estimated that half of the technology events which contributed to the production of new weapons systems in the United States during the 1950's and 1960's arose from advanced development work, and a further 20 per cent arose in the engineering development phase. It is during these stages that the results of R & D can begin to become sufficiently visible to make verification possible.

One method for changing incentives which has been much favored by critics of the military and, for obvious institutional reasons, by legislatures, is to cut research and development funds and to decrease the rate of return from investment in these areas. This has obvious attractions. It is easy to accomplish, popular with competing agencies or firms, avoids careful definition of terms, and operates with some effectiveness at gross or aggregate levels of activity. There may even prove to be usable direct correlations between development spending and the rate of growth of particular technologies. If so, any method for limiting development spending which an outsider felt able to monitor with confidence would also provide confidence in his estimate of the rate of growth of the technology or technologies concerned. More-

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over, budget limitations inevitably create trade-off problems, or make them more acute. Arms controllers can exploit this. There is, for instance, the trade-off between information systems and weapons procurement. A tighter budget might compel the spending of a greater percentage of the defense dollar on information rather than weapons. At the same time there would be pressures to slow down changes in deployed systems. Slower changes would mean greater learning-curve reductions in unit costs for production and servicing, as well as improvements in systems reliability. Both these pressures could operate in the direction of decreased emphasis upon, or at least speed of, changes in weapons systems.

The limitations of this approach are, however, severe. If, as suggested earlier, a 0.1 per cent increase in the rate of technological change correlates with a 1.0 per cent change in the rate of growth of cumulative R & D expenditure, then—even assuming that correlation shows causation, which is by no means certain—a 20 per cent decline in the rate of growth of funding would entail a mere 2 per cent reduction in the rate of technological change. This hardly seems very cost-effective. In any case, the internationality of science and technology, and the steadiness of its gross growth curves over time, suggest that the breeding of new knowledge is not greatly affected by increases or slowdowns in expenditures for research and development by any single nation. If decreased R & D spending is intended to limit knowledge and know-how, therefore, it would have to be accompanied by effective, and perhaps verifiable, measures to deprive the country concerned of access to the science and technology of others. That seems impractical, except at quite exorbitant social and scientific costs.

Nor can the argument be usefully turned around to say that if a 20 per cent decline in the rate of growth of funding leads to so small a reduction in the rate of technical change, technical development would not be seriously damaged by a levelling-off of spending and a reallocation of resources to more popular social purposes. Technological change does not have a direct and immediate relationship to research. But research provides the basis for the most interesting and far-reaching technological changes over the longer term. A small percentage reduction in the rate of change might, therefore, conceal a substantial alteration in its direction and character. Moreover, as we have seen, only a small percentage of R & D costs goes into research. Though the rule of thumb is that research is to development as one to ten, other categorizations are sometimes used. The U.S. National Science Foundation, using its division of defense R & D into categories of basic research, applied research, and development, suggests that, in 1965 for instance, the ex-

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penditure percentages for these categories were 4 per cent, 22 per cent, and 73 per cent, respectively.[33] It seems highly probable that across-the-board budget cuts would principally damage research rather than development—the more so because the political and administrative justifications for such cuts would be likely to emphasize the short-term rather than the long-term payoff. Any attempt to cut budgets in discriminating and detailed fashion, on the other hand, would be administratively difficult and cumbersome, and would almost certainly require large increases in the bureaucracy of science administration, with adverse effects on its subsequent speed of operation and reaction-capacity to new ideas. Since there are no precise and essential correlations between expenditure and the character of R & D results, it would still not be certain that lower funding would necessarily lead to less weapons development, let alone less weapons development of a particular kind.

One other consideration must be borne in mind. If R & D budgets were to be considered vital measures for the observance of international agreements, they would become even more politicized than they are. Budgets can be drained of effectiveness as decision-making tools once the terms in which they are drawn up, and the criteria in accordance with which information is presented, have themselves become the subject of political dispute. Funds can be channeled in ways that are difficult to detect, even by careful auditing. It is a matter on which public accounts and control committees have tales to tell.

There are other senses in which attempts to limit funds might be counter-productive. As a consequence of heavy developmental expenditure, numbers of able people are tied down to development. Many of them might turn to basic and comparatively inexpensive research work if these funds were cut. That might increase the rate of discovery and innovation, and thereby pave the way for even swifter technical development at some point in the future. If, as is sometimes suggested, high labor mobility among scientific and technical personnel is correlated with increased inventiveness and innovation, this result would be even more likely to occur because scientific advances owe much to the introduction of techniques and insights from one field of research to another.

It is also possible to take measures relating to the flow of information. Since detailed information about developments on an opposing side can help, by narrowing uncertainties, to limit the risks against which each power feels compelled to hedge, it can also encourage restraint. The obvious difficulty is that too greatly asymmetrical a flow of infor-

[33] *Federal Funds for Science*, XIV, National Science Foundation (Washington, D.C. 1965).

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mation, or information which reveals the existence of a unilateral advantage, can encourage attempts to exploit it. Four means of managing the information flow seem to be available: unilateral and invulnerable systems of surveillance and verification, tacitly tolerated surveillance, management of the information flow, and the removal of restrictions on information flow in some areas.

Surveillance and verification are the principal methods on which both sides have so far relied. They operate at the point at which weapons systems and major components become visible. Each side is likely to seek maximum efficiency and accuracy for its monitoring and reconnaissance mechanisms, part of the so-called national means of verification. Infra-red and visible light photography already have formidable capabilities, and it must be assumed that satellite-borne cameras can achieve ground resolutions of 0.5 feet.[34] Both sides are likely to continue R & D work in these fields. But the point at which new systems become visible may itself to some extent depend upon the willingness of each side to accept monitoring and inspection. The SALT I provisions, by which each side has granted immunity to the other's surveillance satellites from interference by its own anti-satellite systems, are highly significant here. They clearly imply mutual acceptance of this form of inspection. Though the qualitative gap between on-site inspection and satellite surveillance has been narrowed by the increasing accuracy of satellite photography, there are some things photography cannot do. It cannot, for example, detect all forms of work being done under cover, or whether a missile nose cone contains MIRV's. One of its substantial utilities lies in permitting each side to gather enough information to be deterred from risking conflict. But it may also be that the traditional Soviet reluctance to accept close inspection is being eroded, and that the results of this process may become exploitable for additional forms of inspection. A managed flow of mutual information also has possibilities. In the SAL negotiations and in the Joint Consultative Commission set up under SALT I, both sides have shown themselves willing to go some way to use mutual information for the purposes of strategic reassurance. Perhaps this can be taken further. Though it might in theory be possible to slow down the requisite flow of information within any national R & D system, it is difficult to see how reassurance on such a point might be conveyed by one party to the other.

There is also the idea that some kinds of scientific and technical information might simply be allowed to flow more freely between the

[34] See Ted Greenwood, "Reconnaissance and Arms Control," *Scientific American*, CCXXVIII (February 1973), 14-25.

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two sides. This is likely to have a limited application. I have already argued that scientific knowledge is something like a free good, and that the velocity of circulation of ideas is a vital element in determining the rate of scientific and technical discovery, invention, and innovation. If so, the openness of Western information channels, and the quicker and freer circulation of ideas through them, is in many ways an asset. The relative slowness of Soviet and Chinese access to such information, and their comparative lack of person-to-person contacts, are liabilities; encouragement of freer exchanges of information and of people could be to their advantage. To some extent, improved contacts have indeed been promoted. But the remaining obstacles are formidable. Exchanges of scientific information do not easily translate, for either side, into reduced uncertainties about opposing weapons programs. For both sides, the importance of externalities means that the non-linear effects of any information exchange cannot be easily planned for. In any case, governments are traditionally concerned with maintaining the flexibility and relative advantage that a monopoly of information can provide. On the Soviet and Chinese side, especially, proposals for easier and more uncontrolled exchanges between scientists could easily prove politically embarrassing.[35] At the levels of applied technology, where knowledge is not a free good, and which are of especial importance for arms control purposes, there are different complications. The United States, with its internal freedom of information, regards itself as being at a permanent disadvantage compared to the Soviet Union or China. Though the Russians argue that the multiplicity of American information sources results, for outsiders, in a degree of confusion whose effects are not dissimilar to those of their own misinformation policies, it is difficult to see how the U.S. could make even more detailed information available in defense-related areas without a large Soviet *quid pro quo*—or how, for the time being, the Russians could give it.

It is understandable that, in view of these ambiguities and uncertainties, both sides have seemed willing to explore the possibility of moving from ideas of limitation by treaty to limitation by an ongoing process of negotiation. The basic notion is that since science and technology progress in dynamic fashion, any system of limitations must itself be dynamic and not static. Many variations are possible here, ranging from the idea that the process of negotiation can itself exercise a restraining influence on both parties to the possibility of a series of partial and in-

[35] Suggestions for freer movement of persons have already proved embarrassing in the framework of discussions about European security. For the Russians to permit such free movement could, of course, pose grave dangers to the entire apparatus of political control.

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terim agreements. To some extent, SALT performs the task of just such an arms control conference in semi-permanent session and symbol of a will to cooperate. The Joint Consultative Commission has taken the idea further. So have the various ideas about following up the SALT I Interim Agreement on Limiting Offensive Weapons not by a treaty, but by another Interim Agreement which could eventually be succeeded by a third. Clearly such a process would have many advantages, one of them being an ongoing exchange of information, including information about specific points of doubt. But there are drawbacks. Arms negotiation in this context becomes just another, technical branch of diplomacy. Limitations depend upon the continued willingness of the two governments to cooperate amid the continuing flux and play of political and economic pressures. That must mean a willingness, at need, to subordinate a variety of other domestic and foreign interests to the overriding requirements of cooperation with each other on strategic arms. But that desire for political cooperation could wane for any number of reasons, particularly in an era strongly marked by intolerant neopopulist politics. If it does, it is hard to believe that open-ended arms-control discussions will continue, or be effective if they do.

The final possibility which deserves mention is that of non-verified arms control. This can mean one of two kinds of activity: agreements not subject to verification or inspection, or unilateral actions by either side. Examples of each have occurred. During the middle and later 1960's, the United States refrained for some time from developing and deploying ABM systems, and tried to use that unilateral restraint to secure countervailing Soviet restraint. The numbers of U.S. land- and sea-based launchers have remained stable since 1967. And both sides have limited their CBW weapons by unverified understanding. But to apply such a principle to the whole of defense R & D presents difficulties. Precisely because science and technology move quickly, any advantage which either side possesses will be evanescent. Advantage therefore permits no slowdown in further research. A lead implies an advantage in lead-time and strategic substance; once it is lost, it may be irrecoverable. To slow down R & D in uncontrolled fashion may therefore be to incur strategic costs of an entirely unexpected magnitude and—given the role of externalities—character. Moreover, the greater a sudden and unexpected advantage promises to be for an opponent, the greater the probability that he will regard it as compensating for the risks he incurs by going to development and deployment.

A unilateral slowdown in R & D might be attempted by other means, for example by a damping-down of domestic inter-service or bureaucratic competition. But since the competition relates to real problems

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of political and strategic substance, eliminating it at the inter-service or inter-agency level without any alteration of the strategic balance or the attitudes of either party would merely lead to its reappearance in a new bureaucratic form somewhere else.[36] In any case such competition is, among other things, society's protection against bureaucratic or service secrecy and inertia. Even if it were possible to eliminate competition, therefore, it might be unwise to try.

In sum, acceptance of restraints without verification is merely the acceptance of greater risks. Such acceptance might be justified in conditions of improved political relations between the parties, or with respect to less important military systems,[37] or even because one's forces had become so large and sophisticated that the chances of sudden major changes in the overall strategic balance were thought to have measurably declined. Whether such risks are regarded as acceptable will continue to depend for both sides not only on perceptions of how far they have in fact been reduced, but on the answer to the question: if the bet fails, who will be held responsible and with what consequences?

IV. Conclusion

This analysis suggests that R & D is unlikely to be limitable by any single or static measure, whether of monitoring or spending. What may be needed is the injection of the idea of control of weapons R & D into the political and strategic process at all levels and in a continuing way. Arms control, and its R & D control component, are rightly becoming permanent features of the diplomatic and military scene. If action is to be taken, it must be not just on R & D but on the strategic and political setting in which R & D decisions are made.

There is a considerable possibility that the larger interests of arms control may, in fact, lie not so much in limitations on R & D as a whole, but in much more intensive R & D in at least some novel directions. These will include not only verification and inspection mechanisms, or methods for avoiding accidents or the failure of control, but the development by both sides of new kinds of strategic weapons outside the field, and therefore also outside the politics, of long-range, heavy-yield nuclear warheads. Several possibilities seem to be becoming available. One is for altogether more accurate and smaller-yield classes of warheads. Another may be for novel methods of air and anti-missile de-

[36] This idea is hardly new. *Natura furcam expellas, tamen usque recurret.*

[37] They might be less important for any one of several reasons: because they were less effective in relation to some particular mission, or because their effects were less controllable (as in the case of biological warfare), or because their use was subject to insurmountable political objections.

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fense, possibly based in part on radiant energy.[38] Another may be climate control. The possibilities are many. But it already seems clear that what might emerge is nothing less than the separation of two concepts which, since 1945, have seemed inextricably linked and whose linkage has given the strategic problems of the 1950's and 1960's their particular character. They are the concepts of "strategic weapons" and "mass destruction."

If and when one power or another develops strategic weapons which are not weapons of mass destruction, and possibly not even nuclear, a great many of the assumptions which underlie the present structure of security may require fundamental reevaluation. The character and direction of R & D will necessarily follow, where it does not already precede, these changes. Not only will the question of control over the R & D process then need to be reexamined as to both aim and method, but it will also be clear that although SALT I and II may have changed some of the conditions for strategic competition, they could not remove the perennial problems of the control and management of power, or prevent the emergence of novel dangers which need not be less than those which SALT was designed to meet.

[38] Whether the development of such anti-missile systems would or would not be prohibited under the SALT I ABM Treaty is a matter of interpretation on which different views are possible.

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VATICAN POLITICS: STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION

By FRANCIS X. MURPHY

AS a political component of the contemporary world, the Catholic Church plays an important if ambivalent role in international affairs. On February 25, 1971, in Moscow, Archbishop Agostino Casaroli, head of the Vatican's bureau of Public Affairs, affixed the signature of the Holy See to the ratification of the International Treaty Limiting the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. That same day, in London and Washington, the respective Apostolic Delegates to England and the United States signed identical documents. The participation of papal representatives in this international agreement raises a number of queries in the political order, not the least of which is the fundamental problem regarding the nature of the papacy as a sovereignty. No other religious institution in the modern world functions as both a church and a political organization that exchanges diplomatic representatives and claims total recognition as an independent member of the community of nations.[1]

Although its founder had said explicitly, "My Kingdom is not of this world" (Jn. 18. 36.), the Catholic Church is unquestionably one institution in today's world with an authentic tradition that reaches back through well over fifteen hundred years of political activity. Few contemporary institutions have been more intimately—and none more continuously—involved in the political order.

It is obvious that the Catholic Church, along with most other contemporary political institutions, is undergoing a rapid internal revolution. A key to the understanding of this phenomenon was supplied by Pope John XXIII's call for an *aggiornamento* or updating of the Church's structures and functions in keeping with "the signs of the times." Its basic plan was hammered out during the four sessions of Vatican Council II (1962–1965), when the Church's bishops, theologians, and lay experts formulated a series of sixteen documents that described the church *ad intra* (in its inner constitution) and *ad extra* (in its confrontation with the outside world). This conciliar development was essentially the suggestion of the Belgian cardinal, Léon Josef Suenens, and represented the mind of Pope John as to the direction

[1] Lassa F. L. Oppenheim and Hersh Lauterpacht, *International Law*, I, 8th ed. (London 1955), 234; Josef L. Kunz, *The Changing Law of Nations* (Columbus, Ohio 1968), 276-89.

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in which he wanted the Council to progress. It was supported by John's successor, first as Cardinal Giovanni Battista Montini of Milan and then as Pope Paul VI, when he replaced John as the Supreme Pontiff of the Catholic Church on June 23, 1963.

Vatican Council II introduced changes into the structure and function of the Catholic Church which are substantial both in that institution's inner self-image and its activities in contemporary society. A plenitude of theological monographs and studies have been devoted to the sixteen constitutions and decrees promulgated by the Council.[2] A considerable literature concerned with its practical effects has grown up in the wake of the Council.[3] Comparatively little attempt has been made to analyze the significance of the Church's new political orientation. In this article I furnish a prolegomenon for that task.

I

Vatican authorities have been careful not to base the Church's claim to international sovereignty on the independent status of Vatican City State. Concordats and international agreements with other nations are signed by a representative of the pope as supreme pastor of the Catholic Church, the recognized religious leader of some half billion faithful scattered over the world. This concept of the sovereignty of the Holy See is spelled out in the Lateran Treaty of 1929, signed by the Italian Government and the papal Secretary of State, bringing an end to the so-called "Roman Question" which resulted from the suppression of the pope's temporal sovereignty over the Papal States by the Piedmontese Government in 1870. In protest, the popes had declared themselves prisoners of the Vatican, would not acknowledge the legitimacy of the Italian Government, and refused the recognition of papal independence and financial compensation passed by the Italian Parliament as the Law of Guarantees in 1871.

The Lateran Treaty of 1929 embodied the main financial and political provisions of the Law of Guarantees and recognized the sovereignty of the pope as supreme pastor of the Holy See as well as his independence as ruler of Vatican City State. Despite the ambiguity involved, a clear distinction was made between the pope's two positions. In international relations, the Roman pontiffs have insisted that their sovereignty is constituted by the Church's traditional and universal

[2] Walter Abbot and Joseph Gallager, *The Documents of Vatican Council II* (New York 1966); Xavier Rynne, *Vatican Council Two* (New York 1968).

[3] Peter Nichols, *The Politics of the Vatican* (New York 1968); Jean Chevalier, *La politique du Vatican* (Paris 1969); Carlo Falconi, *The Popes in the Twentieth Century*, trans. by M. Grindrod (Boston 1967).

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character. On this basis, popes exchange ambassadors with independent states, participate in international affairs, and on occasion attempt to serve as mediators in disputes between states.

Juridical foundation for this concept is supplied by the theory that the Church forms a *societas perfecta*, defined as an institution capable of maintaining its complete welfare in its own order and, by right, disposing of all the means to achieve that aim. It is therefore self-sufficient and autonomous. It is this status that is recognized by the Lateran Treaty and reinforced by the Holy See's declaration of intent to remain outside any territorial competition, characterizing itself a neutral State.[4] As a consequence of this declaration, the neutrality of the Vatican City State has been acknowledged in the international order, particularly during World War II, when Vatican diplomats and church officials were accorded free access to the Holy See by both Axis and Allied governments.[5]

The concept of the *societas perfecta* had been developed out of the natural law theories popularized by Puffendorf and the Protestant champions of civil rights in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, mainly in controversy with Catholic kings and princes. By an inevitable process, the Catholic Church absorbed the notion as applied to the international order and has become its champion in the contemporary world. This development was given classic expression in Cardinal Alfredo Ottaviani's *Institutiones juris publici ecclesiae* (Institutes of the Public Law of the Church), the fourth edition of which was published in 1960, on the eve of Vatican Council II.[6]

II

At once ideological and pragmatic, the Vatican's political activity is conducted by the pope through the Secretary of State and the Council for the Public Affairs of the Church. The separation of these two offices was part of a vast reorganization of the Roman Curia or papal administrative bureaucracy, begun by Pope Paul even before the end of Vatican Council II. On December 7, 1965, he published a *motu proprio*, or rescript, abolishing the Supreme Congregation of the Holy Office with its inquisitional apparatus, and creating the new Congregation

[4] Lateran Treaty, Art. 25, paras. 1 and 2.

[5] Roberto Ago, "Occupazione bellica dell'Italia e Trattato Lateranese," *Communicazione e Studi*, II (Milan 1964); J. Puente Egidio, *Personalidad Internacional de la Ciudad del Vaticano* (Madrid 1965).

[6] J. Puente Egidio maintains that Vatican City is not a true state, since it cannot guarantee its own independence. It is, however, subject to international territorial law with a limited juridical capacity created to serve another subject, viz. the Holy See. *Ibid.*, 12, 99, 103. Cf. H. Wagnon, *Concordats et droit international* (Gembloux 1935), 56-63.

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for the Doctrine of the Faith. This move was in keeping with his sensitivity to the criticism of which the old Holy Office was the object during the Council. However, consistent with Pope Paul's gradualistic methods, he retained Cardinal Ottaviani as prefect of the new Congregation, keeping most of Ottaviani's staff. Thus, despite the new structure and rules limiting the competence of this bureau to matters of doctrine and discipline, its members continued to interfere in the activities of other branches of the Church's central government. They based their right to do so on the Congregation's prerogative to exercise vigilance over matters of faith and morals, including, in their viewpoint, the Church's political involvement.

Meanwhile, the pope effectuated a reform of all the Vatican bureaus with a series of rescripts, beginning with *Ecclesiae sanctae* (August 6, 1966), which partially restructured the Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith, and *Catholicam Christi ecclesiam*, which constituted the Council of the Laity and the Commission for Justice and Peace. In pursuit of a policy to internationalize the membership of the Curia, *Pro comperto sane*, of August 6, 1967, he appointed diocesan bishops as voting members of the various curial Congregations and foreshadowed the introduction of non-Italian cardinals as prefects of the curial Congregations. Finally, on August 17, 1967, the apostolic constitution, *Regimini ecclesiae universae*, followed by the *Regolamento generale della curia romana* on October 22, brought about a complete reorientation of the pope's administrative offices, which are now structured under the general term of the Papal Household.[7]

These documents changed the names of the papal administrative bureaus and opened the way for an internationalization of their personnel. This process was begun with the substitution of the Yugoslav cardinal, Franjo Seper, for Alfredo Ottaviani as prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith in January 1968, and was completed with the elevation of the French cardinal, Jean Villot, as Secretary of State on April 30, 1969. To eliminate internal conflicts between the curial Congregations, the pope appointed the Secretary of State as coordinator of the papal administrative bureaus and directed that a monthly meeting be held under the Secretary's auspices. He thus settled a long-standing conflict regarding supremacy of influence, particularly between the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith and the Secretary of State.

Among the internal reforms that Pope Paul introduced were the

[7] Cf. Nicolò del Re, *La curia romana*, 3rd ed. (Rome 1971); I. Gordon, "De curia romana renovata," *Periodica de re morali, canonica, liturgica*, LVIII (1969), 59-116; Charles Pichon, *Le Vatican. Hier et aujourd'hui*, 3rd ed. (Paris 1968).

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abolition of the old papal aristocracy and a gradual toning down of the renaissance ritual that accompanied the pope on ceremonial occasions. Of greater import was the abolishment of the system of *racommandazione*, whereby the incumbent of a lower office asserted his prescriptive right to the position above him and asked powerful prelates to appeal to the pope in his behalf. With *Regimini ecclesiae*, Paul legislated that office holders in the papal household were appointed for five years; did not have a right to promotion or reappointment; and on the pope's demise, lost title to their office entirely. He strongly recommended that incoming popes should not appoint curial officials until after they had been in office for three months. Finally, in December 1970, on the eve of his departure for the Far East, Paul eliminated from participation in a papal election all cardinals upon arrival at their eightieth birthday, compelling them at the same time to surrender all ecclesiastical offices.[8]

III

One of the primary achievements of Vatican Council II was a revolutionary change in the Church's self-image, aimed at introducing a radical reorientation of its activities. In the first two chapters of its *Dogmatic Constitution on the Church*, the Second Vatican Council simply ignored the juridical approach, refusing to define the institution other than in the words of the New Testament, where it is referred to as a "mystery," the "coming of the kingdom of God," and the "people of God."

The third chapter of this document describes the hierarchical order of the Church's governance, repeating the declaration of the pope's supremacy in the rulership of the Church and his infallibility in defining matters of faith and morals as proclaimed by Vatican Council I in 1870. But it modifies the concept of papal rule by associating the bishops with and under the pope as sharing the governance of the Universal Church. In recognition of this adjustment, Pope Paul VI inaugurated a series of Synods of Bishops, wherein elected representatives of the Conferences of Bishops from all over the world would meet with the pontiff and his staff to discuss the Church's policies. Synods were held in 1967, 1969, and 1971, and a permanent secretariat with revolving membership was established in Rome to supervise the implementation of the previous Synod and prepare the agenda for the coming one. Although critics have thus far considered it as more or less a rubber-stamp assembly, the Roman Synod gives promise of developing a ma-

[8] Motu proprio: *Ingravescentem aetatem*, November 21, 1970; see Gustav Thils, "New Light on Papal Elections," *The Tablet*, ccxxv (February 20, 1971), 190-91.

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chinery whereby overall policy making for the Church will gradually be fully shared between the pope and the bishops who govern dioceses, rather than being under the control of the administrative offices of the Roman Curia.[9]

Agitation for a more representative process of papal election had been spearheaded by Cardinal Suenens, who, together with Pope Paul (then still Cardinal Montini), had been the architect of John's vision of the Council's aims and procedures. Nevertheless, the two prelates now disagreed publicly on the Church's current structure. In a famous interview with the press in May 1969, Cardinal Suenens called for a reorganization of the method of papal elections, suggesting that co-responsibility for the Church's universal welfare, when shared with the bishops, would be better expressed if the papal electors were chosen by Episcopal Conferences. At the same time, Suenens called for a total reordering of the idea of papal diplomatic activity, criticizing the apostolic nuncios and delegates for attempting to exercise undue influence in the countries to which they were accredited.[10]

Suenens' thesis was rejected by both the pope and the Roman Curia and an attempt was made, in a document dealing with papal diplomatic actions, to justify the presence of these representatives of the Vatican as in some way a pastoral activity.[11] The move to give these ecclesiastical diplomatic functions a theological basis has not been accepted by most experts; nevertheless, the apparatus of papal diplomatic exchanges with sovereign states has actually been expanding.[12] Most new nations, upon achieving independence, seek the Holy See's recognition. Likewise, in regulating the Church's position in countries with difficult or persecutory regimes, the papal nuncio still proves to be a most important instrument: as an accredited diplomat he has direct access to heads of government. For instance, the papal nuncio in Senegal several years ago successfully interceded with national authorities in nearby African countries for several Protestant bodies whose representatives were simply not recognized by these states.[13]

The Church's attitude vis-à-vis the social, economic, moral, and po-

[9] Francis Murphy and Gary MacEoin, *Synod 67: A New Sound in Rome* (Milwaukee 1968); René Laurentin, *Enjeu du IIe Synode et Contestation dans l'Eglise* (Paris 1969).

[10] Léon Josef Suenens, *Co-responsabilité dans l'Eglise* (Paris 1968); Josef de Broucker, *Le dossier Suenens* (Paris 1970).

[11] Motu proprio: *De muneribus legatorum*, June 24, 1969.

[12] *L'Annuario Pontificio, 1973* (Città del Vaticano) lists 75 ambassadors accredited to the Holy See; 59 papal nuncios or pro-nuncios with diplomatic status; 16 apostolic delegates without diplomatic representation; and 9 representatives accredited to international organizations. See Henri de Riedmatten, "The Part Played by the Holy See in International Organizations," *Concilium*, VIII (1970), 74-93.

[13] Cf. Discourse of Archbishop Giovanni Benelli (English edition), *L'Osservatore Romano*, March 8, 1972.

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litical problems of today's world is justified in the assertion by recent pontiffs that "the Church is not identified with any one culture . . . it is ready to enter into relations with all cultures. . . ."[14] Though this principle is frequently reiterated, there is little comprehension of its full significance among most clerics and observant laity. Although Vatican Council II has justified the notion of pluralism in the explanation of Church teaching and discipline, change in both these spheres still shocks a majority of its prelates and faithful. Thus far, no ecclesiastical critic has made an attempt to lay down a theory regarding the development involved in a major change in policy that was forced upon the Church by the circumstances and pressures of a new age.

In general, when faced with new or evolving social, economic, ethical, and political problems, the pope and the bishops, functioning as the Magisterium or teaching authority of the Church, tend to adopt a conservative stand based upon the reassertion of traditional values and disciplinary decisions. Nevertheless, despite the continuity claimed for its teachings—Pope Paul VI is fond of asserting that "the Church is consistent with itself"—the Church has frequently changed its explanation as well as its attitude in most areas of its theological and disciplinary interests.[15]

Actual change is accomplished by a process that can be best referred to as "reverse English." When, due to the reflection of its theologians, or the attitude of its faithful who are confronted with diverse metaphysical, political, social, or philosophical patterns, the Church is about to accept a change in doctrinal explanation or disciplinary directive, the whole of tradition seems to draw itself up and, with *saeva indignatio*, to refuse to acknowledge the possibility of change. With the publication of a papal or episcopal document that expresses a refusal to budge on the issue, an unwitting acknowledgement is made of the fact that the turnabout is already in process. This mechanism is observable more particularly in the political order; but it is not to be discounted in the doctrinal and disciplinary fields, especially when such teachings cross with political attitudes.

In its Pastoral Constitution on the *Church in Today's World*, Vati-

[14] Pope Pius XII, *Vous avez voulu*: Address to the Tenth International Congress of Historians, September 7, 1955.

[15] Catholic manuals of Dogmatic and Moral Theology employ the proposition method, setting out a thesis to be proved from the Sacred Scriptures, reason, natural law, and the opinions of theologians, as well as definitive statements of Councils and the Holy See. Even in the interpretations of propositions considered infallible or at least irreformable, a wide variety of opinion exists, in keeping with traditions based on the schools of theology favored by Dominicans, Franciscans, Jesuits, etc.

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can Council II gave recognition to a substantial number of such changes in the political order. It called first of all for a complete reorientation of the Church's attitude in confronting the vast mutations brought about by the scientific, medical, political, and economic revolutions that have created the contemporary world in its capitalist, Communist, Socialist, and underdeveloped manifestations.

Dealing with the Church's involvement in politics, this document maintained: "It is in full accord with human nature that juridical-political structures should, with ever better success and without any discrimination, afford all their citizens the chance to participate freely and actively in establishing the constitutional bases of a political community, governing the state, determining the scope and purpose of various institutions, and choosing leaders."[16] This sentence conflicts with the distrust of democracy that found favor in so many areas of Catholic thought throughout the nineteenth and into the twentieth century, not excluding papal teaching.[17] In keeping with the ideological turnabout, the Council said: "Christians should recognize that various legitimate though conflicting views can be held concerning the regulation of temporal affairs. . . . They should respect their fellow citizens when they promote such views honorably even by group action." This is of course a far cry from the dictum of the *ancien* Holy Office that "error has no rights." The new approach is a direct consequence of the teaching of Pope John in *Pacem in Terris* where, without the slightest bow to former adverse policies, that pontiff said: "One must never confuse error and the person who errs, even when there is question of error or inadequate knowledge in the moral or religious field. The person who errs always . . . retains his dignity as a human person."

Approaching the substantial problem of relations between Church and state, the Council asserted that the Church must in no way be confused with the political community or bound to any political system. Calling for a basic respect and cooperation between the two entities that deal with the social and personal vocations of the same human beings, the Council stated that the Church's primary function in the

[16] *Pastoral Constitution on the Church in Today's World*, chap. 75. This document is designated by the opening words, *Gaudium et Spes* [Joy and Hope].

[17] Between 1881 and 1890, Pope Leo XIII published four encyclicals on the relation between Church and society, the most important of which was *Immortale Dei* (November 1, 1885). In these he confirmed the condemnation of secular liberalism and democracy by his predecessors, but spoke of a legitimate liberty while urging Catholics to accept existing political institutions for the common good. The prejudice against democracy can be traced to Thomas Aquinas' *De regimine principum*, 1.2, where he opts for monarchy as the best type of government in keeping with Aristotelian analysis. See Yves Simon, *Philosophy of Democratic Government* (Chicago 1951).

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political order is to "contribute to the wider application of justice and charity within and between nations."[18]

Acknowledging that the Church engages in secular activities to the degree that her own proper mission demands, the Council asserted that it "does not lodge its hope in privileges conferred by civil authority. Indeed, it stands ready to renounce the exercise of certain legitimately acquired rights if it becomes clear that their use raises doubt about the sincerity of its witness or that new conditions of life demand other arrangements." With that sentence, the Council showed itself ready to sweep away more than a thousand years of history in which the Church claimed the prerogative of privileged treatment based on "divine right."[19]

IV

In 1929, shortly after having signed the Lateran Treaty, Pius XI declared himself ready to confront the devil if it were necessary for the good of the Church or the salvation of souls. The key to Pius XI's world vision is furnished by two encyclicals, *Ubi arcano Dei* (December 23, 1922), and *Quas primas* (December 23, 1925). In the first, the pontiff outlined the status of the Church as "a perfect society, supreme in its own order." In so doing, he was echoing the tradition of a millennium as clarified by Leo XIII (1878–1903). In *Quas primas*, with which he established the Feast of Christ the King, the pontiff described the rulership of Christ in the world. As Carlo Falconi remarks, "with inexorable logic, Pius unravels all the consequences of the principality of the Redeemer over not merely Catholics but all mankind, including nations and societies."[20] As Christ's vicar, the pope felt authorized to secure from every country the greatest possible number of concessions and privileges for the Church. This conviction explains his predilection for concordats in which he tried to achieve absolute independence for the local Church's ecclesiastical administration, religious teaching, and matrimonial legislation, as well as the economic security of its institutions. In pursuing these objectives, Pius felt authorized to use whatever political methods were at hand. He thus entered agreements with the Fascist government of Mussolini to secure recognition of the Holy See's international independence, and with the Nazi regime of Hitler to protect the rights of Catholics in the Third Reich. Without openly repudiating these agreements, Vatican Council II urged the Church to

[18] *Gaudium et Spes* (fn. 16), chaps. 75 and 76; *Pacem in Terris* (April 1963), chap. 158.

[19] *Gaudium et Spes* (fn. 16), chap. 76.

[20] Cf. Falconi (fn. 3), 200-204.

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be wary of liaisons with governments, no matter what political policies they favored.[21]

Anthony Rhodes appraises Pius XI correctly as a pontiff totally conscious of his "divine right" as the vicar of Christ, imperious in his attitudes, demanding total obedience of his subjects, and absolute deference to his assertions of the Church's rights in the secular sphere.[22] Rhodes's book is a defense of the policies of both Pius XI and Pius XII. He admits that Pius XI's belief—that a series of concordats with the dictators would promote the Church's apostolic activity more effectively —was, on the whole, mistaken. Yet, he insists that the Holy See actually supported the republics in both France and Spain during the early 1930's; did not give its approval to the Italian campaign in Abyssinia; sought to the best of its ability to protect the Jews against Nazi and Fascist annihilation, and condemned these and the Soviet ideologies, while acting with supreme prudence to preserve absolute neutrality during World War II. This judgment goes counter, of course, to the majority of appraisals dealing with the so-called "silence of Pius XII" in the face of the Nazi atrocities and his crusading activities against the spread of communism.[23]

Whatever be the final judgment of history in these pragmatic matters, it was Pius XII who, in his speech to the Tenth International Congress of Historians (Rome, September 1955), recognized the inappropriateness of the papal claim to sovereignty over civil society that Pius XI had put forth. Asking that the Church be judged in accordance with its own self-vision, Pius XII admitted that the claim of papal supremacy in the political order—asserted by Boniface VIII in 1302—was unsustainable, but pointed to the logic of that development in accord with the nature of the society in which it took place. At the same time, he referred to new developments in relations between religion and the state, exemplified by the situation of the Church in the

[21] See Oswald v. Nell-Breuning, "Octogesimo Anno," *Stimmen der Zeit* (Munich 1971), 289-96, who describes the genesis of the encyclical on the social order published by Pius XI in 1931, which played a crucial role in Catholic social thought and action down to John XXIII. Breuning confesses to a certain naiveté on his own and the pontiff's part in regard to the deeper aspects of many of the issues in both the political and economic order.

[22] Rhodes, *The Vatican in the Age of the Dictators, 1922–1945* (New York 1973), 211-19.

[23] Rhodes, using archival material from the British and German Foreign Offices, puts in better perspective the allegations of Rolf Hochhuth in his play, *The Deputy* (New York 1964), as well as the documented studies by Guenter Lewy, *The Catholic Church and Nazi Germany* (New York 1964), and Saul Friedländer, *Pius XII and the Third Reich* (New York 1966); see also Eric Bentley, *The Storm over the Deputy* (New York 1964); Carlo Falconi, *The Silence of Pius XII* (Boston 1970); Beate Ruhm von Oppen, *Religion and Resistance to Nazism*, Center of International Studies Research Monograph No. 35 (Princeton 1971).

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United States, as possibly indicating a truly viable solution to an admittedly complicated problem.

It is here that the greatness of Pope John XXIII can be perceived. In his apparently naive desire "to restore the Church to the simple form it possessed when it left the hands of Christ, its founder," there was a revolutionary cutting through the political morass of centuries. John did not deny the right of the Church to operate in the political milieu. But he saw its function much more in the nature of a pacifying force, inspiring men and peoples to search for development and peace. This stance both Vatican Council II and Pope Paul have tried to embody in carrying out the Johannine ideal.

Paul's activities in reaching agreements with the Communist countries of the West and his comprehension of the need for a new orientation of the Church in Asia, Africa, and other parts of the world are remarkable developments of political thinking and activity. They are bound to have repercussions in all spheres of ecclesiastical and international interests. At the same time, his encouragement to national episcopal conferences to achieve independence from secular governmental interference in predominantly Catholic countries is contributing further to a total revision of the Church's political orientation. This is certainly the case in Spain, where the Episcopal Conference has explicitly demanded a revision of the concordat between the government and the Holy See aimed at cancelling the ruler's prerogative to have a part in the appointment of the residential bishops; and in Eire, where the hierarchy has shown itself amenable to the removal from the constitution of articles designating that country as a specifically Catholic state.

V

Underlying the Holy See's new political approach is the acceptance of democracy not merely in the secular world, but within the structure of the Church, a notion that was anathema to both the Syllabus of Errors of Pius IX in 1864 and the condemnation of Modernism by Pius X in 1907. What was actually condemned was the concept that equated democracy with the notion that authority had its root and foundation in the people as such, thus denying St. Paul's assertion that "all authority is from God." Of deeper concern, however, was the notion of democracy as settling issues of truth or fact by popular vote. In an organization claiming to possess absolute truth in the spiritual order, it is easy to understand that it would likewise claim to possess superior intelligence in the application of that truth to the obligations of mankind in the secular order. It is precisely this attitude that is now disputed

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by many of the Church's thinkers when faced with a world whose primary interest is earthbound as a result of the noetic revolution of the last two centuries.

Both the Syllabus of Errors and the Anti-Modernist Encyclical had repudiated the notion that the Church should "pay attention to the signs of the times." Yet it was explicitly this latter notion of paying attention to the signs of the times that became the keynote of Pope John's opening discourse to the Council, and of the reorientation of the Church's thinking in both its Dogmatic and Pastoral Constitutions.

In that same opening allocution, John purposefully departed from tradition by announcing the fact that "whereas in the past the Church had acted with severity, that approach was no longer necessary." This announcement guaranteed freedom of debate among conciliar participants. But it had a further reverberation in the political order by effectively defeating the repeated attempts of conservative prelates —particularly those representing constituencies in exile from Communist persecution, such as the Ukrainian—to have communism condemned by the Council.[24]

The delicacy of this situation is highlighted by the history of the Vatican's relations with Soviet Russia. They range from efforts to arrange a *modus vivendi* during the early years of the revolution, through the attempt to annihilate religion in the late 1920's and the Stalin persecutions of the 1930's, to the condemnation by Pius XI in his encyclical, *Divini Redemptoris*, of 1937 (popularly referred to as "On Atheistic Communism"). In that statement, the pontiff declared communism to be totally incompatible with the Christian philosophy. His dictum served as basis for the practical prohibition against Catholics' cooperating with Communists in any fashion, which was promulgated by the old Holy Office in a decree of 1949.[25]

Almost from the start of his reign in 1958, Pope John recognized the need for a change in the Church's approach to the Communist countries. As he prepared for the inauguration of the Council, he authorized a sounding-out of the Orthodox Church authorities concerning their interest in sending official observers to the Council. The Russian Church leaders used this occasion to circumvent the authority of the Greek Patriarch, Athanagoras—the ostensible head of all the Orthodox Churches—by dispatching observers without informing him, thus dis-

[24] Rynne (fn. 2), 475-81, 552-55.

[25] Aimed at the Italian political scene, this decree was ignored by a large proportion of the Catholic electorate, but was used in China to destroy a possible reconciliation between the New People's Republic and the Church. It was likewise employed in capitalist countries as a pretext by Catholics who failed to get involved in correcting the social and economic evils on which communism was feeding.

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concerting that ecumenically minded churchman who had refrained from accepting the Vatican's invitation in deference to the Russians' apparent intransigence. Nevertheless, the Vatican accepted the *fait accompli*, and proceeded with plans to welcome the other Orthodox observers when they arrived.[26]

During the final year of his reign, Pope John corresponded directly with the Russian Premier, Nikita Khrushchev, welcomed his son-in-law, Alexei Adzhubei, to a papal audience, and accepted the well-wishes of the Soviet ruler when the pontiff received the Balzan Peace Prize. His successor, Pope Paul VI, has received the President of the U.S.S.R. on an official visit and has twice welcomed the Soviet Foreign Minister to the Vatican after their encounter in October 1965 at the UN General Assembly in New York. In this connection, it is interesting to note that Soviet officials considered themselves calling on the pope as the head of the Vatican City State, whereas the Vatican announced the visit as made to the Holy Father as supreme pastor of the Holy See.

Cordial relations between the Vatican and Soviet Russia are a source of chagrin and scandal to the millions of refugees in Europe and the Americas who point to the fact that the Soviet Union—with the cooperation of the Moscow Patriarch—still holds several million Catholic Ukrainians forcibly in the Orthodox Church, and is responsible for the active persecution of some half a million Catholics in Lithuania, not to mention Poles and other nationals within the territory of Soviet Russia. In its dealings with the Soviet Union, the Vatican has in mind the improved relations it has achieved with the satellite countries—from Poland and Hungary to Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Rumania, and East Germany—for the basic regulation of Church life in these countries and the appointment of bishops. The one nation still totally unapproachable is Albania, where annihilation of the Church's structure has apparently been successful.[27]

Pope John's encyclical, *Pacem in Terris*, supplies a resolution of the principles involved in this direct dealing with Communist countries which was so severely condemned by both Pius XI and Pius XII. In a now famous passage, John distinguishes between atheistic doctrine as such and practical operations of political, social, and economic theories in the historical order: "It is especially to the point to make a

[26] Rynne (fn. 2), 50-51.

[27] The policy of the Holy See is not to appoint bishops or make boundary adjustments until a peaceful settlement of intranational disputes has been achieved. During the last decade, following political adjustments, and as the result of a détente between the Vatican and these Soviet-orbit countries, the papacy has been able to fill most of the vacancies in the hierarchy. On the Church in Albania, see *L'Osservatore Romano* (English Edition), April 26, 1973, p. 10.

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clear distinction between false philosophical teachings regarding the nature, origin and destiny of the universe and of man, and movements which have a direct bearing either on the economic and social questions, or cultural matters, or on the organization of the state, even if these movements owe their origin and inspiration to these false tenets. While the teaching, once it has been clearly set forth, is no longer subject to change, the movements, precisely because they take place in the midst of changing conditions, are readily susceptible of change. . . ."[28]

This doctrine was repeated by Pope Paul in his encyclical, *Progresso Populorum* (1967), where he dealt with the call for revolution in the social, economic, and political order which was being sounded by both cleric and lay apostles in Latin America. In the encyclical, Paul admitted that governmentally supported exploitation itself constituted a violence. Questioned at Medellín in 1968 on the right of Christians to overthrow such an unjust government by violent means, he answered simply, "Violence is not in keeping with the Gospel."[29]

Commemorating the eightieth anniversary of Leo XIII's *Rerum novarum* in May 1971, Pope Paul gave a brief but significant analysis of the Marxist-Leninist ideology as "a scientific activity, as a rigorous method of examining social and political reality." He recognized the attraction of this attempt to supply a "rational link, tested by history, between theoretical knowledge and the practice of revolutionary transformation." The papal document then asserted that Christian teaching will know how to judge the value of such theories, keeping in mind the tendency to a kind of "totalitarian and violent society to which such process leads." Paul did not condemn it or eliminate it from what he characterizes as the "Christian contribution for a positive transformation of society."[30]

VI

Political pragmatism is currently demonstrated by the Vatican in the attempt being made by the Holy See to renew relations with the People's Republic of China. Louis Wei Tsing-Sing discusses the structure and destiny of the Catholic Church on the mainland up to the time of the Red Guard revolution in 1966, when, for all practical purposes, the Church disappeared along with all other foreign and religious survivals.[31] Wei refers to the disastrous experiences the Church encoun-

[28] *Pacem in Terris* (fn. 18), chap. 159.

[29] See Chevalier (fn. 3), 289-339.

[30] Apostolic Letter, *Octogesima adveniente* [On the Eightieth Anniversary of *Rerum novarum*], May 14, 1971, chaps. 32-34.

[31] Wei, *Le Saint-Siège et la Chine* (Paris 1968), 216-23.

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tered in its attempt to penetrate into the Chinese culture and heartland since the adventures of Marco Polo in the thirteenth and Matteo Ricci in the sixteenth century. In particular, he describes the unhappy results of the policy promulgated by the apostolic nuncio, Archbishop Antonio Riberi, when he forced the majority of Catholics to refuse to accept Mao Tse-tung's People's Republic in 1949.

Originally accredited to the Nanking government as pro-nuncio, Riberi remained in continental China after the departure of Chiang Kai-shek and took control of the Church's political as well as spiritual affairs. To offset the influence of the Chinese Catholic Men's Association in the Church's internal activities, he introduced the clerically controlled organization for convert making, known as the Legion of Mary, into many dioceses. He encouraged priests and people to oppose the Communist take-over with fanatical vigor, and forbade the bishops and leading Catholics to accept the policy of the three autonomies—finances, personnel, and methods of evangelization—urged upon them by the new government.[32] Riberi's intransigence occasioned a split within the Church when a number of native bishops and clerics joined the government-sponsored, patriotic Chinese Catholic Movement and were promptly repudiated with a rejection of this policy by the missionaries and a majority of the people. The Communists responded by expelling the expatriate Christians and imprisoning many clerics and lay leaders.

To fill the diocesan sees left open by the exiled prelates, the government allowed the local clergy and people to elect new bishops, informing Rome only after these prelates had been properly consecrated by bishops recognized by the Holy See. Despite the fact that this practice was similar to that of the early Church, Rome refused to acknowledge the elections. Finally, in 1958, the Chinese government declared attempts to make contact with Rome futile.[33] Shortly after his election, Pope John in a speech referred to the Chinese Church as in schism, but quickly reversed judgment on the representation of Bishop Carlo

[32] In a speech on January 17, 1951, urging the Catholic leaders to accept the three autonomies, Premier Chou En-lai acknowledged the devotion of the missionaries in education and charitable activities, and indicated clearly his comprehension of the need for Catholics to remain united with Rome in spiritual matters. *Ibid.*, 236-37.

[33] On July 11, 1970, the American Maryknoll bishop, James Walsh, was released from prison to which he had been condemned with a 25-year sentence for carrying out, as vicar, the policies of Archbishop Riberi. In public and private statements, he expressed no resentment over the treatment accorded him. Some Vatican officials thought that his release might be the first step in a détente between the Holy See and Peking. But the Chinese Government showed no interest whatever, and if pressed, would indicate that it was the Holy See that had severed relations by refusing, as late as 1958, to acknowledge the communications of the newly elected bishops.

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van Melkebecke, the apostolic administrator in charge of all Chinese Catholics outside continental Asia and Formosa.[34]

Some attempt was made in Cairo by emissaries of Pope John to contact the Chinese Government at the start of Vatican Council II in order to elicit the attendance of the continental bishops. But nothing came of this move. Pope Paul almost from the beginning of his reign indicated an interest in making contact with the Church in China, calling for that immense nation's admittance to the United Nations. However, Vatican diplomatic relations with Taiwan were an absolute barrier, particularly since under the management of Cardinal Yu Pin in Taipei the rank of the Formosan Ambassador to the Holy See was raised to that of a Plenipotentiary (April 22, 1969) with a listing in the *Annuario Pontificio* under the rubric *Cina*. In turn, the Holy See appointed an Australian, Archbishop Edward Cassidy, as pro-nuncio to *Cina* on October 27, 1970.

It is a clear indication of the pragmatism with which the Holy See acts in such matters that in the summer of 1972 the Vatican instructed the pro-nuncio in Taiwan to take home-leave. He returned to his home diocese in Australia, where he remained until called to Rome and appointed pro-nuncio to the Government of Bangladesh in February 1973, still officially maintaining his position in Taiwan. How long it will take before this maneuver begins to affect relations between the People's Republic of China and the Holy See is unpredictable. At stake is the fate of some two million people claimed as Catholics by the Church as late as 1958, and the totally unknown status of the prelates and clergy, some of whom have, more recently, been conducting Catholic services in private.[35]

VII

Vatican agility in reversing policy is further illustrated by the radical change in an area involving both doctrinal teaching and political ideology. In 1928, with his encyclical, *Mortalium animos*, Pope Pius XI condemned unequivocally the ecumenical developments taking shape

[34] Wei (fn. 31), 278.

[35] Within the last two years, expatriate native Chinese allowed to visit their homelands have reported to Bishop Carlo van Melkebecke, apostolic delegate for Chinese Catholics living outside continental China and Taiwan, who resides in Singapore, that Catholic services are conducted in private in many villages and towns; but almost nothing is known of the fate of the bishops and clergy who accepted the three autonomies and functioned until the Red Guard rampages of 1966. The recent exchange of the Vatican diplomat, Mons. Giovanni Cheli, who is well versed in relations with Communist countries, for Mons. Alberto Giovanetti as observer to the UN General Assembly in New York is considered a definite move toward reestablishing relations between China and the Holy See.

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among Protestants. And in 1948, the Holy Office refused to allow Catholic representatives to attend the first Assembly of the World Council of Churches. By 1964, with Vatican Council II's decree on ecumenism (*Unitatis redintegratio*), the Church embarked on an almost 180-degree turn by acknowledging the authenticity of non-Catholic Christian churches as truly religious manifestations with whom the Roman Church should seek to achieve unity. In 1967, the Holy See appointed fifteen official observers to the Fourth Assembly of the World Council of Churches held in Uppsala. A year later, Pope Paul made an unofficial visit to the Geneva headquarters of the World Council.[36]

This ecumenical activity will have an essential bearing on the future organization of the Church. The present pontiff has decided not to change the basic structure of the Church's hierarchical organization, but he is now entertaining the possibility of modification in the method of papal election. His appointment of thirty-three new cardinals (March 5, 1973) indicated a determination to have as many Catholic states and communities as possible represented in the College of Cardinals, which is still described in Canon Law as the Church's Senate.[37] Reaching out to the four corners of the world, the pontiff followed the example of his two predecessors and included as cardinalitial sees areas as sparsely Catholic-populated as Karachi, Pakistan, Osaka, Japan, and Apia in the Samoan islands. Unresolved is the problem of representation of the oriental Patriarchates in union with Rome. During Vatican Council II, the six patriarchs were made cardinals, thus assuring their presence in a possible new papal election. But the successors of two deceased patriarchs have not accepted the cardinalitial designation, apparently as part of an age-long protest against the attempt to latinize their rites and churches.[38]

On the occasion of the creation of thirty-three new cardinals in 1973, Pope Paul suggested that the six principal oriental prelates should have a vote in papal elections; and he spoke of opening the way for bishops who are elected members of the Secretariat of the Roman Synod of Bishops to participate despite the fact that they do not possess cardinalitial rank. This is a major break with tradition, and could lead to a much more explicit democratization of the process involved in the

[36] See Rynne (fn. 2), 98-109, 236-60.

[37] See Stephen Kuttner, "Cardinalis: The History of a Canonical Concept," *Traditio*, III (1945), 129-214.

[38] The problem involves the continual resistance of the Eastern Catholic rites and Synods (eleven, according to the 1973 *Annuario Pontificio*) to the attempts of the Congregation for the Eastern Churches to exercise jurisdiction over them despite the guarantees of self-government reiterated in Vatican Council II's *Decree on the Eastern Catholic Churches*. See Rynne (fn. 2), 335-42.

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selection of a new pope. Paul has also allowed Italians in the College of Cardinals to become a comparative minority—some thirty among one hundred and forty—and eliminated cardinals who have attained their eightieth birthday from the papal election. But the vast reorganization of the Church's structure that would be required by some sort of federation or reunion of the Catholic and non-Catholic Christian churches will have to be faced by a future pontiff.

Conclusion

As a political organization, the Catholic Church remains a unique institution that reflects both its ancient origins and the cultural development of the age in which it is operating at any given moment. Pope Pius XII insisted that the word Catholicism was not proper or traditional as a designation of the Church, since it suggested an ideology rather than a universal Christian presence in the world as a prelude to the achievement of the *polis theou* or Kingdom of God toward whose realization on earth the Church is striving.[39] This concept of a kingdom needs to be considered in its theological significance even by the political scientist attempting to estimate the weight of the Catholic Church's influence on the contemporary world. Ivan Vallier has recently analyzed the transnational aspects of the Church as it changes political postures.[40] He points out the organizational development and ideological commitment to the social, economic, and political order that Rome now encourages on the part of the national and regional Conferences of Bishops in their confrontation with the revolution called for by committed Catholic priests and laity in Latin America, and the reorientation of the Church's policies in both the capitalist and Communist worlds.[41]

A new era of the Church's presence in the world is aborning. Instead of fading out of the contemporary scene as a Roman relic, the Church seems to be on the verge of a new phase of world involvement comparable to its political renaissance in the fourth, twelfth, and sixteenth centuries. Perhaps this time, while viewing the world *sub specie aeternitatis*, it will avoid both the Constantinian syndrome of caesaropapism and the ideological triumphalism of the past three centuries.

[39] Speaking of the Church as an historical fact, Pope Pius said: "Whatever be the final verdict of the historian . . . the Church believes she can expect of him that he will in any case inform himself of her self-image . . ." *Vous avez voulu* (fn. 14).

[40] See Ivan Vallier, "The Roman Catholic Church: A Transnational Actor," *International Organization*, XXV (1971), 479-502.

[41] Gary MacEoin, *Revolution Next Door: Latin America in the 1970's* (New York 1971); Roger Vekemans, "Teologia de la Liberación: comentario bibliografico," *Tierra Nueva*, II and III (Bogotá 1972), 5-23, 5-20.

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Research Notes

POLITICAL SCIENCE AND EAST ASIAN AREA STUDIES

By CHALMERS JOHNSON

POLITICAL science "area studies," or what the American Political Science Association calls "foreign and comparative government and politics" in order to insure that they not be confused with the biggest area study of them all, United States government and politics, have always posed difficulties for the Emily Posts of the discipline.[1] Not a year goes by without a guardian of the methodological flame writing an article bemoaning the "atheoretical" quality of area studies or issuing a warning that "The immersion in local materials may cast the researcher adrift far from any theoretical shore."[2] Strangely enough, despite these strictures, area studies continue to meet all kinds of market tests: publishers much prefer them to other forms of writing on political science (they sell), and students write more dissertations in this field than in any other of the eight categories of political science recognized by the APSA.[3] In Chinese studies alone, between 1945 and 1970, Americans in all fields wrote some 1,401 dissertations, while at least 2,217 were written in the various Western languages, including Russian.[4] This is a rather large number of drifters away from the theoretical shore (perhaps they were merely heeding Chairman Mao's dictum, "We learn to swim by swimming"). Equally astonishing, given the hostility of political science tastemakers to area studies, between 1946 and 1970, the Ford Foundation alone spent $26.8 million on Chinese studies in the United States, while the U.S. Government contributed an additional $15.0 million.[5] It is of course possible that the China specialists were merely adrift in a sea of money.

[1] An earlier version of this paper was delivered to a plenary session of the 1973 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association.

[2] Dankwart A. Rustow, "Modernization and Comparative Politics, Prospects in Research and Theory," *Comparative Politics*, I (October 1968), 44.

[3] My information on publishing trends is based on eight years of membership, two as co-chairman, of the Editorial Committee of the University of California Press. Regarding dissertations in political science, see Peter J. Sackman, "Some Additional Data on Dissertations in Political Science, 1960 and 1970–72," *PS*, IV (Winter 1973), 28, table IV.

[4] Leonard H. D. Gordon and Frank J. Shulman, eds., *Doctoral Dissertations on China, A Bibliography of Studies in Western Languages, 1945–1970* (Seattle 1972), 199.

[5] John M. H. Lindbeck, *Understanding China, An Assessment of American Scholarly Resources* (New York 1971), 79, table III.

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There have been defenders of area studies, but their defenses usually tend to sustain rather than weaken the case that area studies are not quite respectable, even if they are profitable and popular. The two most common defenses are (1) area studies, of East Asia, for example, are important to the United States as a matter of national interest (our last three wars started there, we trade a lot with Japan, etc.); and (2) East Asia embodies one of the world's three or four great civilizations (much of our social science is culture-bound, we need to offer students a well-rounded education, and so forth).[6] I tend to agree with both of these views, but neither of them constitutes an intellectual defense, and the first has become a virtual anathema in many of our "liberal" institutions of learning.

One criticism of East Asian area studies is irrefutable: the field is dominated by historians. And history, although undoubtedly basic to social science, is at the same time antithetical to social science for the simple reason that "explaining what a thing is . . . is just not the same enterprise at all as explaining why it . . . happened."[7] As Richard Wilson has pointed out, there is "a frequently articulated need on the part of many scholars of China to be intellectually acceptable to the non-social science reference group within Chinese studies."[8] Although I agree with this observation, it is not so much a criticism of area studies in political science as it is a plea for more of them and fewer historical studies.

The area specialist is, of course, granted a role within the discipline. He is regarded as a supplier of raw materials, rather like a Bantu miner, chipping away at the cliff face of a South African mine, who is supposed to ship the unrefined ore off to the master goldsmiths living elsewhere—in this case, to "generalists," or "theorists," or "comparativists" toiling away in New Haven, Cambridge, Ann Arbor, or the Stanford "think tank," where the data will be processed. Even Dankwart Rustow acknowledges, "There is no question that without the solid empirical foundation laid by such studies [area studies], past and future, no intelligent theorizing about political modernization would be possible."[9] However, as in the Third World itself, a good many na-

[6] For two excellent articles defending area studies, see Robert E. Ward, "A Case for Asian Studies," Presidential address delivered at the 25th annual meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, March 31, 1973 (Ann Arbor, Mich. 1973); and John N. Hazard, "What Future for Communist Area Studies?" *Newsletter on Comparative Studies of Communism*, IV (February 1971), 3-10.

[7] William Dray, " 'Explaining What' in History," in Patrick Gardiner, ed., *Theories of History* (Glencoe, Ill. 1962), 403, 408.

[8] Richard W. Wilson, "Chinese Studies in Crisis," *World Politics*, XXIII (January 1971), 313.

[9] Rustow (fn. 2), 44.

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tionalizations are going on: the theorists have not been sending back very good theories to the field, and some of the commodity suppliers are going into manufacturing for themselves. This is a point I shall illustrate later.

A few theorists of political science do take area studies seriously, in an intellectual sense. Arend Lijphart, in what is probably the best recent article on the comparative method, finds that "The area approach appears to lend itself quite well to . . . the comparative method because of the cluster of characteristics that areas tend to have in common and that can, therefore, be used as controls. . . . By means of an inductive process—a factor analysis of 54 social and cultural variables on 82 countries—Bruce M. Russett discovered socio-culturally similar groupings of countries, which correspond closely to areas or regions of the world as usually defined. Comparability is indeed not inherent in any given area, but it is more likely within an area than in a randomly selected set of countries."[10]

On this score, East Asia seems to form a natural laboratory for comparative analysis: contemporary China and Japan—controllable for a range of factors including relative ethnic homogeneity, influence of classical Sinitic civilization, closure to foreign intercourse from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries, and primary challenges from Western imperialism within a fifteen-year period—today constitute the two most important archetypes of the "revolutionary" and the "reformist" strategies of national development.[11] In addition to the use of areas to solve the control problem, Lijphart recommends "diachronic," or "era," studies of a single country—for example, the comparison of the Weimar and Bonn republics in Germany in order to analyze a range of German political problems. This is of course possible and has been undertaken in East Asian area studies,[12] but an equally good opportunity for the kind of control suggested by Lijphart can be found by comparing the halves of divided countries, of which two important examples exist in the East Asian area—North and South Korea, and North and South Vietnam. Relatively little research has actually been done utilizing the Sino-Japanese or divided-nation comparisons, but at least the pretheoretical foundations for the latter have been laid by the

[10] Arend Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method," *American Political Science Review*, LXV (September 1971), 688-89.

[11] Cf. Chalmers Johnson, "Reformerische und revolutionäre Durchbruchstrategien, Zur vergleichenden Untersuchung gesellschaftlicher Veränderungen," in Peter Raina, ed., *Internationale Politik in den siebziger Jahren* (Frankfurt 1973), 217-27.

[12] See, e.g., Chalmers Johnson, "Chinese Communist Leadership and Mass Response: The Yenan Period and the Socialist Education Campaign Period," in P. T. Ho and Tang Tsou, eds., *China in Crisis* (Chicago 1968), I, 397-437.

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monumental two-volume work, *Communism in Korea*, by Robert Scalapino and Chong-sik Lee (Berkeley 1973).

In addition to proposing area and era studies, Lijphart believes that the comparative method (here understood as one of a triumvirate of fundamental strategies of scientific research, the other two being the experimental and the statistical methods) can be carried out through the case study. He distinguishes six ideal types of case study, and an exploration of them affords us the opportunity both to review the intellectual place of area studies in social science and to survey some of the recent reports of research in the East Asian field.

Lijphart's first type is the "atheoretical case study." At first glance, this category seems to be nonexistent, since even the purest forms of description still depend upon theoretical concepts. "Only a totally mystical experience," writes Leonard B. Meyer, "is entirely nonanalytic, and it cannot be conceptualized or even adequately described—since the act of description is itself a distortion. Those who seek to savor the singularity of their own psyches must, therefore, abandon all hope of rational discourse or intelligible communication. The only valid response to unmediated experience is silence. As Tom Lehrer has said: 'If you can't communicate, the least you can do is shut up!' "[13]

Perhaps the only widespread form of supposedly "pure" description in the political field is that of an intelligence estimate made by a national government, in which the analyst attempts to avoid every impulse toward the theoretical or conceptual because it may as easily prove to be a source of error as of insight. Needless to say, however, no intelligence estimate is ever *purely* descriptive; that is why they are so often intensely controversial.[14] What Lijphart seems to mean by the "atheoretical case study" is one in which the writer is wholly innocent of, or unselfconscious about, the concepts and theoretical notions that influence his descriptions. The value of such books is that they offer their descriptions uncluttered by jargon or the pretensions of the author. The reader must, of course, exercise his judgment about the dis-

[13] Leonard B. Meyer, *Explaining Music* (Berkeley 1973), 5.

[14] On intelligence estimating, note Klaus Knorr's comment: "One must assume that there exists some sort of operational theory of intelligence, even though most intelligence officers—who, like most other government officials, tend to associate the term 'theory' with 'long hair' and ivory towers—are apt to flinch, if not blanch, at the thought. Any problem-solving organization will evolve premises, analytical procedures, rules of thumb, and other intellectual practices that are based implicitly, if not explicitly, on hypotheses about the reality and about the kinds of events and consequences they must cope with. Such theory is informal rather than formal, apt to be fragmentary rather than integrated, the cumulative sediment of experience rather than the product of self-conscious endeavor." "Failures in National Intelligence Estimates," *World Politics*, XVI (April 1964), 465-66.

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tortions implicit in an atheoretical description, but then he must also do this with self-consciously theoretical books, where the bias may be greater simply because the theorist is under the impression that he has eliminated it through the use of his, perhaps worthless, methodology. Examples of outstanding atheoretical descriptive works in East Asian area studies include Edward E. Rice, *Mao's Way* (Berkeley 1972), and Ezra Vogel, *Canton Under Communism* (Cambridge, Mass. 1969).

Lijphart's second category, the "interpretive case study," is, according to him, an exercise in "applied science." "In these studies," he writes, "a generalization is applied to a specific case with the aim of throwing light on the case rather than of improving the generalization in any way." Works in this category are of the type that is said to fulfill the alleged national-interest function of area studies: they utilize the best of social science theory in order to explain the politics of an area of concern or attention. It is sometimes forgotten that the purpose of empirical theory, or of science itself, is to make precisely such interpretive case studies possible—that is, to allow the perception of pattern and structure in the world and to permit the making of choices.

Lijphart makes this point, but in suggesting that the essence of the interpretive case study is the application of theory to the problem, he greatly oversimplifies "applied science." As Leonard B. Meyer has argued with regard to the field of explaining music: "Because specific musical events are the result of nonrecurring concatenations of conditions and variables, no set of general laws can adequately explain the particular relationships embodied in an actual composition. In other words, no matter how refined and inclusive the laws of music theory become, their use in the explanation of particular musical events will have to depend in part upon the *ad hoc* hypotheses of common sense. . . . A theory which covered every possible interaction of all possible variables would be useless because it would lack precisely what any theory must have—namely, generality."[15] Many of the controversies in political science over the alleged "inadequacies" of theoretical formulations derive from a misplaced belief that a theory can or should explain everything about a concrete case—for example, the frequently lamented inadequacy of theories of revolution and political violence, a subfield of direct relevance to East Asian area studies.[16] This is a problem to

[15] Meyer (fn. 13), 11-13.

[16] See, e.g., Ted R. Gurr, "The Revolution—Social-Change Nexus: Some Old Theories and New Hypotheses," *Comparative Politics,* v (April 1973), 359-92; Chalmers Johnson, *Autopsy on People's War* (Berkeley 1973); Lawrence Stone, "Theories of Revolution," *World Politics,* XVIII (January 1966), 159-76; Charles Tilly, "Revolutions and Collective Violence," in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., *Handbook of Political Science* (Reading, Mass., forthcoming); and Perez Zagorin, "Theories of Revo-

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which I shall return. The following works in the East Asian field constitute, in my opinion, interpretive case studies, but only in the sense that they are instances of "applied science" as described by Meyer: A. D. Barnett, *Cadres, Bureaucracy, and Political Power in Communist China* (New York 1967); Ruth Benedict, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword* (Boston 1946); John Lewis, *Leadership in Communist China* (Ithaca 1963); William W. Lockwood, ed., *The State and Economic Enterprise in Modern Japan* (Princeton 1965); Roberta Wohlstetter, *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision* (Stanford 1962); and the work on Korean communism by Scalapino and Lee, which was mentioned earlier.

The next category, "hypothesis-generating case studies," is one of the types, according to Lijphart, that is most conducive to theory-building. They begin, in his words, "with a more or less vague notion of possible hypotheses to be tested subsequently among a larger number of cases. Their objective is to develop theoretical generalizations in areas where no theory exists yet." The fact that the East Asian field has produced quite a large number of these case studies suggests that the area offers many forms of politics that are as yet unexplained by political science, and that political science theory is not as "general" as some of its authors think. Examples include Nobutaka Ike, *Japanese Politics* (New York, second ed., 1972), on the theory of stable patron-client democracy; Chalmers Johnson, *Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power* (Stanford 1962), on the processes and motivational bases of the wartime mobilization of the peasantry in China and Yugoslavia; Robert Lifton, *Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalism* (New York 1961), on the way Chinese culture is conducive to Chinese Communist psychic engineering; Chie Nakane, *Japanese Society* (Berkeley 1970), on "vertical stratification" and its consequences for social organization and politics; Lucian Pye, *The Spirit of Chinese Politics* (Cambridge, Mass. 1968), on the psychocultural foundations of authority in China; Benjamin Schwartz, *Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao* (Cambridge, Mass. second ed., 1958), on "ideological degeneration" in the migration of Marxism eastward; William Skinner and Edwin Winckler, in A. Etzioni, ed., *Complex Organizations* (New York 1969), on cycles of compliance in Chinese Communist policy implementation; Frederic Wakeman, Jr., *History and Will* (Berkeley 1973), on the nature and implications of the synthesis of Chinese and Western philosophical traditions in the thought of Mao Tse-tung; and K. A. Witt-

lution in Contemporary Historiography," *Political Science Quarterly*, LXXXVIII (March 1973), 23-52.

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fogel, *Oriental Despotism* (New Haven 1957), on the socioeconomic bases of authoritarianism in traditional and modern China.

Lijphart lists fourth what he calls "theory-confirming case studies," that is, "analyses of single cases within the framework of established generalizations." Such studies seem to resemble interpretive case studies, and therefore the same reservations apply to them as to the second category regarding Lijphart's somewhat jejune understanding of "applied science." Actually, very few studies are undertaken solely to test a proposition, and his contention that "the demonstration that one more case fits does not strengthen [the proposition] a great deal" underestimates the value of such work. These case studies are comparable to "normal science" in the puzzle-solving sense described by Thomas Kuhn in his *Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. Puzzle-solving is omitted in Lijphart's division of the work of science into "theorizing" and "applied science," thereby overlooking the fact that it is usually in the interstices between the two where theory actually becomes operational and anomalies are discovered. A few examples of work in the East Asian field that seem to belong in the theory-confirming category are: Robert Bellah, *Tokugawa Religion* (Glencoe, Ill. 1957), a test of the Weberian theory of entrepreneurial motivation in a Japanese context; G. DeVos and H. Wagatsuma, eds., *Japan's Invisible Race* (Berkeley 1966), a test of the theory of caste in a context in which race is not the primary stigma; Glenn Paige, *The Korean Decision* (New York 1968), a test of decision-making theory in the context of the first week of the Korean War; Richard Solomon, *Mao's Revolution and the Chinese Political Culture* (Berkeley 1971), a test of much of the psychocultural theory of politics, including the hypotheses of Lucian Pye mentioned earlier; Robert Ward and Dankwart Rustow, eds., *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey* (Princeton 1964), an attempt to apply the theory of "political modernization"; Max Weber, *The Religion of China* (Glencoe, Ill. 1951), a "negative proof" of Weber's own theory of the relationship between religion and economic enterprise; and James W. White, *The Sōkagakkai and Mass Society* (Stanford 1970), an explicit test of Kornhauser's and others' theories of the genesis and nature of mass society, using the explosive development of a religio-political movement in Japan as a case study.

The next category in Lijphart's list is "theory-infirming case studies," which are said to be similar to theory-confirming case studies in terms of their low theoretical import. This is because, "assuming that the proposition [being tested] is solidly based on a large number of cases, . . . theory-infirming case studies merely weaken the generalization marginally." The assumption here, however, seems inconsistent with

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Lijphart's overall analysis of the comparative method, since there is "no clear dividing line between the statistical and comparative methods; the difference depends on the number of cases," with the principal problems facing the comparative method being "many variables, small number of cases."[17] It would seem that while a theory-infirming case might have only a marginal effect on a statistically derived proposition, it could have a major effect on a proposition derived via the comparative method, given the small number of cases on which it is based. Whatever effect infirming studies have on the theory being tested, the same reservations apply to Lijphart's belief that they, like interpretive and theory-confirming studies, merely involve applying a theory to some "data." Examples that come to mind from the East Asian area include: Chalmers Johnson, *Conspiracy at Matsukawa* (Berkeley 1972), a challenge to the proposition that during the Allied occupation Japan internalized American procedures in the field of criminal law; Jack M. Potter, *Capitalism and the Chinese Peasant* (Berkeley 1968), a challenge to the theory that imperialist treaty ports led to the impoverishment of the Chinese peasantry and to the polarization of Chinese society; Mark Selden, *The Yenan Way* (Cambridge, Mass. 1971), a challenge to the theory of a politically-based mobilization of the Chinese peasantry during the Communist revolution in favor of a theory of economically-based mobilization; and James R. Townsend, *Political Participation in Communist China* (Berkeley 1967), an explicit challenge to the theory that increased political participation increases popular influence on political decisions.

Finally, Lijphart cites "deviant case studies," which, together with hypothesis-generating studies, are said to contribute most to the development of theory. These are "studies of single cases that are known to deviate from established generalizations. They are selected in order to reveal why the cases are deviant." Even though most case studies in the East Asian field might be fitted into this category given the Western bias of much theory, we might mention: Robert E. Cole, *Japanese Blue Collar* (Berkeley 1971), on the extent to which the behavior of the Japanese industrial working class can be explained using Western-derived generalizations; Ronald P. Dore, *English Factory: Japanese Factory* (Berkeley 1973), on the same subject but employing a direct comparison between a factory of the English Electric Corporation and one of the Hitachi Electrical Manufacturing Company; Donald C. Hellmann, *Japan and East Asia* (New York 1972), on the anomaly of Japan's relatively weak state but great economic power; Franz Schur-

[17] Lijphart (fn. 10), 684, 685.

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mann, *Ideology and Organization in Communist China* (Berkeley 1966), on the characteristics of the Chinese Communist revolutionary system in light of the Soviet model; and Donald W. Treadgold, ed., *Soviet and Chinese Communism: Similarities and Differences* (Seattle 1967), on the same subject as Schurmann.

As this typology of case studies and list of illustrative works indicate, an intellectual defense of area studies more serious than the "national interest," "exotic cultures," and "raw materials supplier" defenses can be made and sustained. It must be said, however, that very few of the works listed above were actually written as case studies, and the idea that they should be so regarded is only slightly less misleading than calling them raw data for the "generalists." There is, in fact, a defense to be made of area studies that goes beyond any possible roles they may play as various kinds of case studies. It is a perspective that reveals a logical foundation and contribution to social science (not to mention the fascination it holds for the political researcher) which is every bit as indispensable to true scientific thought about politics as any other style or mode of analysis. The case I have in mind for area studies—not necessarily as they are taught and practiced in area studies institutes—is similar to what Verba has identified as the "disciplined configurative approach," but I prefer to present it here in terms of some ideas borrowed from the "critical analysis" of music.[18]

In his 1971 Ernest Bloch lectures on music, Leonard B. Meyer of the University of Chicago sought to distinguish three interrelated forms of scholarship in music, which, it seems to me, are relevant to scholarship in political science. The first is "style analysis," a normative (as distinct from an idiosyncratic) activity, and one that is

> . . . concerned with discovering and describing those attributes of a composition which are common to a group of works—usually ones which are similar in style, form, or genre. It [style analysis] asks, for instance, about the characteristic features of late Baroque music—its typical textures, harmonic procedures, and formal organization; or it inquires into the features common to diverse movements in sonata form or different types of operas. Style analysis, in its pure form, ignores the idiosyncratic in favor of generalization and typology. Consequently statistical methods are as a rule more appropriate in style analysis than in criticism. For style analysis, a particular composition is an instance of a technique, a form, or a genre.[19]

With a proper substitution of terms, this strikes me as a perfect description of what is loosely called "theory" in contemporary political

[18] Sidney Verba, "Some Dilemmas in Comparative Research," *World Politics*, XX (October 1967), 114.
[19] Meyer (fn. 13), 7.

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science. Political science "theory" seeks to discover the typical patterns of political behavior, the procedures, and the formal organization of diverse social groups or movements, and it ignores the idiosyncratic in favor of generalizations and typologies. Just as music scholars are interested in diverse movements in sonata form, political scholars are interested in diverse movements in "revolutionary," or "national integration," or "international cooperation" form. Statistical and comparative methods are employed, and particular cases are considered important only as instances of a technique, form, or genre (for example, of a "parochial," "subject," or "participant" political culture, or, in different language, of a "traditional," "authoritarian," or "democratic" polity). Lijphart contends that such activities are theoretical in nature and add up to science, which he defines (quoting Meehan) in these terms: "Science seeks to establish relationships; science . . . is empirical; science is a generalizing activity."[20] Meyer would not agree with this narrow a definition of science, nor would I. Science does attempt to do these things, but scientific theory, Meyer's second category, certainly attempts to do much more.

"An authentic theory of music . . . ," writes Meyer, "endeavors, where possible, to discover the principles governing the formation of the typical procedures and schemata described in style analysis." Music theory must try to find explanations in terms of general laws. "We might, for instance, cite the Gestalt law of completeness, which asserts that the human mind, searching for stable shapes, wants patterns as complete as possible." One might have to go further and "explain that because human behavior is not for the most part genetically determined, men must envisage the consequences of choices in order to know how to act in the present; and they can envisage and choose only in terms of patterns and processes which are regular and complete." In sum, "We endeavor to go beyond descriptive or statistical norms to the simplest explanation which takes the form of a general principle. The goal of music theory is to discover such principles."

It is commonly asserted that in political science we have very few theoretical principles of the sort mentioned by Meyer (the "iron law of oligarchy" is usually the one cited whenever a layman asks). What we do have is "style analysis," in the form of participation rates in various democracies, majoritarian and consensual processes of political decision-making, comparative communist studies, instances of and typical procedures for military intervention in the politics of new nations, "theories" (styles) of representation, reformist and revolutionary modes

[20] Lijphart (fn. 10), 683, n. 13.

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of mobilization, and so forth. These tools and correlations are very valuable, but they are not theory. Yet it is this "theory," actually style analysis, that the area specialist is expected to apply if he wants to gain professional recognition for his work. This is not to say that there is *no* general theory in the social sciences; rather, there is no widespread agreement about its theoretical status (which is also true in music scholarship). In behaviorism, structural-functionalism, organization theory, game theory, strategic analysis, and parts of classical political philosophy, political science has a rich heritage of general principles.[21] But those who advocate a greater role of theory in area studies should be reminded that what they are calling theory is, in the main, political style analysis.

Meyer's third category he calls "critical analysis," and it is this genre that I suggest should be taken as the model toward which serious area studies ought to aspire. As a matter of basic definition, Meyer writes, "Critical analysis seeks to understand and explain what is idiosyncratic about a particular composition: how is this piece different from all other pieces—even those in the same style and of the same genre? . . . Criticism tries to discover the secret of the singular—to explain in what ways the pattern and processes peculiar to a particular work are related to one another and to the hierarchic structure of which they form a part." This commitment to explaining the singular should come as no surprise to political scientists: it is the obvious but unstated first principle in the field of United States government and politics. The difference between the specialist in American politics and the music critic is simply that the latter knows, and acknowledges, that he is trying to explain the secrets of a single case—for example, what distinguishes Mozart's 39th symphony from the 40th, both of them being masterpieces.

In studying the singular, "Critical analysis uses the laws formulated by music theory—and . . . the normative categories of style analysis—in order to explain how and why the particular events within a specific composition are related to one another. Theory gives us the general principles governing, say, the processes of melodic implication and closure, while criticism is concerned with the ways in which these principles are actualized—or perhaps evaded—in the case of a specific motive, theme, or section in a particular work." To offer a political example, the theory of supranational functionalism (say, in the work of Ernst Haas) reveals to us the complementarities, spillovers, and processes that may allow a regional grouping to transcend the nation-states of

[21] For a recent, succinct statement of the truly theoretical concerns of political science, see D. D. Raphael, *Problems of Political Philosophy* (New York 1970).

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which it is composed; critical analysis reveals to us how a single leader, say de Gaulle, may inhibit such general processes from working, or how another single leader, say Nasser, may promote a supranational grouping, the U.A.R., even when the functional complementarities do not exist.

Critical analysis is indispensable to the study of music or politics for the simple reason that the way a general principle, or theory, is actualized depends upon the choices of composers or political actors. Lijphart's conception of social science, quoted earlier, is deficient because a political actor can, and often does, observe the same correlations that are made by political scientists, and he can act to enhance or avoid their likely consequences. Strategic, or policy, analysis—probably the single most distinguished theoretical achievement of postwar political science—lies at the heart of critical analysis and is the indispensable complement to theory and style analysis in the explanation of politics.[22] In music, writes Meyer:

> Psychological constants such as the principles of pattern organization, the syntax of particular styles, and typical schemata such as triadic holons constitute the *rules of the game*. Their actualization as specific musical events is the realization of what Koestler [in *The Ghost in the Machine*, 1968] calls *flexible strategy*. For any given musical repertory the "rules" determine the kinds of patterns that can be employed in a composition. They are the province of style criticism. Strategies, which are variable and nonrecurring, give rise to particular instances of some general class or type. The task of critical analysis is to explain why a general rule was actualized in the way it was. . . . Because rules do not determine strategies, commonsense reasons are necessary to explain specific musical events. They bridge the gap between rule and strategy. . . . Because they depend upon particular circumstances, strategy reasons are generally eclectic. Sometimes they will be drawn from established disciplines such as acoustics or psychology; at other times they will be based on common sense. Rule reasons, too, at least for the present, will from time to time be eclectic. This, because music theory is still rudimentary and style analysis only somewhat less so.

[22] A few titles, more representative than comprehensive, will illustrate what I am here calling strategic and policy theory: Raymond A. Bauer and Kenneth J. Gergen, *The Study of Policy Formation* (New York 1968); Bernard Brodie, *Strategy in the Missile Age* (Princeton 1959); David Braybrooke and Charles E. Lindblom, *A Strategy of Decision, Policy Evaluation as a Social Process* (New York 1963); Charles E. Lindblom, *The Policy-Making Process* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J. 1968); Frederick W. Pryor, *Public Expenditures in Communist and Capitalist Nations* (London 1968); Edward S. Quade, ed., *Analysis for Military Decisions* (Chicago 1964); George Quester, *Deterrence Before Hiroshima* (New York 1966); Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, Mass. 1960); Warner R. Schilling, Paul Y. Hammond, and Glenn H. Snyder, *Strategy, Politics, and Defense Budgets* (New York 1962); Glenn H. Snyder, *Deterrence and Defense* (Princeton 1961); and Aaron Wildavsky, *The Politics of the Budgetary Process* (Boston 1964).

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One way to illustrate Meyer's point is to cite some recent books that bring to mind his conception of a critical analysis, and that have not yet been mentioned. The following works are neither purely descriptive nor are they case studies in Lijphart's sense; they draw upon theory, style analysis, and *ad hoc* hypotheses of the authors in order to offer scientific explanations of significant strategic or policy choices and their consequences: N. R. Chen and Walter Galenson, *The Chinese Economy Under Communism* (Chicago 1969); George R. Packard III, *Protest in Tokyo: The Security Treaty Crisis of 1960* (Princeton 1966); Dwight Perkins, *Market Control and Planning in Communist China* (Cambridge, Mass. 1966); Tang Tsou, *America's Failure in China, 1941–50* (Chicago 1963); Peter Van Ness, *Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy* (Berkeley 1971); and Allen Whiting, *China Crosses the Yalu* (RAND 1960). It seems to me nonsense to suggest, as some political scientists have, that work of this sort is "atheoretical" or in some sense inferior-grade social science.

The analysis of political strategy or policy requires the use of both theory and style analysis, but it also inevitably involves the use of *ad hoc* (though potentially generalizable) hypotheses. Such analyses are in no sense deterministic, contrary to the implication of Lijphart in his characterization of the interpretive case study as a form of "applied science." As Meyer notes:

> Even in the long run, our most confident surmises about routes and goals may prove wrong. This is because, given the particular style within which he works, the composer is a *free agent*. . . . The implications—the possible consequences of a musical event, of a motive, phrase, or even section—are always plural. A musical event implies a number of alternative actualizations. What the composer [or the political leader, e.g., Mao Tse-tung or Fidel Castro] does is to discover the possibilities implicit in his own musical [or political] ideas. . . . Determinism is a mistaken notion applied to works of art [or of strategy or policy] not only because implications are plural, but also because, within the style he employs, the composer may at any particular point in a piece be absolutely arbitrary [numerous political parallels come to mind, but compare Truman and the atomic bomb, Khrushchev and de-Stalinization, and Mao and the Cultural Revolution[23]]. That is, he may invent and use a musical idea or relationship which has nothing to do with—was in no way implied or dependent upon—preceding events in the piece. Though he is free at any point in a work to do as he likes, a responsible composer will subsequently take such an arbitrary act into

[23] On the undetermined nature of strategic choices, see Jeremy R. Azrael, "Varieties of De-Stalinization," in Chalmers Johnson, ed., *Change in Communist Systems* (Stanford 1970), 135-51.

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account. That is, the relationship between antecedent events and the arbitrary one will, taken together, have consequences later in the composition.

The Sino-Soviet dispute and the extensive analytical literature on it illustrate these points of Meyer's in the political field.[24]

In order to clarify further Meyer's concept of the critical method, two additional issues must be discussed. First, critical analysis of strategic choices does not attempt either to recreate the cognitive processes of the actors or to write a straight history of what occurred. The first is probably impossible and perhaps irrelevant, while the second is relevant but misses the point. As Meyer says, "The critic attempts to understand not the history of the decisions which resulted in a composition, but the 'logical' alternatives presented to the composer given the structure of a particular set of musical circumstances. He is, to paraphrase Aristotle, concerned with what might be called the poetry of creative [or political] choice, not its history."

Second, the methods of the critical analyst are extensive, but the best critical analyses require not simply serviceable tools of the trade but also broad knowledge, experience, judgment, art, and a "good ear." And even then the critic may be wrong. This is because of the idiosyncratic, nonrecurring nature of virtually all significant strategic choices. Meyer comments:

> Critical analysis should in general be as *in*clusive as possible. That is, *all* the methods, theories, and techniques which are relevant to and will illuminate the composition being considered should be brought to bear. . . . [The critical analyst] may refine existing hypotheses, devise quite new ones, or borrow concepts and methods from other disciplines such as linguistics, psychology, or systems analysis. . . . Because its reasons are often *ad hoc* and its explanations eclectic, criticism may at times seem somewhat improvisatory. But this does not mean that it is arbitrary or illogical. Different sorts of arguments from a variety of sources may be employed, but they must be applied *objectively*: rules and techniques, arguments and evidence must be used in the same way in each analysis; and, though not systematized, reasons must be consistent with one another. Criticism must obviously be musically [or politically] persuasive, but this is not enough. For what finally convinces is aural [political] cogency combined with logical coherence.

Political science, to vary slightly a point made recently by Samuel Huntington, is always borrowing ideas from other disciplines—"political development" from an analogy with "economic development," and

[24] See, e.g., Chalmers Johnson, "The Two Chinese Revolutions," *China Quarterly*, No. 39 (July–September 1969), 12-29.

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"political culture" from the key concept of the anthropologists.[25] In perhaps the first modern instance in which the field of music has been tapped for insights into political science, I have here borrowed extensively from one chapter of Leonard B. Meyer's outstanding book on critical analysis. I am indebted to Meyer because he has made the case for area studies—that is, the "disciplined configurative approach" or "critical analysis"—better than I could and because, since his conception is oriented entirely toward the analysis of music—a subject at some distance from political science—perhaps his case will be more persuasive than if it had been couched in social science practices and mores, given the long-standing confusion over the theoretical import of area studies.

It seems to me that the intellectual case for area studies of the "critical analytical" type is irrefutable, and that work of this type will continue to be undertaken and be in demand because of its intellectual challenges and pleasures. However, I do not believe that all, or even most, area studies reach the standard indicated by Meyer, or that run-of-the-mill programs in area studies necessarily prepare students to do good area studies work. Nonetheless, instead of attacking or abandoning area studies—an action that in the short run would merely cut the discipline's empirical roots and in the long run prove futile—area studies, perhaps retitled "critical analysis," ought to be upgraded and taught more seriously. If, for example, I were asked to choose only two books from the field of East Asian area studies—one dealing with China and one with Japan—that came close to achieving the highest standards of critical analysis, I would name Etienne Balazs, *Chinese Civilization and Bureaucracy* (New Haven 1964), and William W. Lockwood, *The Economic Development of Japan* (Princeton 1954).

Finally, one additional reason why political science needs area studies is the perilously weak state of political science "style analysis"—or what is sometimes called, carelessly, "middle level theory"—and the continuing need for inputs into *it* of critical analyses of real world politics. To mention merely one example, the current state of political development "theory" does not present a picture of great intellectual power and persuasiveness, as several analysts have pointed out.[26] There have been notable advances in conceptualization and method in this and other areas of comparative politics, but there have also been too many instances of style analysis being confused with theory and of

[25] Samuel P. Huntington, "The Change to Change: Modernization, Development, and Politics," *Comparative Politics*, III (April 1971), 305.

[26] See, e.g., *ibid.*; Ann Ruth Willner, "The Underdeveloped Study of Political Development," *World Politics*, XVI (April 1964), 468-82; and Mark Kesselman, "Order or Movement? The Literature of Political Development as Ideology," *World Politics*, XXVI (October 1973), 139-54.

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arcane methodologies being confused with both. Real area studies constitute the only legitimate road to a genuine theory of political development—such as can be found, for example, in two comparative analyses that include significant East Asian components: Reinhard Bendix, *Nation-Building and Citizenship* (New York 1964), and Barrington Moore, Jr., *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Boston 1966). Even if widespread agreement on the general theory and styles of politics were to materialize in the future, area studies—requiring knowledge and experience in addition to the theoretical and stylistic texts—will persist in the form of critical analyses of concrete instances of political activity.

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MODERNIZATION AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY: A Theoretical Exploration

By CLAUDE AKE*

WHAT is the effect of the process of modernization on political stability? That is the question I want to explore theoretically. I will suggest that there are no plausible reasons for the expectation that the process of modernization is destabilizing, and also that there is no problem of political instability in transitional societies or anywhere else. Let us begin by examining some of the arguments used to support the thesis that modernization causes political instability.

I. ANOMIE, ROLE CONFLICT AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY

The type of argument that recurs most frequently in the literature is the one that links modernization with anomie or with role conflict. The substance of the argument is as follows: modernization is characterized by changes of norms and values and this causes an orientational upheaval. The disorientation weakens societal ties and the mechanisms of social control and creates psychological stress. These factors in turn lead to political instability. Lucian Pye presents what is perhaps the best known version of this argument:

> . . . people in transitional societies can take almost nothing for granted; they are plagued on all sides by uncertainty and every kind of unpredictable behavior. In their erratically changing world, every relationship rests upon uncertain foundations and may seem to contain an unlimited potential for good and evil. People are not sure what they should get from any relationship, and so they are never sure whether they are getting what they should. The concepts of friend and foe become blurred. Above all else, the individual cannot be sure of the actions of others because he cannot be sure about himself.[1]

Pye draws attention to the "fragmentary" nature of the socialization process in transitional societies. He holds that in such societies, primary socialization and secondary socialization inculcate values which are quite often in disharmony. This pattern of socialization makes attitudi-

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[1] Lucian W. Pye, *Politics, Personality and Nation Building: Burma's Search for Identity* (New Haven 1963), 54-55.

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nal orientations incoherent and weakens associational sentiments. Since it is associational sentiments that make it possible for members of a society to have "considerable conflict without destroying the stability of the system," the weakening of associational sentiments renders social conflict more intense.

David Apter gives a very similar account of the political consequences of modernization. For him, modernization is the "spread of roles originating in societies with an industrial infrastructure, serving functional purposes in the industrial process, to systems lacking an industrial infrastructure." As a society modernizes, the following effects occur: (1) "the normative integration of the previous system begins to weaken, thereby widening the area of public meaning and reducing the area of prescriptive values"; (2) there are "more complex roles which need to be managed"; and (3) "there is more ambitiousness and less predictability in social action, producing greater uncertainty by individuals both of themselves and of the anticipated responses of others."[2]

For Apter, the source of the political problems and conflicts associated with modernization is the incompatibility of roles. Societies undergoing modernization are said to have three types of roles: (a) traditional, (b) accommodationist (partially new roles), and (c) new (industrial):

> In practice, the substance of modernizing politics is in large measure the result of incompatibilities between these three types of roles. The effort to adjust and modify them is particularly difficult in the absence of an impersonal dynamic mechanism such as exists in industrial countries. The modification and rearrangement of such roles, the selection of role priorities, and the use of restratification to provide possible solutions to the problems of role incompatibilities are all strategically important aspects of political policy-making. The claims put forward by competing political groups, each representing some portion of the total stratification system, are the means by which role malintegration is transformed into political conflict.[3]

Pye and Apter make an interesting and highly suggestive case. But it is not conclusive. Let us consider the point about the uncertainty of people in modernizing societies. They make a rather easy assumption here. If roles were changing on a large scale, as it appears they do in modernizing societies, then there would be some confusion over role expectations and, by implication, some uncertainty or lack of predict-

[2] David Apter, "Political Systems and Developmental Change," in Robert T. Holt and John E. Turner, eds., *The Methodology of Comparative Research* (New York 1970), 158-59.

[3] David Apter, *The Politics of Modernization* (Chicago 1965), 123-24.

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ability in social life. In such circumstances some people would indeed, as Apter suggests, engage in role testing, "exploring the legitimate limits of their roles and experimenting to the point where they expect sanctions of one kind or another to be initiated."[4] The difficulty is that the expectation of uncertainty in this situation depends on a further assumption about how change is introduced. From the mere fact that a society is changing one cannot conclude that there will be more uncertainty and less predictability in regard to behavior expectations. In particular, one has to make the further assumption that change is not thoroughly planned and that those affected by change are not well socialized into new expectations. As far as I can see, Pye and Apter do not make this assumption. If they did, they would have a difficult time justifying it. If we can agree that proper planning of change and proper "anticipatory" socialization can minimize disorientations and the uncertainties associated with modernization, the question arises, why should they not be able to eliminate these disorientations and uncertainties altogether? It may well be that however thoroughly change is planned, it will cause some disorientation and make behavior expectations more confused to some degree. But this has to be demonstrated, not assumed.

Both Apter and Pye consider modernization to be a disintegrative process. Pye thinks the process is disintegrative because it weakens associational sentiments. The weakening of associational sentiments is essentially the effect of the disorientations and the uncertainty about behavior expectations which are associated with modernization. We have already seen that it is problematic to assume that people in modernizing societies will suffer from these disorientations. Let us grant, for the sake of argument, that the assumption is valid: inasmuch as people are disoriented and uncertain of role expectations, associational sentiments may be weakened. As Pye suggests, the incoherence of the world may make people not only unsure of themselves, but suspicious of other people as well.

The problem is that Pye is considering only one possibility. There is another possibility which is at least as plausible. The disorientation and confusion over roles may stimulate some forms of associational sentiments. There is a large body of literature showing that such disorientation and confusion over roles are among the conditions that give rise to charismatic leadership and mass movements. According to this literature, anxieties created by the general incoherence of the human environment can quite easily create strong if "regressive" forms of group

[4] *Ibid.*, 125.

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identity.[5] Pye needs to develop a more rigorous argument that takes account of this possibility.

Apter also finds modernization disintegrative. According to Apter, "as societies modernize the normative integration of the previous system begins to weaken, thereby widening the area of public meaning and reducing the area of prescriptive values."[6] However, this is part of a more fundamental problem, namely, the incompatibilities between roles—traditional, accommodationist, and new. Apter posits that modernizing societies (unlike industrial societies), lack a wide set of role interlinkages. As a result, "the mutually reinforcing aspects of roles do not generate a stable pattern of authority but the reverse." Apter gives the following illustration of the point: "In India, for example, the consequences of caste-fixed urban relationships, residential patterns, and factory or work place (even today) interfere with functional roles. This causes unrest, managerial uncertainty and lowered efficiency. The situation becomes a direct political problem, as well, when caste groups like the Scheduled Castes Federation take on qualities of a trade union, a caste, and a political party challenging the Congress Party."[7]

Apter is correct in saying that modernization can weaken the normative integration of the traditional system and cause role conflict. That much is obvious. However, his point does not tell us much about the consequences of modernization for the integration of society at large or for the maintenance of a stable pattern of authority. Consider the process of industrialization. Industrialization is usually associated with bureaucratic norms and bureaucratic organizations which to some extent are not in harmony with the norms and organizational patterns of traditional society. So we have a source of conflict here. However, we cannot stop with this conclusion; while industrialization generates some sources of conflict, it also has some integrative effects. Industrialization brings together (in factories, for example) people who previously had little or nothing in common. It forges links across ethnic groups, thereby possibly reducing their particularism and increasing the resiliency of social and political structures. Industrialization appears to be making African elites more homogeneous—more a self-conscious socioeconomic class and less a disorderly coalition of "opinion leaders" of tribal or ethnic groups. It is becoming increasingly difficult to make sense of what these elites are doing unless one assumes that they are acting out

[5] See Franz Neumann, "Anxiety and Politics" and "Notes on the Theory of Dictatorship," in Franz Neumann, ed., *The Democratic and the Authoritarian State* (New York 1957), 270-300 and 233-56; Harold D. Lasswell, "The Psychology of Hitlerism," *Political Quarterly*, IV (July-September 1933), 373-84.

[6] Apter (fn. 2), 159.

[7] Apter (fn. 3), 132 n.

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their class-consciousness. There is no need to go into a documentation of these tendencies. For our purposes it is enough to draw attention to the logical possibility that, as the forces of production develop with modernization, the solidarity of elites and indeed their power can be enhanced.

To conclude, Pye and Apter give us some reason to believe that modernization can be disintegrative. But they have not given us any reason to believe the *process* is distintegrative.

Let us look briefly at Samuel Huntington, who also finds modernization to be disintegrative and destabilizing. He finds that rapid social and economic change "calls into question existing values and behavior patterns." It thus breeds corruption, which in turn breeds violence.[8] What does the term "corruption" mean to Huntington? "Corruption is behavior of public officials which deviates from accepted norms in order to serve private ends." According to Huntington, modernization breeds corruption, first because it entails changes in basic values; thus, "behavior which was acceptable and legitimate according to traditional norms becomes unacceptable and corrupt when viewed through modern eyes." Second, modernization creates new wealth and power whose relations to politics are undefined. Corruption occurs in the process of using wealth to secure political power or in the process of using political power to procure wealth. Finally, modernization breeds corruption because it changes and multiplies the laws by which society is governed. As the laws change, some group is put at a disadvantage and this group subsequently becomes "a potential source of corruption." What exactly is the relation of corruption to political instability? Huntington's answer is that "corruption tends to weaken or to perpetuate the weakness of the governmental bureaucracy." Corruption is at once a cause and an effect of the disorganization of political structures and authority patterns: "The functions, as well as the causes of corruption are similar to those of violence. Both are encouraged by modernization; both are symptomatic of the weakness of political institutions; . . . both are means by which individuals and groups relate themselves to the political system and, indeed, participate in the system in ways which violate the mores of the system. Hence the society which has a high capacity for corruption also has a capacity for violence."[9]

Huntington's concept of corruption—a concept clearly central to his thesis—is rather fuzzy. According to his definition of corruption, it is

[8] Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven 1968), 59-69. See also Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," *World Politics*, XVII (April 1965), 386-430.

[9] Huntington, *Political Order* . . . (fn. 8), pp. 59, 60, 61, 69, 63.

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hard to determine whether an act is corrupt when (a) it deviates from accepted norms, (b) serves private ends, or (c) deviates from accepted norms and serves private ends. Even without going into this ambiguity, it is easy to show that Huntington's thesis is not persuasively argued. Let us consider the three points he makes to illustrate how modernization breeds corruption. The first point assumes that when modernization takes place, some forms of behavior which were not previously regarded as corruption come to be so regarded. This assumption may well be correct. But modernization cannot be said to increase corruption merely by altering the criterion of what constitutes corruption. The alteration of the criterion could conceivably decrease corruption. Huntington's second point has the same logical difficulty. He says that modernization causes corruption because it creates new groups with economic or political power who would use that power to maximize their political effectiveness or their wealth. It is conceivable that the new groups may use their wealth or power to abuse public offices for their own advantage. However, we are not told why they must necessarily act in this manner, or indeed why it is probable that they would act in this manner. Huntington's third point about the change of laws rests on two untenable assumptions. One is that modernization will lead to a multiplication of laws. It could just as easily lead to their reduction. Another is that, as laws multiply, more people are placed at some disadvantage. Why would not the changes in the laws make more people happier with the system?

Let us assume, for the purposes of argument, that modernization causes corruption. Does corruption cause political instability? To all appearances there is as yet no conclusive answer to this question. Huntington posits that corruption may weaken the bureaucracy or other governmental institutions and thereby generate political instability. On the other hand, he is also aware that corruption can be a means of enhancing political stability. Elites can use corruption to increase and consolidate their power. In admitting these two possibilities, he implicitly underlines the necessity of making a more rigorous argument. He should therefore have gone on to show us in some detail why corruption is more likely to exacerbate political instability than to enhance political stability. But he does not do it.

2. MODERNIZATION, POLITICAL PARTICIPATION, AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY

The second type of argument made to support the thesis that modernization causes political instability uses political participation as the intervening variable between modernization and political instability. Weiner and Hoselitz provide a good example of this argument. They

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posit that the "political stability of many economically backward societies is the by-product of political apathy among the masses and relative isolation of persons who would form the core of potentially strong organized groups," and that modernization, particularly economic development, "is a factor which contributes to the fairly rapid destruction of political apathy and isolation."[10] According to Weiner and Hoselitz, economic development improves educational facilities, creates new groups by establishing contacts between people who were previously isolated, and facilitates the making of demands on the government. As economic development continues to generate new groups and demands, the political system may become more susceptible to the stresses of demand overload.

It is not clear that economic development is likely to generate political instability just because it increases political participation. To begin with, some forms of political participation are supportive rather than destabilizing. From the mere fact that something increases the number of people who can participate in politics we cannot conclude anything about its effect on political stability. Perhaps what Weiner and Hoselitz are saying is that unless you have political participation you cannot have political instability, or, put differently, that economic development produces a necessary though by no means sufficient condition of political instability, namely political participation. If this is what they are saying, they are not refuted by showing that political participation may also be system-supportive. However, political participation is not a necessary condition for political instability. To govern people is to enjoin them on pain of punishment to act in certain ways and to refrain from acting in certain ways. Either people are completely free and able to do as they please and therefore are not being governed, or they are being governed—in which case a limitation is imposed on their behavior. Insofar as people are being governed—that is, insofar as a political authority imposes limitations on what they can do—there is always the chance they will revolt or engage in deviant behavior or subversion. In other words, to have political instability it is not necessary that people participate politically; it is enough if they are governed, i.e., required to obey. The mere existence of government is the necessary condition of political instability.

3. MODERNIZATION AND THE GENESIS OF CONFLICT

I will now examine some arguments to the effect that modernization generates or intensifies conflict in society. S. N. Eisenstadt finds that

[10] Myron Weiner and Bert F. Hoselitz, "Economic Development and Political Stability in India," *Dissent*, VIII (Spring 1961), 173-74.

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modernization intensifies conflict by increasing structural differentiation: "Conflicts between various groups are inherent in any social structure, and the more differentiated and variegated the structure, the higher the extent and intensity of such conflicts; thus the very process of modernization necessarily creates a high level of conflicts."[11] The trouble with this argument is that it states only one side of the case. No one will deny that structural differentiation may generate tensions. And yet it is equally clear that structural differentiation will eliminate some sources of conflict and reduce the level of tension in some areas. For instance, it may eliminate conflicts caused by diffuse role orientations or the overlap of roles. Again, the argument needs to come to grips with the conventional wisdom that structural differentiation enhances political stability by replacing mechanical solidarity with organic solidarity.

Weiner and Hoselitz maintain that economic development magnifies some conflicts: "No matter what criteria are employed, some groups are bound to be dissatisfied. The more the capacity of government to spend increases, and the more investment decisions are made by government rather than by the private sector, the more there are likely to be conflicts over allocations between organized groups and government. . . ."[12]

Many other people have noted that modernization creates a revolution of rising expectations which very quickly becomes a revolution of rising frustrations because of the limited capacity of the governments of transitional societies to satisfy demands for goods and services. According to Mancur Olson, one other reason why economic growth generates conflict is that it invariably creates a class of " 'nouveaux pauvres' who are much more resentful of their poverty than those who have known nothing else."[13] Once more we only have one side of the case. The expanding role of government in economic change may also be an effective instrument for enhancing the stability of the political system. It may use these powers to gain new supporters, to reinforce old ones, and to weaken opponents of the system. Olson recognizes that economic development also creates a class of "nouveaux riches." But he does not prove that, on balance, the level of governmental support will fall as a result of economic development. As for the revolution of rising expectations, it is not quite clear what it has to do with modernization. Is it in the very nature of modernization to bring about a revolution of rising expectations? Or is the revolution of rising expectations a by-

[11] S. N. Eisenstadt, "Modernization and Conditions of Sustained Growth," *World Politics*, XVI (July 1964), 584.

[12] Weiner and Hoselitz (fn. 10), 177.

[13] Mancur Olson, Jr., "Rapid Growth as a Destabilizing Force," *Journal of Economic History*, XXIII (December 1963), 533.

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product of extravagant claims that elites happen to make? I do not know.

To sum up, the arguments I have examined are not successful. They are calculated to validate the proposition that modernization generates political instability. At best, they only succeed in establishing that modernization *can* generate political instability. There is a significant difference between the two propositions, "*X* generates *Y*" and "*X* can generate *Y*." The former suggests a necessary relationship between *X* and *Y*, but the latter suggests merely a possibility. The former is falsified by any instance in which *X* does not generate *Y*; the latter is not falsified by any such instance. The former is not confirmed by a single instance in which *X* generated *Y*, but the latter is fully confirmed by such an instance. If the arguments that I have examined amount to the proposition that modernization *can* cause political instability, they are telling us very little.

The Concept of Political Stability

Part of the reason why no clear picture of the relation between modernization and political instability emerges is that we are rather confused about what political stability is. For the rest of this paper, I want to clarify the concept of political stability and to suggest:

(a) That misconception of political stability is a source of the belief that modernization causes political instability.

(b) That "the problem of political stability" is more apparent than real.

The writings on modernization I have reviewed conceptualize political instability, implicitly or explicitly, as violence, conflict, civil disorder, short duration of governments, lack of institutionalization, and so forth. They are typical of the conception of the phenomenon in contemporary political science. To illustrate, in *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators*, the number of people killed in all forms of "domestic violence" is taken to be indicative of the extent of political instability.[14] Feierabend and Feierabend use aggression of groups within the political system as an indicator of political instability.[15] Jean Blondel defines political instability as lack of longevity of government.[16] For

[14] Bruce M. Russett and others, *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* (New Haven 1963), 97-100.

[15] Ivo K. and Rosalind L. Feierabend, "Aggressive Behaviors Within Polities, 1948–1962: A. Cross-National Study," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, x (September 1966), 249-71; also, Ivo K. Feierabend, Rosalind L. Feierabend, and Betty Nesvold, "The Comparative Study of Revolution and Violence," *Comparative Politics*, v (April 1973), 393-424.

[16] Jean Blondel, "Party Systems and Patterns of Government in Western Democracies," *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, i (June 1968), 180-203.

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Martin Needler, a country is stable if the government is chosen by free elections and if the government acts constitutionally.[17]

These conceptions of political stability do not fully reflect the fact that, properly speaking, only relations or a system of relations can be said to be stable. I would not normally describe my pen as stable or unstable. But if it is balanced on my index finger, I can properly apply the word stable—not to the pen as such but to the relation of the pen to my index finger acting as a fulcrum. The application of the term (to a relation) always suggests the possibility of change in that relation, a certain possibility of centrifugence among the elements which constitute the system. Perhaps it is the notion of possible centrifugence which restrains us from applying the term "stable" to all systems, or all systems of relations. Thus we do not usually describe the biological organism, man, as stable, though it is a system of relations, an ordered harmony of parts. In this case, the parts are very well integrated. But we readily think of alignments and political systems as being stable or unstable. The relations or systems to which the adjective stable is conventionally applied happen to be those whose centrifugence is quite obvious. For our limited purposes here, it is not necessary to go into a detailed characterization of the types of relations to which the adjective stable is applicable. It is enough to stress that only systems, or systems of relations, can properly be called stable or unstable.

We can look at this point from another angle. We say of some things that they are destabilizing and of other things that they are stabilizing. The sentence, "*X* is stabilizing," or "*X* is destabilizing," is not really fully intelligible. It is fully intelligible only when we make some assumptions about what is being stabilized or what is being destabilized. If somebody simply declares that something is destabilizing or stabilizing, that declaration invites the question, "what?" What is being stabilized or destabilized? The answer is a relation or a system. Thus, exposure of a solution to the sun may be said to be destabilizing—in the sense that it leads to the alteration of the chemical relations of the solution. It seems perfectly intelligible to say that violence destabilizes polity *Y* or institution *T*, *Y* and *T* being systems—that is, social structures or systems of roles. It does not sound quite right to say that *X*, for instance violence, destabilizes political socialization, a process. The implication of what we have just said is that if *X* is destabilizing to system *S*, then it is wrong to assume that it is also destabilizing to the

[17] Martin Needler, "Political Socioeconomic Development: The Case of Latin America," *American Political Science Review*, LXIII (September 1968), 889-97. For a review of the main conceptions of political stability in contemporary political science, see Leon Hurwitz, "Contemporary Approaches to Political Stability," *Comparative Politics*, V (April 1973), 449-69. I am indebted to this review essay.

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system S_2, unless of course we make the prior assumption that systems S_1 and S_2 are identical. We make this type of assumption if we declare that violence, civil strife, protest, coups d'état, or failure to accept democratic procedures will destabilize political systems. The point is that what destabilizes one political system may stabilize another one and may be quite irrelevant to the stability of yet another political system. We need a definition of political stability which takes account of this elementary but important point.

Before we define political stability, it is necessary to clarify the concept of a political system. A political system is a system of acts, or more accurately, of roles. The role is a configuration of behavior expectations associated with an actor in an interactional situation. It may be convenient to think of these expectations as falling into three categories: expectations about what one ought to do (duties), about what one may do (rights), and about what one can do (capabilities). Insofar as political role expectations are the same among members of the society, and insofar as behavior corresponds to role expectations, interaction is coherent.

It is important to specify just how roles give structure to human interaction. Members of a society do not usually have a detailed knowledge of role expectations. In fact, it is more accurate to say that they hardly ever have a precise knowledge of role expectations. More often than not, what gives coherence to social interaction is knowledge of the general limits of permissible behavior. Within these limits there is some flexibility. Thus two occupants of identical roles—for example, two Supreme Court judges—may act in somewhat different ways in an identical situation. And yet, we might easily agree that each of them has fulfilled his role well. In the light of these considerations, it is perhaps more accurate to conceptualize role expectation as expectation about the general limits of permissible behavior in an interactional situation, and role fulfillment as behavior that falls within the limits of permissible behavior. Role expectations are, so to speak, obstacles limiting variability in the patterns of behavior "exchanges." By exchanges, I mean the communications and transactions of people in interaction. The structure of the social system is the system of such obstacles.

Political stability is the regularity of the flow of political exchanges. To the extent that the flow of political exchanges is irregular, the political system is unstable; to the extent that it is regular, the political system is stable. A political system is stable insofar as political actors proceed as usual—that is, confine their choice of political behavior to the general limits imposed by the role expectations of political inter-

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action. Politically destabilizing acts are irregular exchanges; all acts which are not irregular exchanges are politically stabilizing. The irregular exchange is defined *ex post facto* from the knowledge of a political system or, what is the same thing, a particular system of political exchanges.

This definition is merely a reformulation of some current commonsense notions of political stability. When we consider the definitions which relate political instability to violence, civil disorder, etc., one striking feature of these criteria of instability is that in the context of the political systems in which they originate, they are irregular political exchanges. They fall outside permissible behavior. To illustrate the point further, if the Government of France were defeated in a constitutionally conducted national election and refused to relinquish power, we would regard the government's behavior as destabilizing. Similarly, if the President of the United States of America suddenly dissolved Congress and imprisoned the Supreme Court judges for making a decision with which he disagreed, we would again regard such behavior as politically destabilizing. In relation to the relevant political systems, these are instances of irregular political exchanges, instances of unpermitted eccentricity in the flow of political exchanges. As a rule, those things which we conventionally regard as politically destabilizing are also things which fall outside the limits of role expectations of the relevant political system. Are these acts properly described when we call them destabilizing? It seems that they are. For one thing, as their incidence increases, the political structure or the pattern of political exchanges breaks down; that is, expectations about political behavior become more and more elastic until the political order turns to its antithesis, anarchy. This is not unlike what would happen if we all simply refused to conform to conventional meanings of language: we would go into what is designated as a barber shop and find only people selling fresh vegetables; we would walk into a bakery and be asked whether we want to collect or deliver our laundry; we would go to what is advertised as a tennis match and find ourselves watching an opera. As more and more people took liberties with conventional expectations in this manner, society would become incoherent.

To ask how stable a polity is, is to seek to know the incidence of irregular political exchanges. We know this by comparing patterns of interaction or behavior with the role expectations of the polity in question. However, it is not easy to identify irregular political exchanges or destabilizing acts. For one thing, there may be some disagreement over

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what the expectations of certain roles are. This raises the question as to whose role expectations constitute the reference point for deciding what is an irregular political exchange or a destabilizing act. It seems to me that the solution to the problem is to take, as reference point, the role expectations sanctioned by the laws and conventions of the polity. Thus, irregular political exchanges or politically destabilizing acts are forms of behavior which violate the laws and conventions of the polity. Stabilizing acts or regular exchanges remain a residual category. This solution appears to be open to two objections. First, it contains a conservative bias because it implies acceptance of a constituted authority's notion of proper conduct. My answer to this objection is that we are interested in representing reality accurately, and this criterion appears to be the only one that reflects the reality of political life. Once we accept the premise that we decide what is irregular or destabilizing by reference to specific political systems, we have to use this criterion. Every historical political system is what it is by virtue of the laws and conventions that govern it. Whenever there is an issue as to whether someone has acted properly or not, the dispute is authoritatively resolved by reference to the laws and conventions of the polity. The choice of role expectations as a criterion is not an assertion to the effect that constituted authority is always "right." Rather, it is simply a recognition of the fact that the dominance of a particular system of laws and conventions gives the historical polity its peculiar "structure."

The second objection is that this criterion for isolating destabilizing political acts makes political acts out of all criminal acts. What is odd is not that we are making all criminal acts political, but that political scientists do not customarily draw attention to the fundamental "politicalness" of criminal acts, or indeed all acts that violate the law. Whether the effect is intended or not, all violations of the law are political acts in the sense that they defy or repudiate constituted political authority. The very essence of political authority is to command and to elicit obedience. Every crime is an instance of disobedience of the command of political authority. Hence, to commit a crime is to strike at the *raison d'état* of political authority. As more and more members within a political system commit more and more crimes, political authority weakens and the political system disintegrates.

Is There a Problem of Political Instability?

Most people who have written about modernization and political development, including the present author, have given the impression that there is a serious problem of political instability in transitional so-

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cieties. The truth seems to be that this problem is more apparent than real. The problem appears to have been created by our conceptual confusion and prejudices.

One aspect of this confusion is the failure to distinguish clearly and systematically between political instability and political change. Our conventional conceptions of political stability do not pay enough attention to this distinction. When we use these conventional conceptions of political stability, we are apt to see political instability somewhat too ubiquitously. For instance, many of our conceptions of political stability contain some notion of longevity. Lipsett's conception of political stability in *Political Man* is perhaps the most famous example of this. When we build the notion of longevity into our conception of stability, we are already confusing political stability with the absence of political change. The belief that modernization is destabilizing reflects this confusion. Many of the changes associated with modernization—the decay of old roles, the creation of new roles, modifications of authority patterns, the rise of new interest groups, the erosion of certain solidaristic ties, the displacement of some primary groups by secondary groups—are too readily taken as sources or symptoms of political instability. In many contemporary modernizing societies, the executive of the state changes very frequently. This has reinforced the belief that modernization itself is destabilizing.

But these changes are not necessarily sources or symptoms of political instability. As we have seen, political stability is the regularity of the flow of political exchanges. To say that a polity is stable or that the flow of political exchanges is regular does not imply that political change is not occurring. Political change is compatible with political stability as long as the change occurs in accordance with prevailing expectations about how such change may legitimately come about. Political change therefore becomes an instance of political instability only when it violates established expectations about how that particular type of change may legitimately occur. To build the concept of longevity into the definition of political stability is to ignore the distinction between types of political change. If we work with such a notion of political stability, we will necessarily exaggerate the extent of the political instability of historical political systems.

There is another sense in which we exaggerate the extent of political instability. Polities in which phenomena such as constitutional crises, the abuse of high office, frequent changes of the executive of the state, political assassinations, and coups d'état occur frequently are usually characterized as being highly unstable.

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Thus, contemporary African and Latin American polities are usually said to be highly unstable mainly because they often have coups d'état, changes of the executive, constitutional crises, etc. But do these indeed prove that these polities are highly unstable? Not really. These phenomena are forms of political interaction associated with elites. Elites constitute only a small proportion of the political population; we cannot say anything conclusive about the level of political stability by concentrating on elite interactions.

It may be argued that although elites are a small proportion of the political population, what they do is decisive for the political system, and that it is therefore necessary to pay special attention to the behavior of elites when we want to measure political stability. All the same, we cannot measure stability accurately if we give special importance to what elites do or to what happens in the elite stratum of the political system. To understand why this is so, we have to remember that political stability is the regularity of the flow of political exchanges. The assertion that a political system is highly stable or unstable ought to be based on an examination of the patterns of flow of political exchanges in the political system as a whole. In measuring political stability, we are dividing the distribution of patterns of communications and transactions into two categories. It is rather like watching the flow of traffic to determine the incidence of violations of traffic rules. Since we are interested in the extent of "regularity" of traffic behavior, we naturally do not "weight" the violations, nor do we consider the "importance" of the violators.

The more general significance of what I am saying here is that any measure of political stability which weights "destabilizing" or "irregular" patterns of political behavior misconceives what political stability is. The tendency of some studies of political stability to weight destabilizing patterns of behavior arises because of confusion of issues of measurement with issues of prediction. In measuring political stability, we are dealing with manifest behavior, and we are determining the incidence of a particular form of manifest behavior. If we are interested in predicting levels of political stability, we want to think not simply in terms of the incidence of patterns of behavior, but in terms of the balance of political forces. In those circumstances, we will have to resolve tendencies of manifest behavior into political forces by weighting them according to the resources and influence of the political actors who display them. If we avoid these confusions and remember that the level of political stability has to be a ratio of irregular political exchange to the totality of the political exchanges of the entire political population, it becomes

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quite clear that we have tended to exaggerate the problem of political instability.

Finally, it is pertinent to note that we take it for granted that there is a serious problem of political instability in some societies without really tackling the problem of defining critical levels of political instability. Yet it is clear that unless we can specify quantitatively what level of political instability is critical (say for the survival of the political system) we have no grounds for holding that there is a serious or even a significant problem of political instability in any political system. Is political stability something of which the more the better? Is political instability something of which the less the better? Or is there a critical or significant level of political instability? Critical for what? How is this critical level of political instability determined? Is it the same for every political system? These are questions which must be answered as part of the process of establishing the validity of the assumption that there is a significant problem of political instability in any society. It is all the more necessary to answer these questions because, to all appearances, the real and interesting problem is not how to maintain order, but how to revolutionize it.

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Review Article

SHAPES OF A WORLD TO COME

By JAMES P. SEWELL

Jagdish N. Bhagwati, ed., *Economics and World Order From the 1970's to the 1990's*. New York, Macmillan; London, Collier-Macmillan; Toronto, Collier-Macmillan Canada, Ltd., 1972, 365 pp., $11.95 (U.S.).

Alastair Buchan, *Power and Equilibrium in the 1970s*. New York and London, Praeger (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1973, 120 pp., $6.00.

Raymond Vernon, *Sovereignty at Bay: The Multinational Spread of U.S. Enterprises*. New York and London, Basic Books, 1971, 326 pp., $8.50.

NO theory of world politics yet created is able to guide us into a new age, but scholars and statesmen persist in conceiving global designs that claim our attention. Many writers are tempted by a formidable problem: What is the "real" shape—or alternatively the preferred shape—of the world to come? The fruits they offer are varied in taste but often so appealing in appearance that students of international relations cannot refuse to try them.

The three books under review will appeal to different reading publics. It would be misleading to suggest without qualification that these studies preview the state of our planet. With one exception, they stress the present more than the future. Yet visions of tomorrow are sometimes imbedded within analyses of today. To that extent, the use of elementary questions may help to uncover an observer's prophecy. My questions are simple: (1) Which *actors* should we follow in order to comprehend the future? (2) What *substantive range* of interplay among these actors should we observe to grasp what lies ahead? (3) How should we characterize the emergent *quality of relations* among actors?

The books at hand yield different answers. Although a few selections cannot represent a field of inquiry rich in its diversity of investigators and starting points, or enable a reviewer to observe all of the salient trends in the study of world politics, these works do challenge us to assess the coherence of contemporary international relations. In addition they suggest, obliquely, some considerations that ought to go into trial constructions of a global future.

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I. Actors

Nothing is more fundamental to a discipline than the supposed nature of its basic units.[1] Today the multiform character of actors as perceived by students of international relations testifies to a field in flux within the academy, and perhaps in the world outside. National actors have not entirely disappeared, but subnational, transnational, and even international (or intergovernmental) actors compete for the scholar's acclaim. Some years ago Raymond Aron could distinguish homogeneous from heterogeneous systems merely by asking whether component *states* approximated each other in their organizing principles, values, and conception of policy. Today, it seems, there exists a more elemental sort of heterogeneity within the global constellation.

Alastair Buchan directs sensible, unstartling advice to statesmen and would-be statesmen. *Power and Equilibrium in the 1970s* is founded on five major centers of influence: the United States, the Soviet Union, China, Japan, and Western Europe. The former Director of the Institute for Strategic Studies claims no prophet's distinction for his actors; Henry Kissinger, Richard Nixon, and a host of others have divined the impending world in terms that are outwardly similar. Such a global pentagram accords the European Community a status comparable to that of four established nation-states. Buchan occasionally refers to his fifth unit as "Brussels," although the Oxford professor (who presents himself as having a "European cast of mind") recognizes the uncompleted evolution of political institutions for a Europe capable of concerted action toward the rest of the world (pp. 10, 28ff.). During the present decade no less than during times past, Buchan seems to envisage *national governments* as the prime movers of international affairs.

Sovereignty at Bay draws on building blocks of a different order. At the beginning of his careful *ex parte* argument, Raymond Vernon recognizes a widespread sense of foreboding: "the sovereign states are feeling naked" (p. 3). These states yield top billing, in Professor Vernon's presentation, to 187 enormous U.S.-controlled corporations. The emphasis is on extractive ventures and manufacturing industries among enterprises studied as part of a Harvard University research project dating from 1965. Vernon tends to de-nationalize these corporations; he also de-nationalizes his states. He sees the attributes of nationality

[1] As Thomas S. Kuhn argues, consequential research can hardly begin until "a scientific community thinks it has acquired firm answers to questions like the following: What are the fundamental entities of which the universe is composed?" *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 2nd ed. (Chicago 1970), 4-5.

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more clearly abroad than in the United States. Nationalism is invoked mostly to explain foreign response to corporate action originating in the United States. One finds little concession to the literature on political culture. "National ideologies are ephemeral commodities; as governments come and go, one set of national tenets displaces another" (p. 53).

By factoring out nationality as though its status as an element common to *nation*-states and "multi*national*" corporations allowed it to be treated neutrally, the author places these two entities at some distance from each other. Vernon's corporate actors thus become almost as sharply distinguishable from the government of the "home country" as from that of the "host country" (pp. 134, 205ff., 265ff.; however, see also pp. 145-50).

Vernon starts by giving identities to his transnational organizations that make them distinct from the nation-state of their origin. He proceeds by treating corporate dynamism as an independent variable to which governments (as dependent variables) react. By contrast, Buchan asserts that "today . . . governments have powers to create barriers to transnational movements which even the most vicious tyrannies [of the eighteenth century] lacked" (p. 53).

In the collection entitled *Economics and World Order*, basic global units are less clear-cut and considerably less uniform. Jagdish Bhagwati invites his fellow authors to combine prognostication and prescription in tackling an assignment no less momentous than the evaluation of "forces in the world system" (p. 2) between now and the year 2000. Bhagwati divides his world system into rich and poor nations. He maintains that the latter are characterized by "growing political cohesion." This coalescence "has resulted in their acting as a fairly effective, and at times monolithic, bloc in international economic negotiations" (p. 6). Bhagwati makes no effort to rebut the generally accepted finding that the poor act alone more often than they act together. Regarding the outcome of key issues, Bhagwati insists that large and affluent nations constitute forces to be reckoned with at least as much as low-income nations. He does not specify whether the great powers are to be considered as actors in conflict with each other or as actors in concert. Thus the basic units of both the poor and the rich take on an ambiguous character.

Elsewhere, this volume portrays other kinds of actors. For instance, Stephen Hymer scrutinizes the differential impact of multinational corporations; Jozef Pajestka descries three multinational socioeconomic units—the "developed capitalist countries," the "socialist countries," and the "economically underdeveloped countries"; and in a section on the

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Third World, essays are grouped into "regional" categories—Latin America, Africa, and Asia. Perhaps the lack of congruence among basic units is a necessary cost of broad participation in this work, an outgrowth of the World Order Models Project. In the eyes of the contributors, some of whom offer redoubtable "views from the bottom," the influence of particular actors seems to vary in importance.

How, if at all, will the fundamental units of tomorrow's world differ from those of today's? Buchan foresees a Europe that will soon be forced to choose either the line of evolution toward "a less powerful European grouping within an integrated NATO framework" or toward "a more powerful, more autonomous system under the umbrella only of the collective alliance" (p. 94)—to decide, that is, between roadways leading toward Atlantic unity and European unity. Here the security considerations of principal actors bear heavily upon the reshaping of fundamental units. "Smaller powers" are also gaining "new forms of coherence, new means of underpinning their own national identities" —paradoxically, by participation in limited-membership intergovernmental arrangements (p. 107). But beyond these marginal changes, Buchan's world of the 1970's consists of the same kind of political units as his world of yesterday.

Vernon's projected units also differ little from his present ones. "The basic asymmetry between multinational enterprises and national governments may be tolerable up to a point," he concludes, "but beyond that point there is a need to reestablish the balance." When this degree of stress occurs, governments may respond by creating "some body" of indeterminate nature, "charged with weighing the activities of the multinational enterprise against a set of social yardsticks that are multinational in scope" (p. 284). This formula is concerned with facilitating transnational operations rather than with transforming existing operant units. It merely implies supportive participation by extra-corporate actors in the application of guidelines set up by the enterprises themselves. Two such guidelines are the "world is our oyster," and "when in Rome do as the Romans do" (p. 147).

The collection of essays edited by Bhagwati predicates a global system that comprises entities other than nation-states and multinational corporations. *Economics and World Order* refers to international institutions—for instance, the IMF, IBRD and GATT—that are developing distinctive personalities (a process that is assumed rather than critically examined). Bhagwati also pierces the surface of the nation-state to describe human beings as pertinent units, although his individual units might better be described as object-actors than subject-actors. In his opening essay the familiar aspiration of closing the gap between

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rich and poor nations is supplanted by a proposal for a worldwide standard of living based on a minimum per capita income of $200. (Pitambar Pant advances a comparable proposition in the volume's concluding essay.) "Ultimately," states Bhagwati, "our objective should be the elimination of poverty; and poverty has to be defined in terms of *people* rather than *nations*" (pp. 13-14).

The three selections examined demonstrate a discrepancy among the actors as seen by present-day observers. Only Vernon works consistently from a basis other than the nation-state. His study puts more distance between this traditional unit and the multinational corporation than accessible evidence would seem to justify. *Sovereignty at Bay* neither sets out in quest of an alternative framework for viewing all of world politics, nor arrives at one indirectly along the way to its author's own objective. A global design constructed upon non-state units should demonstrate how such units have become, or could believably become, more fundamental than the nation-state.[2] In the meantime, the perplexed observer of global affairs is sure to welcome designs which superimpose non-state actors upon the nation-state in a coherent fashion.

II. Substantive Range

Major nation-states seeking assurance of survival; giant corporations engaged in extensive profit-making operations; an assortment of global actors capable of reallocating scarce resources: these multiform units, seen by different observers, suggest a process of perceptual conditioning by substantive issues. The study of international relations has long drawn its chief inspiration from a universally acclaimed (if particularly construed) desire for *security*. This basic need, while still not satisfied, has now been extended by other claims. Indeed, the faltering persuasiveness of the "national security" nostrum suggests that perceptive observers have begun to refine public concerns that were once subsumed by a single label.

The works under review offer no typologies by which to classify emergent global issues. However, exposure to their varied concerns prepares the reader to recognize unaccustomed functional dimensions of world politics. Let us consider the pattern of substantive matters traced by these studies.

The range of issues in Alastair Buchan's world of the 1970's corresponds, on a global level, to the kinds of strength wielded by his major actors. Forms of strength include strategic power, or the capacity

[2] To become more fundamental would imply that surrogate units assume leading roles in significant international problems across a wide range of substantive matters.

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to deliver nuclear weapons at long range; tactical ability, or the possession of conventional and deployable military force; political or psychological influence; and economic potential. Exercises of tactical military virtuosity may give rise to paradoxical outcomes.[3] To Buchan, the two last-mentioned sources of strength seem to be most important for the shape of a world to come. He maintains that the great political and intellectual magnet of tomorrow will not be the United States (pp. 20-21); it *may* be China, at least in the sense of China's attraction for Third-World leaders (pp. 85-86). Buchan recognizes that the economic prowess of Japan and of a Europe following the pace set by Germany may lead to foreign potency, but he contends that it also contributes to domestic vulnerability. He suggests this vulnerability of economically advanced nation-states without considering either the global disposition of resources or the energy-intensive industrialism of Japan, Europe, and the United States.

Buchan's "economic" category serves primarily as a catchall for issues deemed likely to arise—or to persist, in the case of monetary chaos —during the present decade. *Sovereignty at Bay*, on the other hand, offers a finely wrought briefing on those microeconomic questions which might be perceived by Raymond Vernon's non-state actors: that is, high-level corporate executives. *Economics and World Order* enriches our register of economic issues in a manner possible only to an assemblage of authors with multifarious national backgrounds and political predilections. Bhagwati identifies a general consensus among his contributors on behalf of positive international action to raise the living standards of low-income peoples; but the reader gathers a stronger sense of differing nuances than of any common theme. Among the substantive areas of international concern that reflect tacit disagreement among his contributors are the following: *trade and monetary issues* (to what extent are anticipated preferences and concessions, let alone present arrangements, sufficient to generate development or other desired outcomes?); *external aid* (into what kinds of situations—the "least-developed" economies or those with the greatest manifest promise of development—should aid chiefly be channeled; and under what

[3] "One of the factors which one cannot discount is that for over twenty-five years Soviet military power has been potential rather than employed, except for brief and decisive interventions in Budapest and Prague; whereas American military power, to say nothing of British and French, has been frequently deployed in action, with all the shortcomings that the conduct of real war shows up. One has only to travel around the developing world, to the Arab countries, to Southeast Asia, even to Subsaharan Africa, to find that there is a mystique—a credibility, if you like—about Soviet military power, armies as well as navies, and in places about Chinese military power as well, a mystique which American military power does not have. . . . This situation need not, however, persist." Buchan, 81-82.

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conditions, if any, is an increase over present magnitudes of aid likely?); and *technology* (do transfers of various technologies to the Third World speed modernization, buttress dependency patterns, exacerbate income maldistribution, or produce some other sort of impact?).

No book is likely to encompass all the issues foreseen by global actors. The authors of the works under review properly consider selected issues; they do not compile inventories. Nevertheless, it is pertinent to observe that none of these globe-contemplating volumes seriously addresses itself to the question of how much a human future depends upon the state of our planet. The effects of ecological dangers from too many people, too few resources, too much pollution, and other hazards to the earth's biosphere are minimized—both as threats and as opportunities for effective international action. Buchan displays simple realism when he disparages the hope by some that the "exponential growth of our demands on finite natural resources will unify mankind"; up to now, he states, "the evidence is lacking" (p. 52). Neither the author nor the corporate actors of *Sovereignty at Bay* express much concern about depletion of resources or pollution by industries. M.I.T. professor Bhagwati dismisses the *prima facie* tie between levels of population and pollution: "I share Medawar's optimism rather than Ehrlich's pessimism: technology can be deployed [therefore *will* be deployed?] to counter the disruptive effects of other technology . . ." (p. 18).

Why are the issues represented in these three books so disconnected and inconclusive in comprehending the concerns of our senses and the fears of our expectations? They lack a typology of substantive areas that fits contemporary international relations. Until someone shows us how to move beyond security, and beyond the dichotomies within which security serves with some residual category to divide the problems of humankind, examinations of the future will necessarily leave much to be desired.

III. Quality of Relations

If the studies before us are a guide, it is becoming less stylish, and probably less accurate, to model images of the current global system upon Hobbes' state of nature or Rousseau's *état de guerre*. These writings for the most part suggest an era of mutual adjustment among actors. The nation-states of *Power and Equilibrium* present our limiting case. Buchan does fear the outbreak of a trade war of all against all (pp. 88, 108). Yet even his "intractable social order" (p. 110) is over-

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arched, if not reshaped, by current developments. The plenitude of the superpowers' nuclear capacities contributes to a growing sense of global stability despite the "adversary" (p. 16) character of bipolar strategic relationships. Military intervention at a distance has become more difficult and more costly, in the broadest terms, for major powers (pp. 82, 91). At the same time, events in several parts of the world imply that we are witnessing a tacit revision of the rules of the game. These rules increasingly sanction peaceable access, or the right of interpenetration, in place of exclusive spheres of influence (pp. 92, 94, 95; the Soviet Union is Buchan's deviant, pp. 108-9). Finally, mass communications and other factors are creating the '"irrefragable bond of habitual intercourse'" which underpins "an international social consciousness" (p. 53, quoting Burke).

The major corporate actors of *Sovereignty at Bay* display considerable willingness to accommodate their own kind. For a time, cartels reduced uncertainties by formalizing understandings about the geographical division of the market (pp. 82-83; cf. Buchan's "spheres of influence"). Now the competition seems rather subdued even when extractive or manufacturing firms enter (or gain "access" to) areas previously monopolized by rivals. Vernon serenely refers to "oligopoly partners" (p. 75; see also p. 45).

But state actors pose certain obstacles to accommodation among the newest globalists. Vernon's perception of the relations between nongovernmental and governmental actors provides a contrast with the views of other observers. As indicated, he insists that transnational offshoots have identities separate from their national parent state. For example, corporations and governments are said to be inclined to "hold each other at arm's length" within the American system. "'Mind your own business' is the typical state of mind, if not the rhetoric, with which U.S. enterprise confronts U.S. government agencies" (pp. 206, 207; see also pp. 213, 214, 218, 261-62). One need not search as far as Lenin's *Imperialism* to find disagreement over whether a "gap" (Vernon, 228) actually exists between public and private actors. It would seem that Harry G. Johnson envisages considerably closer relations when, in *Economics and World Order*, he writes—without distinguishing an American exception—of "national states . . . which have become accustomed to lean on the domestic corporation as an instrument of national economic policy"[4] (p. 179). Possibly the proposition on relations at

[4] Cf. Murray L. Weidenbaum, *The Modern Public Sector* (New York and London 1969), *passim*. For a Canadian view of the "new mercantilism," see Kari Levitt, *Silent Surrender: The Multinational Corporation in Canada* (Toronto 1970), 99-103.

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arm's length is strengthened by Vernon's exclusion of public utilities, transportation, communications, trade, and banking from his study.[5] The intertwined affairs of U.S. agencies and ITT, to specify only one private enterprise, would make the arm's-length thesis more difficult to maintain. But even within his present scope of inquiry, Vernon does not test his proposition against all germane behavior. For instance, the arm's-length model does not fit manufacturing enterprises in their roles as defense contractors to the U.S. Government and as officially licensed arms salesmen to Asia, Africa, and Latin America.[6] This admixture of contrary evidence suggests the pertinence of thorough-going analyses of the relations between national governments and locally based corporations.

According to Vernon, host states feel vulnerable (pp. 223, 238, 247), tense (*passim*), or dependent (e.g., p. 204). But Vernon—unlike Thomas E. Weisskopf, Stephen Hymer, and Osvaldo Sunkel in *Economics and World Order*—tends to ascribe such symptoms ultimately to forces beyond U.S.-based transnational enterprises. Thus, foreign vulnerability may stem from U.S. governmental intervention in the policies of home-based firms (another challenge to the proposition about relations at arm's length). Regarding U.S. corporate establishments in France, "the propensity for generating tension may depend on the norms and expectations of the actors rather more than on the quality of the performance" (p. 223; see also pp. 25, 230, 249, 250). Not even increased participation by local management in raw-material ventures will alleviate feelings of subordination: "as long as the product requires marketing in foreign countries, 'dependence' will presumably continue in some form" (p. 59). It is difficult to know what must be done to respect the sensitivities of hosts, given their subjective quality; and indeed, perhaps the major lesson intended is that vulnerability, tension, and "dependence" must be lived with rather than eliminated (cf. pp. 265ff.).

What future changes are expected in the relations among actors? For two of our authors, the words *moderation* (by each actor in its external demands) and *balance* (of actors by other actors for the

[5] Vernon does cite public-private relations in Japanese trade and banking to show what might be called an arm-in-arm pattern. He distinguishes another characteristic of Japan's political economy which could pertinently be investigated more closely in the United States and elsewhere: the circulation of individuals between governmental agencies and industry. See pp. 225-30.

[6] Vernon takes note of such exceptions on pp. 213-14. To the sources he cites *en passant*, one might add James R. Kurth's "Why We Buy the Weapons We Do," *Foreign Policy*, No. 11 (Summer 1973), 33-56. See also David A. Andelman, "Pentagon Spends Millions To Save Ailing Companies," *New York Times*, April 30, 1973, p. 1. On the governmental-nongovernmental nexus in arms transactions with the Third World, see John Stanley and Maurice Pearton, *The International Trade in Arms* (London and New York 1972), 7-8, 24ff.

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benefit of all actors) seem to summarize the desired quality best. Vernon's corporation managers, "chary of governmental action, are likely to continue to make their own way in the international environment, tempering their eagerness to expand with judiciously applied self-restraint." Regarding the level where these two kinds of actors relate to one another, "social organization" is challenged to "ensure" that the undefined "large units on which our future societies are likely to be based act as countervailing political powers, not as mutually reinforcing ones" (p. 273). The means for this assurance are not specified.[7]

Buchan admonishes statesmen to moderate both their claims and the means employed to realize these claims.[8] Time and again he resorts to the metaphor of balance of power. In one passage, Buchan sketches a "mobile" variant (p. 49); elsewhere he inflates the desired relationship of actors to a "philosophy of multiple coexistence" (p. 105). On the other hand, he criticizes balance of power—rightly, I think—on grounds of its inadequacy both as an analytical construct and as a guide for conducting the new diplomacy (pp. 54, 63-70). In his peroration, Buchan concludes that "it would be a sorry world and one that risked alienating not only the lesser powers but our own younger generation as well if they were asked to believe that a balance of power is the highest political achievement of which the new great powers are capable." Thus is the torch passed to someone else.

Several contributors to *Economics and World Order* forecast worsening relations between actors in the rich North and the poor South. Carlos F. Diaz-Alejandro, for instance, prophesies a decade or more of friction, punctuated by political "happenings," especially if the global economy is afflicted by major depression or neo-mercantilism on the part of industrialized nation-states (pp. 241, 246). Ali A. Mazrui examines aspects of this "perilous cleavage" of the world and explores means for "anticipating a revolution by providing the changes necessary to avert it" (pp. 302, 318). But none of the discontented essayists

[7] However, Samuel P. Huntington contends that world politics may be approaching a global structure "far less conducive to the emergence and operation of transnational organizations than one in which one center predominated. Clearly it favors a dispersion of control over transnational organizations. It may also favor a slowdown in their numerical growth and some restriction in the geographical scope of their activities." "Transnational Organizations in World Politics," *World Politics*, XXV (April 1973), 333-68; quote from 362. Insofar as large corporations have acted as "mutually reinforcing" agents (to invoke Vernon's broad description) of a preponderant governmental power, this threat might be expected to diminish in the future.

[8] This exhortation to restraint seems to allow a double standard, for Buchan welcomes a regenerated United Nations offering arenas within which the governments of low-income nations might "drag as many resources as possible out of the developed world" (p. 107).

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develops a credible strategy or a sequence for achieving what is deemed important. Bhagwati's own conclusion is surprisingly sanguine, and some of the contributors from the Western and Socialist realms seem to perceive no imminent danger or necessary conflict. The reader senses neither an economic nor a political dynamic which moves us toward the goals that the authors specify for a distant year of reckoning. The volume's dust cover acknowledges an intellectual trade-off of sorts by maintaining that "the book's balance allows the reader to pursue the issues without feeling the forward thrust of any particular notion of world order."

IV. Conclusion

I have examined three significant volumes for their answers to some questions bearing on the immediate future: Which actors must be included? What range of issues demands investigation? How are the relations among actors to be portrayed?

Forward thinking is not irrelevant in a world whose citizens remain confident of leverage upon the outcome of their aspirations. But the present review entitles me to make only modest suggestions for specific contributions by students of international relations. First, if some actors have to be excluded from one's plan, the global design must justify their exclusion. Also, it should account for the connection between governmental and nongovernmental actors based within the same nation-state. Second, the design should demonstrate sensitivity to issues that lie outside the traditional scope of international relations and beyond the immediate interests perceived by leading actors. Better yet, it might show how the issues selected for treatment represent a coherent typology of functional areas from which these matters were drawn. And finally, whether its focal point is the present day, a distant target date, or a middle-range period, such a design might usefully show how relations between actors may be modified in a way which sustains readers' hopes for a world that is desirable to live in and feasible to reach.

The works under review exemplify two basic approaches to an unresolved problem. The orthodox approach, that of analyzing the world of today and then nudging it into the future, has not proven especially fruitful in freeing authors' imaginations from the status quo. Neither Buchan nor Vernon takes us very far toward a preferable world. On the other hand, the approach of normative projection, that of positing optimal values to be realized by a target date, has not provided the footing to work back from the year 2000 to the present. The volume edited by

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Bhagwati demonstrates acutely our lack of a bridge across the abyss separating the earthly estates of humanity. Moderation and balance may seem adequate as counsel for the leaders of nation-states and corporations which have arrived at a status of relative contentment. But what advice is pertinent for the gravely dissatisfied? The field of global prognosis and prescription awaits conceptions able to lift us beyond the current moment, yet capable of showing believably how we might evolve beyond the points where we stand now.

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THE CONSOCIATIONAL DEMOCRACY THEME

By HANS DAALDER*

Lucien Huyse, *Passiviteit, Pacificatie en Verzuiling in de Belgische Politiek: een sociologische studie*. Standaard Wetenschappelijke Uitgeverij, Antwerp, 1970, 252 pp., D. Fl. 21.35.

Gerhard Lehmbruch, *Proporzdemokratie: Politisches System und Politische Kultur in der Schweiz und in Oesterreich*. Mohr, Tübingen, 1967, 58 pp., DM 7.40.

Arend Lijphart, *The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands*. University of California Press, Berkeley, 1968, 211 pp., $8.00.

Eric A. Nordlinger, *Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies*. (Occasional Papers, No. 29), Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass., 1972, 123 pp., $4.00.

G. Bingham Powell, Jr., *Social Fragmentation and Political Hostility: An Austrian Case Study*. Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1970, 176 pp., $7.50.

Jürg Steiner, *Gewaltlose Politik und kulturelle Vielfalt: Hypothesen entwickelt am Beispiel der Schweiz*. Paul Haupt, Bern/Stuttgart, 1970, 337 pp., DM 48.00. English edition: *Amicable Agreement Versus Majority Rule: Conflict Resolution in Switzerland*. University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1974, 312 pp., $12.95.

I

THE books that are the subject of this review share three important characteristics.

1. They deal exclusively, or at least predominantly, with the political experiences of some smaller European countries which have traditionally been *terra incognita* on the map of comparative politics. Most writing in the field of comparative politics has centered either on the larger developed countries or on the developing states in the Third World. The Scandinavian and Benelux countries, Austria, and Switzerland have either been neglected or treated as isolated phenomena, mainly of folkloristic interest. As a category, they have been written off (with the exception of Austria) as "the sober parliamentary democracies," or as examples (listed with a note of surprise) of "working multi-party systems." In Gabriel Almond's famous typology they appeared as systems which combined certain features of what he called

* This review article was written when I was a Fellow at the new Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study in Wassenaar. It benefitted from a critical reading by S. N. Eisenstadt.

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the "Anglo-American type" on the one hand, and the "continental European system" on the other.[1] Paradoxically, the smaller developed countries of Europe therefore remained an underdeveloped area in political science.

2. These books are much more than simple studies of particular countries. In fact, the books by Huyse, Lijphart, and Steiner are, in Lijphart's words, "an extended theoretical argument based on a single case of particular significance to pluralist theory," without an attempt "to provide an exhaustive description of all facets of the political system" (p. 15, n. 43). Lehmbruch's study is more of a general essay; G. Bingham Powell chooses the narrow focus of a single Austrian city to administer a survey that seeks answers to major theoretical issues. These books therefore graphically reveal the superficiality of the view that configurative studies can contribute little to general theory—a vacuous assumption disproved convincingly earlier by Harry Eckstein in his study of Norway.[2]

3. These studies present a formidable challenge to existing typologies of democratic regimes, and to widely held beliefs on the conditions of effective and stable democratic rule. Against prevailing normative views, based mainly on American or British perspectives, they contrapose the model of what Lijphart has called "consociational democracy,"[3] or what Lehmbruch first termed *Proporzdemokratie* and later *Konkordanzdemokratie*.[4] Since 1967, when this concept was first developed independently by these two authors, an extensive body of theoretical writing has sprung up.[5] Jürg Steiner and Lucien Huyse have added their

[1] Gabriel A. Almond, "Comparative Political Studies," *Journal of Politics*, XVIII (August 1956), 391-409.

[2] Harry Eckstein, *Division and Cohesion in Democracy: A Study of Norway* (Princeton 1966); see esp. the preface, the introductory chapter, and the concluding chapter. See also Robert A. Dahl, ed., *Political Oppositions in Western Democracies* (New Haven 1966), which combines country studies with important theoretical argumentation by the editor. On the subject of the present review article, see also Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven 1971), chap. 7, "Subcultures, Cleavage Patterns, and Governmental Effectiveness."

[3] Arend Lijphart, "Typologies of Democratic Systems," *Comparative Political Studies*, I (April 1968), 3-44, and "Consociational Democracy," *World Politics*, XXI (January 1969), 207-25.

[4] Gerhard Lehmbruch, "Konkordanzdemokratie im Politischen System der Schweiz," *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, IX (December 1968), 443-59, esp. p. 449. A number of papers are brought together by Kenneth D. McRae in *Consociational Democracy: Political Accommodation in Segmented Societies*, The Carleton Library No. 79 (Toronto 1974), which also contains a number of articles discussing the relevance of the model to Canadian politics. See also Robert Presthus, *Elite Accommodation in Canadian Politics* (New York 1973), in which the author specifically acknowledges his indebtedness to Lijphart's theoretical work.

[5] This literature was first discussed in an international environment during the Brussels Congress of the International Political Science Association in September 1967, when Arend Lijphart presented his "Typologies . . ." (fn. 3), and Gerhard Lehm-

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intimate knowledge of their native Switzerland and Belgium, respectively, to Lijphart's analysis of the Netherlands and to Lehmbruch's comparative essay which was based mainly on Austrian and Swiss democracy. Lijphart and Nordlinger contributed to a further systematization of the theory. Lijphart's counter-typology has now acquired the *imprimatur* of the editors of the Little, Brown Series—Gabriel A. Almond, James S. Coleman, and Lucian W. Pye—who advertise Kurt Steiner's recent volume in that series, *Politics in Austria*, as showing "the Austrian republic's transformation from the 'centrifugal democracy' of the interwar period, to 'the consociational democracy' of the Great Coalition after World War II, to the current 'depoliticized democracy.' "[6]

These books should therefore not be read chiefly as studies of specific countries; those in search of detailed historical or institutional knowledge will occasionally find themselves disappointed. Instead, we are presented with sophisticated monographs that have much to offer, not only to specialists in comparative politics, but also to students of normative and empirical democratic theory and of political sociology, and even to those specialists in international relations who are interested in the interaction of domestic and international politics.

II

The model of consociational democracy starts from a familiar proposition in pluralist theory: that social cleavages are moderated if different cleavages cut across one another, but become loaded with conflict if they cumulatively reinforce one another. Societies that show the latter pattern are designated by a variety of terms, such as "vertical pluralism," "segmented pluralism," "social fragmentation," "ideological compartmentalization," or by a Dutch metaphor (often misspelled and practically always mispronounced), *verzuiling*—literally meaning pillarization. In Almond's view, the fragmented political culture and the poorly differentiated role structure of such systems make for an ideological style of politics, immobilism in policy making, and an erosion of demo-

bruch gave a paper on "A Non-Competitive Pattern of Conflict Management in Liberal Democracies: The Case of Switzerland, Austria, and Lebanon." A further discussion took place during the I.P.S.A. Round Table on Comparative Politics at Turin, September 1969, on the basis of an introductory report by Val R. Lorwin, "Segmented Pluralism: Ideological Cleavages and Political Cohesion in the Smaller European Democracies," a revised version of which appeared in *Comparative Politics*, III (January 1971), 141-57.

[6] See the Preface and the jacket of Kurt Steiner, *Politics in Austria* (Boston 1972). Also see section IV of this article.

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cratic legitimacy and stability. In an extreme form there would be such a hardening of cleavage lines that civil war is likely to erupt, as indeed happened in the case of the Austrian *Lager* in 1934. I first experienced the full force of this argument when a leading American political scientist confronted me with the statement: "You know, your country theoretically cannot exist." A sense of bewilderment lies at the bottom of the literature under review. Basically, the authors seek to explain what at first sight seems to be the paradox of coexistence of strong subcultural divisions with democratic stability. Pared to its essentials, their argument runs as follows:

1. Strongly divided societies can be stabilized by a conscious effort on the part of political elites, provided they deliberately seek to counteract the immobilizing and destabilizing effects of cultural fragmentation. Patterns of inter-elite accommodation therefore form an independent variable that may impede and reverse the centrifugal forces at the level of the masses.

2. In order to be successful in these efforts, elites must consciously eschew the competitive practices which underlie the norms of British-style democracy. Instead, they must regulate political life by forming some kind of elite cartel.

3. Elites must therefore drop the assumption of simple majority rule. They must rely instead on forms of proportional representation in which no single actor acquires an independent mandate. In segmented societies, "rational" theories of coalition behavior therefore do not hold. The characteristic form of politics is that of grand coalitions in which all major segmental groups share and find security.

4. Governmental power must be narrowly circumscribed, so as to allow subcultural groups considerable autonomy in arranging their own affairs. Mutual vetoes and concurrent majorities are vital in matters that might affect values which are of overriding importance to any or all of the subgroups in the society.

5. Consociational democracy therefore tends to show a curious mixture of ideological intransigence on the one hand and pragmatic political bargaining on the other. Separatism makes for a dogmatic, expressive style of politics within ideological families. But relations among subcultures are settled by a process of careful and businesslike adjustments.

6. To prevent the stagnation brought on by ideological immobilism, such societies must develop procedures of purposive depoliticization. Preferably, matters must be treated in technocratic terms so as to prevent them from catching ideological fire. That can be done most easily by

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a process of bargaining behind closed doors. Carefully articulated compromises can then be offered as the only possible solution which can find acceptance by all.

7. Such politics inevitably reduce the importance of elections and even of the direct accountability of leaders. Elections are conducted in strong ideological terms. Since political groups cater above all to their own particular ideological clienteles, elections result in little real change. Elite groups therefore remain largely insulated from direct political upsets. And they need this insulation to work out the careful compromises that serve to stabilize highly divided societies.

8. Autonomous elite politics therefore presuppose that the electorate on the whole play a rather passive role—as both a condition for and a consequence of stable politics in divided societies. At least two of the authors (Jürg Steiner and Lucien Huyse), first came to the subject of consociationalism by way of empirical studies of political participation, which revealed a low degree of political participation combined with a substantial belief in the legitimacy of the existing political system.[7]

9. Successful consociational democracy tends to have an extensive network of functional organizations within ideological families, which allows a means of controlled representation for special interests. The prevalence of myriad ideological organizations is therefore not necessarily a sign of impending battle. Rather, it provides the organizational infrastructure on which elites can operate in an atmosphere of discretionary freedom, coupled with a fair guarantee of consensus. In the view of some authors, such ideologically separate groups also help to minimize opportunities of conflict: "good social fences," in Lijphart's words, "may make good political neighbors." (See his article in *World Politics* [fn. 3], p. 219.)

This schematic representation inevitably neglects many nuances in the analyses found in these books. Moreover, the authors have moved beyond such general statements. Powell and Steiner present original survey work. Lijphart has used secondary analyses of survey material to test the relative importance of religion and class as dividing lines.[8] Lehmbruch has published a series of review articles on the literature of individual countries included in the typology;[9] he has scrutinized the

[7] Lucien Huyse, *De Niet-aanwezige Staatsburger* (Antwerp 1969), also published in a French edition, *L'Apathie politique—étude sociologique* (Antwerp-Brussels 1969); Jürg Steiner, *Bürger und Politik* (Meisenheim 1969).

[8] Lijphart, "Class Voting and Religious Voting in the European Democracies: A Preliminary Report," *Acta Politica*, VI (April 1971), 158-71; also published in a revised version as Strathclyde Occasional Paper No. 8 (Glasgow 1971).

[9] Lehmbruch (fn. 4), and "Das politische System Oesterreichs in vergleichender Perspektive," *Oesterreichische Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht*, XXII (1971), 35-56.

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normative debates on electoral reform and the functioning of political parties and coalitions.[10] Lijphart is extending his work by treating Northern Ireland, Canadian linguistic controversy, and the possible applicability of the model of consociational democracy to the new states. Steiner, more than other authors, includes sketches of actual policy-making processes. The authors have commented on one another's work, moreover, so that one can indeed begin to speak of an incipient school.

The fertility of theoretical debate and the impressive array of arguments derived from the political experience of a number of polities constitute impressive testimony to the internationalization of the discipline. The books under review are, after all, the work of a German with close knowledge of Austria and Switzerland (Lehmbruch); a Dutchman who received his doctorate from Yale and studied and taught in the United States for twelve years before he returned to the Netherlands to take up a chair at Leiden University (Lijphart); a Swiss who received a doctorate in Mannheim and is now Professor of Political Science at the University of North Carolina (Steiner); an American who has been closely associated with Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba in projects on comparative politics and whose present book is based on original fieldwork in Austria (Bingham Powell); and a Belgian who worked in Oxford for some time and whose book is perhaps the fullest theoretical critique yet published of the literature of the other writers (Lucien Huyse, whose perceptive analyses may be compared with the theoretical essay of Nordlinger, but whose work is, alas, less readily accessible for linguistic reasons).

III

The typological coining of the model of consociational democracy constitutes a major contribution to the literature. It widens our understanding of the variegated possibilities of effective democratic rule, and undermines the assumptions of dichotomous models based implicitly or explicitly on the contrast between Britain and the United States on the one hand and Weimar Germany, the French Third and Fourth Republics, and Italy on the other. But it does *not* answer the vitally important question why and how such consociational systems developed.

[10] Lembruch, "Strukturen ideologischer Konflikte bei Parteienwettbewerb," in *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, x (September 1969), 285-313; also "Die Wahlreform als sozialtechnologisches Programm," in Lehmbruch and others, *Demokratisches System und politische Praxis der Bundesrepublik*, Festschrift für Theodor Eschenburg (Munich 1971), 174-201, and "The Ambiguous Coalition in West Germany," *Government and Opposition*, III (Spring 1968), 181-204. See also Jürg Steiner, "The Principles of Majority and Proportionality," *British Journal of Political Science*, I (January 1971), 63-70.

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From the literature under review one may derive at least five different lines of argument.

1. CONSOCIATIONALISM AS THE PRIVILEGE OF SMALL STATES

A first trend of thought regards consociationalism as typical of the politics of smaller states. Practically all writers single out external threats as a major reason why political elites draw together and deliberately submerge their differences for the sake of the larger interest of preserving the independence of the system.[11] The proposition seems plausible, but it is analyzed in little depth. Different interpretations are in fact possible.

(A) One possible argument stresses the importance of imposed neutrality: Switzerland, Belgium, the Netherlands, and more recently Austria, have all had neutrality forced upon them at one time by agreement (explicit or implicit) of the surrounding foreign powers. In this view, the possibility that smaller states might jeopardize international peace by internal conflicts would not be tolerated by the big powers. Consociationalism was therefore, so to speak, thrust upon them.

(B) A somewhat similar argument emphasizes anticipatory self-restraint rather than foreign imposition: elites in smaller states who are conscious of the precarious situation of their country might decide to lower the temperature of internal strife so as not to give cause to one power or another to intervene in such internal quarrels. Political elites, in this view, are well aware of the grave dangers to their society from the interaction of internal and external conflicts, and deliberately move to reduce the first in order to lessen the threats of the second.

(C) A third view runs counter to this argument to some extent. Instead of stressing the overbearing load which a combination of foreign threats and internal conflicts may pose, small states are assumed to carry a comparatively low load in international politics. This position is rather similar to older arguments put forward in the 1930's by writers like Ferdinand Hermens and Carl J. Friedrich, to the effect that institutions fragmenting political authority (such as coalition governments, proportional representation, or a low level of bureaucratic development) were luxuries which small nations might be able to afford, but not states which carried a larger responsibility in international affairs.

(D) Yet another opinion holds that the relatively more exposed and open international position of smaller states would make their leaders aware that many decisions cannot in fact be taken within the confines

[11] See in particular Lehmbruch, "Kondordanzdemokratien im internationalen System," *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, X (1969), Sonderheft 1, 139-63.

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of the nation-state; *ceteris paribus*, they would therefore be more sensitive to the need to leave specific sectors alone. A sense of self-restraint would be nourished, and the number of sites in which decisions are taken more or less autonomously would multiply.[12]

This short review suggests that more work must be done to study the interaction of internal and external conflicts. In particular, one should investigate the issue whether (or under what conditions) an increase of external pressure aggravates or lessens domestic conflicts. Comparative studies of this problem in the consociational states and other smaller countries should answer the question whether we are faced with a general property of small states or with phenomena that are particular to consociational societies. Before one concedes the view that consociationalism can only flourish in small states, one should study cases in which small states did *not* handle their external policies successfully, and contemplate the question whether an active stance in international politics by larger states (with all its consequences for internal politics) is a matter of inescapable fate or of political choice.

The indefinite state of the argument on matters such as these is evident also in the ambiguous treatment of the importance of nationalism among the writers under review. There is a tendency to de-emphasize the importance of nationalism and national identity as an independent explanatory factor. One even finds the statement that a strong sense of nationality might jeopardize the carefully worked-out internal balances which a consociational system allows. Further empirical study of this intricate problem is necessary. One should analyze in greater detail, for instance, under what conditions and to what degree loyalties to subcultural groups and to the state are compatible with one another. The older literature on "subjective" versus "objective" views of nationality might be helpful for a better insight into this problem.[13]

2. CONSOCIATIONALISM AS A "SELF-DENYING HYPOTHESIS"

A second explanation of the rise of consociational democracy is put forward with great force by Arend Lijphart, who speaks of consociationalism as "a self-denying hypothesis." This argument grants the supposition of the explosive potential of a society in which cleavages reinforce rather than cut across one another. But, Lijphart argues, as

[12] A comparative project on the problems of small modern states in which special emphasis is given to the impact of foreign factors is under way at the Hebrew University and the Jerusalem Planning Group at the initiative of S. N. Eisenstadt and others.

[13] See, for instance, C. A. Macartney, *National States and National Minorities* (London 1934); and Alfred Cobban, *National Self-Determination* (London 1945).

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they become aware of this peril, elites may move to neutralize the effect of such divisions by establishing a network of overarching cooperation among themselves. This argument places heavy demands on elite groups, not only in their relation with one another, but also with their followers. In particular, there may be a severe strain on their relation with those secondary leadership groups (Val Lorwin once dubbed them *Lumpenelites*) who may have every incentive to mobilize sectional groups against their own top leaders by fanning hostile ideological sentiments within individual subcultures. This theory puts considerable emphasis on the specific circumstances and conditions that allow elites at a particular moment to work out some kind of lasting compact. Among the factors referred to in the writings of Huyse, Lijphart, and Nordlinger are the following: external threats; a relatively low load on decision-making processes; the existence of a clear balance of power among subgroups in a country; political and economic stakes of all sections, and in particular of leading groups, in the political functioning of the system; a low degree of mobilization and/or a high degree of encapsulation of the masses; and above all, an awareness of clear and present dangers to the system as a whole. Paradoxically, this trend of thought combines a somewhat deterministic belief in the explosive potential of social cleavages and in the ability of autonomous elite groups to thwart their effect. It would seem to offer a better explanation of cases in which a viable state was reconstructed *after* an actual explosion (as in Austria after 1945) than of societies in which conflicts never reached such heights (as in Switzerland or the Netherlands).

3. CONSOCIATIONALISM AND THE SPECIFIC NATURE OF CLEAVAGES

A third trend of reasoning concentrates more on the nature of the cleavages than on autonomous elite behavior. This body of thought may be further classified into a mechanistic and a qualitative version.

The mechanistic version seeks an explanation in the ways and frequencies in which cleavages intersect one another. Thus, it makes a considerable difference whether one subculture has any chance of obtaining an independent majority, whether two camps roughly balance one another out in equal strength, whether there is a multiple balance of power between three or more segments, or whether one can indeed speak of a fragmented political culture in the sense that there are a large number of clearly distinguishable groups. The major differences between Austria and Switzerland, for instance, as Lehmbruch and Steiner convincingly show, lie in the much greater number of groups, subcultures, and parties and the much more variegated or-

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ganizational structure of Switzerland as compared to Austria. In view of the many groups and the large number of crosscutting social differences (in addition to the low degree of exclusive identification with any particular subgroup) in Switzerland, one wonders whether Steiner's characterization of Switzerland as "segmented pluralism" and Bingham Powell's description of Austria as "social fragmentation" are not etymological misnomers; it might be more appropriate to reverse these labels.

A second mechanistic argument lies in the attempt to prove that in most of the countries under consideration there are a large number of crosscutting cleavages. These may be found in relation to actual groups or, more likely, in relation to reference groups, or potential groups in the sense of Arthur Bentley and David Truman. An unclear point in these arguments is, however, whether such crosscutting cleavages operate primarily on the elite level or on the mass level. Lehmbruch argues that in Austria the elites are more likely to be ideologically motivated than the masses; the latter have more diffuse ideological positions. Lijphart's version of the consociational model, on the other hand, would seem to emphasize the moderating effects of elite linkages on the potential (but organizationally controlled) ideological separatism of the masses. Nordlinger presents some major objections to using the hypothesis of crosspressures by itself:

> There are thus four reasons for not using the crosspressures hypothesis to explain conflict regulation: 1) it is not especially plausible, given the limited, weak, and indirect supporting evidence; 2) two necessary conditions—the nearly equal salience of crosscutting divisions and their simultaneous triggering—have been omitted from the explanatory variable, and, if included, they would drastically restrict the hypothesis' applicability; 3) since the vast majority of deeply divided societies manifest only the mutually reinforcing pattern the hypothesis' applicability is further restricted in its applicability to the regulation of severe conflicts; and 4) there is reason to doubt the presence of a correlation between crosscutting divisions and successful conflict regulation (p. 100).

A more promising line of argument may be the one that centers on the qualitative differences of specific cleavages. Somewhat surprisingly (in view of the overwhelming and almost determinative importance ascribed to the existence of divisive cleavages), there is in this literature little systematic reflection on whether particular cleavages are more likely to lead to conflict or accommodation than others. This is perhaps an unfortunate consequence of the loose usage of the term "cleavages," which is held to refer indiscriminately to matters of class, status, region, religion, language, race, and so forth—a tendency en-

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hanced by ambiguous expressions such as "communal" or "ethnic" divisions.

In addition, as Lucien Huyse shows with great finesse, there is the danger of regarding divisions in society as static properties. Instead, one should pay attention to the hierarchy of cleavages, and to their successive replacement by one another in a process of dynamic change (depending on elite behavior and the solution or non-solution of particular conflicts). The Belgian case, with its combination of divisions of class, religion, and language—all apt to acquire political content—offers an interesting arena for such a study. Even more fascinating would be a study comparing Belgium and Switzerland; in the latter country, similar divisions are present in even greater variety and flexibility, but are causing far less political controversy.

A further reason for investigating the nature of specific cleavages more closely is the circumstance that seemingly insoluble conflicts may sometimes be successfully regulated through package deals in which different groups receive different favors. Both Lehmbruch and Steiner offer interesting glimpses of the importance of such political deals: the literature is full of terms like "pacification," "accommodation," "entering compacts," "*litizieren*," and "*junktimieren*." Such practices offer interesting material to students of political decision making. They should also be of interest to students of comparative political recruitment and political leadership, as these seem to demand a special kind of politician.

4. CONSOCIATIONALISM AND THE DEGREE OF POLITICIZATION OF SOCIAL DIVISIONS

A fourth line of thought focuses on the degree of intensity of particular cleavages. This is perhaps the most neglected variable in the books under review. All too often, authors assume without detailed political analysis that social divisions are automatically translated into political conflicts. This point is noted by Nordlinger, who criticizes Steiner and Lijphart for confusing the regulation of intense conflict with the continuity of conflict-regulating outcomes. He writes of Steiner:

> The author claims to be explaining that society's [Switzerland's] success in regulating its intense religious and linguistic conflicts. Yet, the linguistic conflict never became intense, the intense religious conflict was regulated in the nineteenth century, and [the author] deals almost exclusively with contemporary Swiss social and political patterns. . . . Similarly, in Lijphart's study of Dutch politics, the conflict-regulating explanations refer almost exclusively to the post-1945 period, whereas the severe religious and class conflicts were regulated at the beginning of the twentieth century (p. 15).

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Nordlinger distinguishes analytically between (a) social differences; (b) segmental divisions or segments that develop when groups of persons become subjectively aware of their similarity and value that similarity positively; (c) conflict groups that develop when a significant number of individuals believe that their segment's social identity, cultural values, or material interests conflict with the segmental attachments of other individuals, and are inspired to political efforts designed to influence the conflict's outcome; and (d) conflict organizations that are structured relationships among members of conflict groups devoted wholly or in part to the struggle with an opposing conflict group. In the rest of his study Nordlinger devotes little attention, alas, to the ways in which social differences give rise to conflict behavior, and even lapses into a tautological phrase: "If segments take on a high degree of political salience, as they invariably do in deeply divided societies, they will form the bases of *conflict groups*" (p. 7).

The force of the canons of sociological pluralism is evident in the fact, therefore, that even their critics remain hostage to them. There is little analysis of the vital issue of which forces make for what degree of politicization (or non-politicization) of what dividing lines. Nor does one find that much attention is given to the question of how the earlier politicization of one particular cleavage line affects the exploitation of other cleavage lines, or how, historically, particular cleavages have superseded or become superimposed on one another.

The neglect of these questions may perhaps be explained by two factors; first, what might be termed the coding tautology, and, second, a lack of historical depth. In comparative research, variables of social background are often more easily collected than attitudinal variables. If they show certain skewed distributions, such demographic variables are often assumed to be of attitudinal importance, with little investigation of the degree to which this is actually true. Lack of detailed historical knowledge leads analysts to single out particular cases of accommodation which are not posed against a background of longer time-perspectives. Perhaps one should, therefore (Nordlinger's counsel notwithstanding), focus after all on persisting regulatory processes rather than on incidents of *ad hoc* accommodation?

5. CONSOCIATIONALISM AND ELITE BEHAVIOR: CAUSE OR CONSEQUENCE?

A fifth view gives rise to the suggestion that the relation between cleavages and elite behavior should conceivably be reversed: rather than seeing accommodationist practices as an elite response to threatening political divisions, one might argue that earlier consociational practices facilitate the accommodation of new emerging cleavages.

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This point may be illustrated by differing interpretations of the Dutch case. In Arend Lijphart's perspective, differences of class and religion threatened to pyramid to such an extent in the Netherlands that, by 1910, there was a real danger to the stability of the system. The elites then acted to forestall the breakup of society by agreeing to submerge their differences, and in 1917 acceded to a package deal in which demands for religious schools, general suffrage, and proportional representation were granted in one great compromise. Consociationalism, then, was an answer to the perils of a real split.

In contrast, one might argue that accommodationist styles developed in the Netherlands in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries.[14] The absence of a central executive in a confederal state nurtured the development of an accommodationist elite culture in transactions within collegial city councils, among cities, and among provinces. Did not Althusius coin the word "consociationes" in the early seventeenth century to characterize that very process? For this reason, the elites were never internally homogeneous, but at the same time they were very adept at accommodating new groups when a slow process of democratization began to develop. In this reading of Dutch history, Calvinists, Catholics, and Socialists never developed the threatening militancy that Lijphart ascribes to them. By 1910 none of these movements (with the possible exception of the Calvinists, who by that time had already secured safe cabinet positions) had a well-organized mass base. The great Pacification of 1917 was therefore not a response to Dutch *verzuiling*, but in many ways its prelude. Only after 1917 did the various Dutch groups develop their strong networks of subcultural interest organizations. Although such organizations were conducive towards isolating Dutchmen of different ideological origins, none of these segments ever was an effective threat to the Dutch state as such. Consociationalism in the Netherlands should therefore not be regarded as a response to the perils of subcultural splits (as Lijphart argues), but as the underlying reason why slowly developing subcultural divisions never did become perilous when social modernization led to mass mobilization.

If one assumes this point to be of wider relevance than a local dispute between two Leiden colleagues, a number of new questions will follow.

First, one should investigate the historical factors which may account for the development of that special type of political culture at the elite

[14] One should contrast Lijphart's analysis with Daalder, "The Netherlands: Opposition in a Segmented Society," in Dahl, *Political Oppositions* . . . (fn. 2), 188-220. See also Daalder, "On Building Consociational Nations: The Cases of the Netherlands and Switzerland," *International Social Science Journal*, XXIII, No. 3 (1971), 355-70.

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level that allowed the later peaceful transition to modern pluralism. None of the writers (with the exception of Lehmbruch and, in a more abstract fashion, Nordlinger) deals with historical conditioning factors of this kind in any detail. But one may glean certain interesting glimpses from their studies. Lehmbruch refers to the *amicabilis compositio* of the Peace of Westphalia between different religious groupings as one main source. In the Austrian case he attributes further importance to corporate representative traditions and to the deliberate attempt in the Hapsburg Empire to accommodate a large number of nationalities. Steiner emphasizes the importance of a merchant aristocracy in Swiss cities and cantons, as well as old practices of adjustment between different regions and religions in Switzerland. These facilitated the later transition to party proportionality in the Swiss collegial executive, as well as the compact between capital and labor in the 1930's, and above all, the non-politicization of linguistic lines. The low degree of centralization in these states is probably a major factor as political resources remained distributed over many sites. And, in cases where centralization did occur, it was of vital importance whether all segments of society obtained access to executive and bureaucratic positions or not. A corollary of these factors would be the persistence of long-standing pluralist traditions which militated against the individualist and majoritarian assumptions of popular sovereignty, and which allowed the evolutionary development of accountable government and the large number of social organizations which mediate between elites and masses in a modern society.

Second, one should attempt to disentangle more clearly the properties of consociationalism on the one hand and democracy on the other. Most of the books under review tend to take democracy for granted, and only seek to specify the particular features of the consociational subtype of general democracy. Yet, just as there may be democracies that are and others that are not consociational, so consociational societies need not be democratic, though some are. The term consociationalism was, after all, first applied by David Apter in the context of his work on emerging African countries.[15] It is also no accident that some of the authors (Nordlinger in particular, but also Lehmbruch and Steiner) use the general language of the literature on conflict regulation in addition to that of democratic theory. There would therefore seem to exist an imperative need for comparative study—of consociational systems (democratic or not), and of democratic systems (con-

[15] David Apter, *The Political Kingdom in Uganda: A Study in Bureaucratic Nationalism* (Princeton 1961), 24-25.

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sociational or not)—if one is to get a closer grip on the specific character of consociationalism on the one hand and democracy on the other, as a prelude to a fuller understanding of their interaction.

Third, the analytical distinction between consociationalism and democracy further raises the important question to what degree a consociational democracy can be the result of choice on the part of particular elites (as is implicit in Lijphart's "self-denying hypothesis"). Or should it be regarded more as the product of an older pluralist inheritance? A comparative study of the four European consociational systems under consideration would probably reveal a continuum in which post-1945 Austria would be placed on one end, and the Netherlands and Switzerland on the other, with Belgium in an intermediate position. But a more careful elaboration of the particular factors at work in each case would seem necessary before the model of consociational democracy is extended to the new states generally (as Lijphart and Nordlinger explicitly suggest). If consociationalism presupposes the earlier existence of a special elite culture rather than intelligent choice by particular elites at a critical juncture of a nation's history, its transfer to other societies is likely to meet with greater difficulty. Many of the new states do have old pluralist traditions. But do not most of their present-day elites tend to regard such traditions as obstacles to modernization rather than as a vital inheritance to be preserved in the development of a new pluralist democracy?

IV

Ironically, the consociational model is coming under considerable stress at the very moment at which it is belatedly being recognized on the map of comparative politics. In at least three of the four states treated in the literature under review, recent developments are undermining the neatness of existing structures. In the Netherlands, *verzuiling* is rapidly breaking down, and so are the parties which are most closely associated with it. In Austria, the rigor of the *Lager* is also declining, and the grand coalition once thought vital to guarantee the persistence of the state has given way to single-party cabinets. In Belgium, linguistic controversies and centrifugal forces generally are threatening the traditional balance of the *familles spirituelles* of Catholics, Socialists, and Liberals, without as yet providing for a new organizational infrastructure to channel these new divisions. Switzerland shows perhaps the fewest changes; but politics in that country have traditionally been so flexible that one wonders whether it ever really fitted the con-

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sociational model: although it might have certain consociational practices at the elite level, it never had the tightness of segmented organizations which the model stipulates.

Do these stresses make the model a matter of the past? Should one conclude that its somewhat static quality makes it of little help in accounting for future developments, just as its main weakness lies in its lack of clarity about the reasons for its genesis? Paradoxically, this need not be so. For the very clarity of the model makes it possible to explain why it is now experiencing such obvious strains.

Perhaps Lijphart's parsimonious analysis is most suggestive here.[16] He divides political systems along two dimensions, one axis being the one of fragmented versus homogeneous political culture, and the other that of coalescent versus competitive elite behavior. He thereby distinguishes four forms: that of *centripetal democracy* where political culture is homogeneous and elite behavior competitive; that of its logical opposite, *consociational democracy* where political culture is fragmented and elite behavior coalescent; that of *centrifugal democracy* where political culture remains fragmented and elite behavior is competitive; and that of *depoliticized democracy* where elite behavior remains coalescent while political culture becomes homogeneous. Movements of systems in one or the other direction along these axes would then determine their main future properties.

One may also investigate to what degree particular features of consociational democracies are breaking down. What about the erosion of strong segmentation? To what extent do elites begin to reject the assumptions of cartel accommodation? Do the systems still respect the principle of mutual vetoes, and do they cling to grand coalitions in preference to simple majority rule? To what extent are we witnessing the end of ideology, and with it the disappearance of the peculiar accommodational styles of depoliticized bargaining behind closed doors which seemed to be the paradoxical corollary of ideological segmentation? What about the effect of elections that have become more unsettling to elite positions as voters have become more independent? To what degree is proportional representation—which for two generations or more ensured stability by guaranteeing entrenched ideological positions—now becoming a source of political fragmentation? How do linkages between elites and masses develop now that former organizational links are breaking down? How do elites behave when they are

[16] See Lijphart, "Typologies . . ." (fn. 3), and his more detailed analysis of changes in Dutch politics in "Kentering in de Nederlandse Politiek," *Acta Politica*, IV, No. 3 (1968-69), 231-47.

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suddenly faced with direct mass pressures? The neatness of the model of consociational democracy provides an interesting measuring rod for the study of its demise.

At the same time, however, the model seems to some extent to be in danger of being overworked. It was developed as a deliberate countermodel to the Anglo-American type of democracy, and it should make its mark as such. But it should not be reïfied: common dissimilarity from other types does not necessarily prove similarity. Future work should therefore systematically explore the differences as well as the common traits of systems subsumed under the label of consociational democracy. As a control, one should also compare these countries with other small European democracies which may have fewer social divisions, but which may be similar in other respects (for instance, in their institutional structure, or in the specific impact which foreign factors exercise on internal politics). It will be necessary to incorporate these countries in the general literature of comparative development, so as to answer questions on the origin of consociational practices and the way in which different cleavages became or did not become politicized in successive waves of democratization.[17] The literature on consociational democracy—like other writings on democracy—runs the danger of aprioristic normative notions. These should be spelled out in greater detail, and impressionistic evaluations of the democratic quality of particular states should be tested in studies of actual political performance. Only then can one speak with any conviction of their relative record in comparison to other political systems. Finally, one should watch contemporary and future developments. For if it is true that these systems are more affected by particular historical factors than the neatness of the model implies, their present political properties must also influence the way in which they meet the many changes of the contemporary political scene.

For the time being, however, one should be grateful for the very substantial contributions which these books make, each in its different way. There is great intellectual clarity in Lijphart and in Huyse. There is subtle and studious wisdom in Lehmbruch. There are many perceptive remarks in Powell and in Steiner, although neither is free from a certain naiveté. Nordlinger's study presents a courageous attempt to grapple with theoretical issues on a comparative basis. It lacks the advantage of detailed first-hand knowledge of the countries on which he

[17] Although Stein Rokkan wrote a preface to Jürg Steiner's book on Switzerland, there is little evidence so far that the work on the consociational democracy model is being integrated with Rokkan's important work on comparative European development generally; cf. esp. Rokkan, *Citizens, Elections, Parties* (Oslo 1970), *passim*.

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bases his theoretical reasoning; this sometimes gives his arguments a somewhat arid quality. This reader must therefore confess to a preference for the earlier genre of the "theoretical country-study." Is the present state of comparative politics not such that a book by a specialist on one country, with a thorough theoretical grounding, is likely to make better reading than the work of the generalist who inevitably must construe his propositions mainly on the basis of secondary sources?

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Note from the Editors

The editors of *World Politics* wish to call attention to the fact that they have received separate communications from Samuel P. Huntington and Leonard Binder, and a joint letter from Lucian W. Pye, Myron Weiner, Sidney Verba, Joseph LaPalombara, and Leonard Binder, alleging misinterpretations of their views in Mark Kesselman's review article. "Order or Movement? The Literature of Political Development as Ideology" (Vol. xxvi, October 1973, 139-54). This article discussed Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (1968), and Binder *et al., Crises and Sequences in Political Development* (1971). Although *World Politics* does not publish letters to the editors, the common practice of informing the author about the receipt of communications concerning his article was followed.

When confronted with Huntington's objections to one page, as an example, of Kesselman's review, the latter acknowledged that he had incorrectly stated Huntington's position when he wrote (p. 148), "Under the rubric of social mobilization, Huntington lumps together such diverse processes as literacy, urbanization, economic growth, and demands for political participation." This passage did not recognize Huntington's theses that modernization is a product of both social mobilization and economic development, and that mobilization should be distinguished from modernization.

The editors have also received a communication from James C. Scott regarding a misunderstanding: Scott, who was quoted by Kesselman (p. 148), states that he wishes to apologize to Huntington and to take responsibility for any misunderstanding that may have arisen from the quotation, made with his permission. He was using quotation marks to express a characterization of Huntington's argument and was not directly citing Huntington's work.

The editors call attention to the notice carried on the inside front page of the journal: "Statements of fact and opinion appearing in *World Politics* are made on the responsibility of the authors alone and do not imply the endorsement of the editors or publishers."

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